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Abstract
There has been a tendency in the forest policy arena to concentrate on top-down 
managerial and technical aspects of forest management in order to ensure long term 
supplies of timber and, to a lesser extent, conservation of biodiversity. By analysing the 
political dimensions of property rights, these approaches to forest management can be 
understood to mask the fact that forests are often contested domains, with local forest 
communities’ rights and aspirations often at odds with the dominant 
production/protection regime.
The thesis thus analyses the property rights assumptions of the dominant forest 
management regime in relation to forest communities’ rights and access to forest 
resources, and analyses how and why property rights institutions are chosen and how 
they evolve over time. By defining property rights as political institutions establishing 
reciprocal relationships between social actors in relation to forests, issues of power, 
exclusion and competing rights claims become the central focus of analysis.
An analytical framework based on institutional theory is adopted to explore the complex 
political processes that shape evolving property rights institutions. Institutional theory 
identifies key factors that act as constraints or incentives to institutional choice and 
change: distributional conflict; asymmetries in power between bargaining parties; the 
role of ideology; and historical path dependence. The thesis analyses data from two case 
studies, the Solomon Islands and British Columbia, Canada, in order to investigate these 
factors in an empirical setting. The findings suggest that the analytical factors provide a 
useful means of comparative analysis and help explain the dynamic political processes 
surrounding property rights institutions and forest management in each case, not only in 
terms of how the institutions were established but also how change has been constrained 
or mediated over time.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
1.1 Context for the research
This thesis is concerned with exploring the property rights dimensions of forest 
management and control, within the context of forests as contested domains. The 
research topic arose as a result of the author’s experience of forest policy processes at a 
global and national level. These appeared to lack informed input regarding the 
implications of forest policies for local forest communities, whereas practical 
experience suggested that the policies themselves often had significant impacts on local 
forest communities’ lives. In order to investigate the nature of the connections between 
these two levels of analysis, the thesis explores how the prevailing policy approach to 
forest management, referred to as the “forest management regime”, finds expression in 
property rights institutions that mediate relationships between social actors in regard to 
the forest resource. The focus is on forest management and the allocation of forest 
resources as a political process. By adopting a theoretical framework for analysing the 
political dimensions of property rights, this thesis firstly aims to explore the implicit 
property rights assumptions of the dominant forest management regime, particularly in 
relation to forest communities’ rights and access to forest resources. The second aim of 
the thesis moves beyond a critique of the prevailing property rights assumptions of 
forest management to analyse how and why property rights institutions are chosen and 
how they evolve over time, within the context of forests as contested domains. It 
therefore seeks to analyse property rights institutions as social relations that are shaped 
by complex and dynamic processes that constrain or facilitate institutional choice and 
change.
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This chapter discusses the prevailing approaches to forest management, which tend to 
concentrate on top-down managerial and technical aspects of forest management in 
order to ensure long term supplies of timber and, to a lesser extent, conservation of 
biodiversity. The implicit property rights assumptions regarding forests and the 
allocation of rights to use forests are discussed and data is presented on the way these 
property rights assumptions are reflected in actual global forest ownership patterns. The 
chapter then summarises the focus of the thesis, presenting a synopsis of the remaining 
chapters.
1.2 Prevailing approaches to forest management
As popular understanding of the environmental importance of forests has grown, so 
have calls for their protection. Natural forests contain the most significant terrestrial 
ecosystems on the planet. It is estimated that forests originally covered 50% and now 
cover around 30% of the world’s land area (FAO, 2001a). Whilst there are a number of 
different forest ecosystem types according to biogeographic regions, such as temperate 
forests, boreal forests, tropical dry forests and tropical moist forests, all natural forests 
provide a broad range of environmental goods and services. They regulate global and 
local climates, stabilise soils, protect and regulate the hydrological cycle, contain the 
bulk of terrestrial biodiversity, provide wildlife habitat and a range of timber and non­
timber products, see figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1 Environmental goods and services provided by natural forests
Environmental goods Environmental services
Timber for construction 
Fuel wood
Non-timber forest products 
Rattan 
Cork 
Resins
Medicinal plants
Fruit
Nuts
Game
Biodiversity storehouse
Wildlife habitat
Hydrological cycle regulation 
Climate regulation -  macro and micro 
levels
Soil quality and stabilization
Shelter
The 1980s saw the emergence of a popular global concern about the fate of the world’s 
forests, in particular tropical rainforests. This was the decade when satellite imagery 
showed the Amazon burning; when the deforestation rates in the tropics became of 
international concern; when the importance of tropical rainforests as storehouses of 
biodiversity was described by scientists and when environmental NGOs first organised 
high profile campaigns to boycott tropical timber products. All of these served to 
highlight the fragility of rainforest ecosystems and the fact that the future of the world’s 
forests was under threat unless the global community took action.
However, forests are not only of environmental significance, they also play an 
important role in social and economic development. Human interaction with forests has 
occurred for thousands of years, with timber providing the principal source of fuel and
♦ tV i • •building materials globally, until the middle of the 19 century and the increasing use of 
fossil fuels (Perlin, 1989). They are also sources of non-timber forest products such as 
nuts, fruit, honey, latex, rattan, medicinal plants and game. In the 21st century, forests
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continue to provide the principal means of fuel and construction for the majority of the 
world’s population, and millions depend directly on timber and non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) for their survival. The World Bank estimates that forests, open 
woodland and agroforestry systems contribute directly to the livelihoods of 90% of the
1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty; that 60 million people, mainly indigenous 
and tribal groups, are almost wholly dependent on natural forests; and that 350 million 
people live in or next to natural forests and depend almost entirely on forest resources 
for income and subsistence (World Bank, 2003).
The importance of forests has been recognised by those in political power for centuries, 
from the ancient Greeks to contemporary nation states around the world, and thus 
control of forests and access to forest resources have long been strategically significant 
politically as well as being a primary source of livelihoods for forest dwellers (Perlin, 
1989). In particular, industrial timber production has been of immense economic and 
political importance over the centuries. Just over half of all wood harvested in the world 
is used as firewood, whilst the rest is used for industrial purposes, see Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 Volumes of wood used as fuel wood and industrial wood, 1991-1995
World roundwood 
production
World fuel wood 
production
World industrial wood 
production
000 cu m 000 cu m % 000 cu m %
1991 3388692 1821801 54 1566891 46
1992 3329138 1843467 55 1482332 45
1993 3335373 1858662 56 1476711 44
1994 3375882 1893550 56 1482332 44
1995 3411044 1922611 56 1488433 44
Source: FAO (1997)
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Trees for fuel wood are rarely the same as trees for industrial wood production, with the 
bulk of fuel wood being sourced close to population centres, whilst timber tends to be 
commercially extracted in more remote areas, and therefore the two are rarely 
competing for resources (Sedjo and Lyon, 1990). There is increasing recognition of the 
role that non-timber forest products play in the social and economic lives of forest- 
dependent people, and these provide important subsistence and revenue sources from 
local and national markets (Repetto and Gillis, 1988; Peters, Gentry and Mendelsohn, 
1989). Notwithstanding the importance of fuelwood and NTFPs to forest-dependent 
people, it is timber that is the product which frequently attracts most international 
attention, being a significant contributor to the global economy and international trade. 
Production of timber and manufactured timber products are estimated to contribute 
more than US$450 billion to the world market economy each year, with the annual 
value of internationally traded forest products being between US$150 and US$200 
billion (World Bank, 2003). As a result, forest management policies have evolved to 
focus primarily on timber production rather than on other goods and services.
Prevailing approaches to forest management are based on specific value systems 
regarding why and how forests are useful. Forest management in its broadest sense 
implies decision-making about the allocation and use of forest resources within a 
framework of clearly identified and agreed upon goals, in principle based upon sound 
ecological knowledge of the forest resource and an assessment of the needs of the 
majority of beneficiaries. In practice, decision-making regarding forest management is 
normally the jurisdiction of government departments, who generally operate within 
national government strategies.
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Forest management is considered to be important because forests are perceived to be 
scarce resources and therefore decisions need to be taken regarding the allocation and 
use of forest resources. Forest management is viewed as part of an overall national 
development strategy to maintain forests and obtain revenue from them. Given the 
economic importance of timber, both at national and international levels, the production 
of timber has thus become the primary focus of forest management policies and 
practices. There is broad acceptance in mainstream policy debates that timber harvesting 
is a way of ensuring forests are not cleared altogether, particularly if they are properly 
valued (World Bank, 2003; Pearce, 2001; Barbier et al, 1994). Timber harvesting takes 
place under institutional arrangements whereby the state (national or provincial, 
depending on jurisdiction) identifies areas of forest to be managed for timber production 
- usually as part of a Permanent Forest Estate. This is a nation’s forest endowment that 
is designated to be maintained as forest rather than being cleared for other purposes. It is 
usually subdivided into production and protection forests.
The basis for identification of production forests is those areas that contain valuable 
timber species that are accessible for harvest. In practice, the most accessible forest in 
terms of transport and topography is harvested first, such as forests around coastal areas. 
Thus, the timber industry has moved over decades from the most accessible to less 
accessible forest areas as the resource is mined of harvestable timber (Poore, 1989).
This is true in temperate forest areas of North America (Sedjo and Lyon, 1990) and the 
tropical rainforests such as those in Africa (Valeix, 1999) and South East Asia (Aiken 
and Leigh, 1992). Thus, in North America, timber production has shifted from East to 
West and from coastal to inland areas. In Africa, harvesting is shifting from coastal 
locations such as Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana, whose primary forests are virtually
12
exhausted, to the forests of Central Africa, such as Cameroon, Gabon and the Congos.
In South East Asia, Philippines and Thailand have become net importers of timber as 
their commercial primary forest resources have been exhausted and new sources of 
timber are being exploited in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
There has been a tendency in forest management research and the forest policy arena to 
concentrate on the managerial and technical aspects of forest management in order to 
ensure long-term supplies of timber and, to a lesser extent, conservation of biodiversity. 
Timber production has therefore been the domain of economic and silvicultural 
specialists, whilst conservation has been the domain of biologists, often specialising in 
ecology or wildlife. Thus, at the macro-level, forest management takes place within 
broad economic development strategies, with timber production being an important 
source of revenue to governments through royalties, stumpage fees, export and 
corporation taxes etc. At the forest stand level, decisions are often based on a mix of 
economic and silvicultural considerations that frame operations, such as which species 
to harvest, where to harvest, how to harvest, the nature of processing and the demands 
of the consumer.
The commercial production of timber has evolved to be the primary function of forest 
management policies: "The prime objective in forestry is to grow trees to produce 
timber, whatever the secondary objectives may be. The forest manager thus has to 
produce as much timber as possible, as quickly and economically as possible, within the 
various constraints imposed" (Williams, 1988:125). Because commercial timber 
production is the dominant goal of modem forestry, economics has become an 
important forestry management tool on two levels: firstly, within the broader sphere, to
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make choices between the various possible uses of scarce resources; secondly, within a 
more specific forestry context to make decisions on the appropriate mix of resources, 
labour and capital (Pearse, 1990). Thus economists aim on the one hand to allocate 
forest resources between competing claims in the most economically efficient manner 
(which can result in forest clearance, for example by conversion to agriculture) and on 
the other to maximise rents from timber extraction, calculate the optimum economic 
sustained yield of timber and other products, and help determine the size of the annual 
allowable cut, the age to which trees will be allowed to grow before cutting and the 
specific areas to be cut (Robinson, 1988).
Economic models are also used to predict global trends in the forestry sector, in order to 
identify or predict supply and demand changes that could have an impact on volumes 
and location of timber production, although this has proved to be an inexact science. A 
review of the forestry sector carried out at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis synthesised studies conducted into structural changes that could affect 
the global forestry sector, focusing on issues of demand, supply and international trade 
(Kallio, Dykstra and Binkley, 1987). The authors considered forest resources and timber 
supply, the forest industry, demand for forest products and international trade and they 
projected sharply rising prices as supplies became more limited due to declining 
availability of forest resources. Conversely, Sedjo and Lyon (1990), in their timber 
supply model, forecast modest price rises that would tail off as forest management 
practices were introduced to move from depleting old growth stock to managed 
secondary and plantation forests. Nagy (1988) argued that models based on demand and 
supply, prices, markets etc are of limited value because of the highly variable nature of
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real market forces and concluded that complexity of market conditions are difficult to 
simplify and generalise.
Economic analyses often refer to the importance of establishing long-term, secure 
tenure arrangements over forests, both as a means of combating deforestation 
(Panayotou and Sungsuwan, 1994) and in order to facilitate sustainable forestry 
practices (Barbier et al, 1994). In particular the security, length and size of the tenure 
are considered to be significant. Thus, the argument is often made for long-term, secure 
and sufficiently large concessions in order to provide economic incentives for forest 
management and sustainable timber production.
The other dominant managerial discipline applied to forestry has its roots in biological 
sciences, with silviculture and the analysis of forest dynamics being used to calculate 
sustained yields of timber, utilising data on growth and regeneration rates to determine 
felling practices and post-harvesting treatments. It assumes that if the right scientific 
analysis can be used to work out the maximum sustained yield of timber through 
harvesting and planting techniques, then tree crops can be managed on an on-going 
basis. Silvicultural systems are devised to manipulate the forest to favour certain species 
which are the "crop" or "stand" to be harvested, usually for timber (Whitmore, 1991; 
Matthews, 1989). Systems have been developed according to the amount of light 
required by the target species to regenerate, and so are based around the amount of gap 
left in the canopy. They range from the removal of all timber from the cutting area at 
one time (monocyclic or clearcutting) to selective systems where only certain trees are 
removed on a polycyclic basis in a continuing series of felling cycles (selective logging) 
(Robinson, 1988). Most tropical forestry management is based on the polycyclic 
method, with the selection of a relatively low number of target timber species, based on
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the assumption that natural regeneration will occur without too much intervention as 
long as enough seed trees are left to provide adequate seedlings to produce a second 
crop, usually being calculated as within a 20-30 year cycle (Johns, 1997). The 
monocyclic system is based on the clearance of commercial trees and other non-target 
species with the aim of creating an even-aged stand of commercially viable species.
Seed trees and seedling stocks are required to produce the crops. This is a longer 
rotation system, calculated at around 70 years (Johns 1997). The success of silviculture 
and harvesting methods depend on the extent to which they operate within the natural 
biological limits of the forest (Whitmore, 1991). Polycyclic methods are thus employed 
in forests where forest composition is heterogeneous and target species are spread 
amongst other species, such as tropical rainforests, whilst monocyclic methods are 
employed in forests with a more homogeneous composition, such as boreal forest 
systems. However, given that many timber species live to upwards of two hundred years 
and do not reproduce at an early age, some forest ecologists consider that even felling 
rotations of 40 to 50 years are not conducive to maintaining forest composition 
(Richards, 1996). For example, the moabi tree, which is an African hardwood highly 
valued by the commercial trade as well as having high value to local communities, only 
reproduces at around 70 years (Debroux, 1998). Data about forest composition and 
regeneration rates are rarely available, thus making accurate calculations about truly 
sustained yield harvesting difficult to achieve (Richards, 1996; D’Silva and Appanah, 
1993).
In summary, technical aspects of timber harvesting have become the single most 
important training for professional foresters. Technical analyses of the timber industry 
focus on timber supply models which link ecological information about forest growth to 
economics and markets (Binkley, 1987). The underlying assumption of forestry within a
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managerial and technical approach is that a large enough area of forest is available to be 
managed on an economically and biologically viable basis. The alliance between 
silviculture and economics, as practised by professional foresters and forest economists, 
is described as an uneasy one however, with foresters often blaming economists for not 
working within the biological limits of forests, whilst economists accuse foresters of not 
considering the wider economic considerations of society with regard to allocation of 
scarce resources in the most efficient manner (Pearse, 1990; Whitmore, 1991; 
Robinson, 1988).
A further aspect of natural forest management that has gained increasing importance 
since the 1980s, due to the much greater awareness of the ecological consequences of 
deforestation and forest degradation, is management to conserve non-timber goods and 
services, including recreation, aesthetics and environmental services, such as the 
preservation of biodiversity (see, for example, Grainger, 1993). These claims have 
primarily been met by the development of conservation policies, such as the 
establishment of national parks and reserves, which seek to preserve areas of forest in 
tact by prohibiting all, or some, human activities within their boundaries in order to 
protect the selected ecosystems from degradation or deforestation (Ghimire, 1991). It is 
now being increasingly argued that the range and extent of totally protected areas are 
not going to be sufficient to protect adequate areas of ecologically important forest. The 
development of buffer zones surrounding protected areas are being advocated, where 
sustainable forest management policies would allow for environmentally friendly 
activities (Blockhus et al, 1992). Also, conservation areas within timber management 
areas are being advocated, with the articulation of the need to integrate conservation 
into timber management regimes being one of the measures to increase sustainable 
forest management (Johns, 1997; Higman et al 1999).
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As the understanding of forest ecosystems has increased, the arguments for conserving 
representative ecosystems in protected areas has also increased. Forest ecosystems 
contain the bulk of terrestrial biodiversity and as such have been the focus of global 
conservation efforts. Approaches range in scale, from the macro- level of forest 
landscapes to the micro-level of forest stands (Hunter, 1999). The increasing 
understanding of biodiversity and forest ecology has led to a change in emphasis with 
regard to conservation. Forest reserves have often been located in areas with low 
economic value, for example mountainous zones where timber extraction would be 
uneconomic, thus ecological values have rarely taken precedence over economic values 
(Norton, 1999). However, with an increasing understanding of forest ecology and 
dynamics, the concept of representativeness has become increasingly important in 
identifying areas for conservation, whereby each protected area should contain the full 
range of ecological characteristics based on biogeographical studies and ecological 
surveys. Thus, the development of conservation policies are increasingly based on 
issues of scale and representativeness that apply either within concession management 
areas, or in the protection of forests within reserves that are gazetted by the state and in 
which human activities are largely forbidden. In considering forest biodiversity, Oliver 
et al (1999) identify a complex organizational hierarchy of forest management, ranging 
from operations within a forest stand, through landscapes, sub-forest and forest to 
policy. They argue that this organisational hierarchy can be effective whatever form of 
property rights are in place, as long as, in the case of single ownership (either private or 
public), an inefficient top-down approach is avoided, and in the case of multiple 
ownership that non-market values are incorporated.1
1 In their analysis, Oliver et al do not consider those multiple owners who are not primarily involved in 
resource extraction for monetary returns, rather they identify multiple owners as being "free market 
entrepreneurs" (Oliver et al, 1999: 589).
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In summary, the mainstream approaches to forest management can therefore by 
described as a blend, in varying measures, of silvicultural techniques, economics and 
conservation, with the dominant goal being the sustained production of timber on an 
ongoing basis, and the secondary goal being conservation of environmental services 
(Shepherd, 1992; Poore, 1989). These technical and managerial approaches tend to 
favour relatively large areas of forest as management units and therefore have implicit 
property rights assumptions regarding the ownership of forests and the allocation of 
rights to use forests. The underlying assumption is that the state and private interests are 
the most appropriate stakeholders to manage and control the forest resource to achieve 
timber production and conservation. This in turn is reflected in global forest ownership 
trends.
Accurate data on tenure and property rights to forests have historically proved difficult 
to obtain due to lack of transparency. Often the information is not made publicly 
available by governments, or indeed is not systematically collated by them. Using the 
available official tenure figures for 24 of the top 30 forested countries, White and 
Martin (2002) extrapolate percentage distribution of global forest ownership according 
to the two broad categories of public and private ownership, further subdivided to 
reflect the extent to which communities administer or own forest lands, see Figure 1.3 
below.
2 The 24 countries for which data were available for White and Martin’s study are: Argentina, Australia, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic o f  
Congo, Gabon, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Japan, M exico, Myanmar, Papua N ew  Guinea, Peru, Russian 
Federation, Sudan, Sweden, Tanzania, USA. The remaining six countries, for which data were 
unavailable, were: Angola, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Paraguay, Venezuela and Zambia (White and 
Martin, 2002, pp. 4-5)
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Figure 1.3 Percentage distribution of global forest ownership
Category of 
forest
Category of ownership according to legal definitions
Public Private
Administered
by
Government
Reserved for
Community
and
Indigenous
Groups
Community/
Indigenous
Individual/Firm
Global Forest 
Estate
77 4 7 12
Developing
countries
71 8 14 7
Developed
countries
81 1 2 16
Source: White and Martin (2002)
According to these data, broadly, 77% of the world’s forests are publicly owned and 
under state control, 11% have a level of recognised community control and 12% are 
owned by individuals or corporate entities. In developing countries, the amount of forest 
land owned or administered by communities rises to 22%, whereas in developed 
countries the figure is only 3%. Whilst this extrapolation provides a useful indicator of 
broad ownership patterns, it masks some important variations. For example, in the USA 
55% of forest lands are privately owned by individuals and firms. Such private 
ownership by individuals and firms is even more extensive in Sweden (70%), Finland 
(80%) and Argentina (80%), whilst in contrast Mexico and Papua New Guinea have 
high levels of community ownership of forests, with the former having 80% of its 
forests under community ownership and the latter having 90% under community 
ownership (White and Martin, 2002).
Given that the majority of the world’s forests are public forests controlled and 
administered by governments, how the state manages and allocates these forests is 
significant. The state sets economic development objectives, which may involve
20
decisions regarding the amount of forest to be converted to other uses, for example 
agriculture, and the amount of forest to be reserved as a Permanent Forest Estate, that is 
kept as forest. The state sets national forest management objectives and establishes 
broad laws and regulations for the use and management of forest resources. 
Governments are therefore responsible for establishing forest policies and legislation 
and controlling at a national level the priorities for use of forest resources. National 
governments take part in intergovernmental initiatives that influence the evolution of 
forest policies at global and national levels (Gale, 1998; Humphreys, 1996). The state is 
represented by national, provincial and local governments as well as civil servants and 
the judiciary, all of whom can and do play a role in forest management and developing 
forest policies. For example, the forest departments of various levels of government 
play an important role in developing, monitoring and implementing forest policies and 
legislation. In the case of production forests, governments have in the main chosen to 
grant access rights and to a greater or lesser extent devolved management authority to 
the corporate sector via contractual arrangements to harvest timber (White and Martin, 
2002; FAO, 2001c). In return for security of access to timber for a specified period of 
time, companies undertake to pay royalties and other fees to the governments. States 
tend to directly manage the forest resource when conservation is the primary objective, 
although increasingly there are examples of the management of protected areas being 
delegated to private organisations, such as non-governmental organisations, or even of 
forests being bought by private interests in order to conserve them.
Whilst White and Martin’s work makes a significant contribution to analysing broad 
patterns of control of the world’s forests, there are important issues that such data 
ignore. For example, the designation of forests as public forests administered by the
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state is a contested concept in many countries where indigenous and other forest- 
dependent peoples’ traditional rights are claimed but unrecognised by the state. Also, 
the allocation of large concession areas for timber production or the designation of 
protected areas often undermine usufructuary rights and effectively exclude local forest 
dwellers from access to and control of local forest resources. In order to analyse 
property rights dimensions of forest management and control taking into account such 
factors, this thesis aims to explore the property rights assumptions of the dominant 
production/protection forest management regime, particularly in relation to local forest 
communities’ rights and access to forest resources.
The following section outlines the focus of the thesis within this context. However, first 
here is a brief discussion of the term ‘local forest communities’ as used in this thesis. 
The term ‘local forest communities’ has been used to identify groups of people who live 
in or close to areas of forest that they rely on to provide economic, social and ecological 
goods and services for their livelihoods and well-being. For example, the forests could 
provide potable water, non-timber forest products, employment and business 
opportunities and recreational activities to people living in a village or settlement in the 
forest. However, the thesis acknowledges that communities are heterogeneous, with 
individuals possibly belonging to a number of different, not necessarily place-specific 
communities, such as churches, conservation groups or internet-based communities, 
creating different allegiances and interests. It also recognises that within location- 
specific communities there need not be social cohesion, with individuals or groups 
having differential power and values. Individuals within communities can also be state 
representatives or have links to business interests. There is thus a complex set of
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relationships that exist within local forest communities and between these communities 
and other groups, and this is accepted as a factor within the term as used by the thesis.
1.3 Focus of the thesis
In contrast to prevailing approaches to forest management outlined above, this thesis 
considers forest management as being an inherently political process, incorporating 
concepts of power, exclusion and competing rights claims. The thesis therefore analyses 
the property rights dimensions of forest management and control within the conceptual 
framework of property rights as political institutions. It does this by developing a 
theoretical framework that is explored in the context of empirical data from two case 
studies, the Solomon Islands and British Columbia, Canada. The aims of the thesis are 
to investigate the implicit property rights assumptions of the dominant 
production/protection forest management regime, particularly in relation to forest 
communities’ rights and access to forest resources, and to analyse how and why 
property rights institutions are chosen and how they evolve over time, within the 
context of forests as contested domains.
Chapter Two elaborates the theoretical framework for the enquiry. It starts by 
identifying the prevailing approaches to property rights and natural resources in the 
literature, which are often predicated on the “Tragedy of the Commons” model and 
critiques of it. This literature proposes different property rights regimes as offering 
solutions to the dilemma of how to manage resources sustainably. Section 2.2 briefly 
describes these regimes, namely open access, private property, state property and 
common property, clarifying misconceptions of common property that associate it with 
the Tragedy of the Commons model. Thus, much of the literature has focused on the
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functional nature of property rights institutions, presenting an array of institutional 
options for managing resources.
Less attention has been paid in the literature on natural resources to critical analyses of 
the political and dynamic characteristics of property rights institutions, and this thesis 
aims to contribute to that literature. The chapter reviews the theories that are 
fundamental to the concept of property as it has evolved in the western liberal tradition. 
Section 2.3 explores the linkages between economic, juridical and political systems 
within this tradition and how they have all supported private property as a pragmatic 
and normative model for delivering wealth maximisation and individual freedom, 
protected by a body of laws. In order to provide a conceptual framework for 
understanding the political aspects of property rights, section 2.4 argues that by defining 
property rights as political institutions establishing reciprocal relationships between 
social actors, issues of exclusion, power, distributional conflict and differing, sometimes 
competing rights claims, become the central focus of analysis. These in turn challenge 
the assumed neutrality of economic approaches to property rights in regard to efficient 
allocation of resources and highlight the power relations and resistance to change 
inherent in the status quo. Section 2.5 proposes an analytical framework based on 
institutional theory that identifies four key factors influencing institutional choice and 
change: distributional conflict; bargaining power; ideology; and historical path 
dependence. By adopting this theoretical approach, the chapter argues that there is the 
potential for a more complete understanding of the property rights dimensions of 
resource management and control and the processes behind evolving property rights 
arrangements. The thesis uses these themes to guide the analysis of the empirical data, 
to help explore the political aspects of property rights institutions and to shed light on
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the complex processes by which property rights institutions are established and 
modified.
Chapter Three considers the property rights assumptions behind forest management 
policies, the implications for stakeholders and the consequences for the development of 
alternative policies, such as community forest management. By describing the complex 
web of inter-relationships between decision-makers, managers, controllers and users of 
the forest resource, the chapter argues that forests can be understood as contested 
domains, particularly those forests assigned to timber production. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 
argue that the managerial and technical approaches to forest management are rooted in 
the dominant property rights paradigms of the western liberal tradition and the tragedy 
of the commons, and. property regimes have evolved within this framework. As such, 
private property rights to forests are predominant in the form of timber concessions and 
other contractual arrangements, notwithstanding the fact that states control the majority 
of the world’s forests in the public interest. With regard to protection forests, states 
usually maintain direct management of protected areas. A growing understanding of 
common property regimes and the language of participation has meant that forest 
policies increasingly seek to include forest communities. However, the literature 
suggests that this is usually in relation to forests that are outside the main 
production/protection sphere.
Having provided in Chapter Two a conceptual basis for understanding the property 
rights assumptions underlying management, decision-making and control of the forest 
resource, Section 3.4 explores the multiple layers of rights claims to forests, especially 
those forests that are allocated to timber production. By reviewing literature on the 
relationships between the timber regime and local forest communities, it becomes clear
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that forest-dependent communities’ rights are often at odds with the dominant 
production/protection regime, despite the growing interest in community forest 
management both as a concept and as a policy option. The chapter therefore argues that 
the dominant approach to forest management masks the fact that forests are contested 
domains. By defining property rights as an expression of reciprocal relationships 
between these social actors, issues of control, access rights, exclusion, participation, 
empowerment and differing, sometimes conflicting, rights claims can become the 
central focus of analysis of forest management policies. The chapter therefore concludes 
that property rights issues are central to understanding forest policy development, even 
though they are not often explicitly elaborated and the assumptions are rarely 
challenged in the policy arena. This in turn has implications for alternative forest 
management strategies, such as community forest management. Finally, key research 
questions are identified to be explored in the empirical research: how has the dominant 
forest management regime evolved? What are the property rights implications of the 
forest management regime for communities? How do local forest communities and the 
dominant forest management regime interact?
Chapter Four describes the methodological approach adopted by the thesis to examine 
the questions framed by Chapters Two and Three. It describes the rationale for adopting 
a case study approach in the light of the theoretical framework and outlines the basis for 
selecting the two case study locations, the Solomon Islands and British Columbia, 
Canada. These two case studies were considered to be particularly illuminating 
examples because, in each location in the 1990s, forestry was a significant economic 
activity and a dominant political issue, engaging significant public debate. A 
comparative analysis was considered to be useful because it allowed the analytical 
themes to be investigated in different settings, which would in turn provide further
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insights into the theoretical approach. The chapter also describes how the research was 
operationalised, discussing issues of triangulation and data comparability that arose, as 
well as the methods and stages in data collection.
Chapter Five presents research findings from the Solomon Islands. In the Solomon 
Islands, community tenure has been the dominant land ownership institution. However, 
the case study reveals how colonialism by the British led to attempts to introduce forest 
management practices and associated tenure policies adopted from the models imposed 
elsewhere. As a result, concepts of state control of the forest resource to promote private 
sector development were introduced. Explicit in this was the belief that Solomon 
Islanders were not able to develop commercial timber operations themselves. However, 
tasked with finding forests to establish a Permanent Forest Estate, with its implicit 
assumptions of empty and unused forests (“Waste Lands”) and exclusion of other users, 
the colonial administration failed due to the resistance of Solomon Islanders and 
sympathetic representatives.
In the 1990s, although customary tenure remained the dominant tenure, management of 
the forest resource was increasingly ceded to the private sector by the state and 
communities. This introduced an additional layer of rights to forest resources on top of 
customary tenure, in practice undermining the traditional approach. The introduction of 
private property-type arrangements gave considerable power to the private sector, both 
in terms of negotiating with landholders and in terms of operational control of forest 
areas. Decision-making regarding the allocation of the resource to the private sector for 
timber production was subverted by individuals within communities for the promise of 
personal gain. This in turn undermined existing property rights structures. The changing 
ownership of companies increased the sense of distance between traditional landholders
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and the managers of the forest resource. Also, communities saw the benefits from the 
resource exploitation accrue either to private companies or to only certain members of 
the community, causing distributional conflict at a local level. However, there were also 
examples of new institutions being established as a way of asserting communal rights in 
new forms, helping to demonstrate the complex and dynamic processes surrounding 
property rights institutions in the country.
Chapter Six summarises research findings from British Columbia. The dominant forest 
management paradigm is epitomised in British Columbia, that is state control of the 
forest resource with management of the resource delegated to private corporate 
interests. As a result, First Nations and local forest communities found themselves 
excluded from decision-making, management and control of forest resources. There was 
evidence of conflict over allocation decisions, with a strong wilderness protection 
movement developing in the province. The 1990s saw forest-dependent communities 
increasingly express a desire to have more control over decision-making and 
management of the forest resource, and data collected in the Nelson forest region 
showed the attempts by communities there to gain more control over local forest 
resources through community management plans, albeit with different results.
Chapter Seven presents a cross-case analysis of the two case studies in order to 
investigate the political dimensions of property rights institutions and the factors that 
influence institutional choice and change. The chapter draws together themes and issues 
raised in the empirical work using the analytical factors elaborated in Chapter Two, 
namely distributional conflict, bargaining power, ideology and historical path 
dependence, as a framework to guide the analysis of the empirical data. The empirical
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data in turn are used to reflect on the analytical factors and their relevance in explaining 
the political dimensions of forest management and control.
Chapter Eight concludes by discussing the contribution of the thesis to the literature on 
forests and property rights, in particular the interactions between the timber regime and 
local forest communities. The thesis contributes to the literature on institutional theory 
by considering its applicability to understanding the political and dynamic processes 
underlying the establishment of property rights institutions and the constraints and 
incentives influencing institutional change. The limitations of the thesis are also 
discussed, both in terms of the empirical data and the theoretical framework, with 
avenues for further research being identified.
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Chapter Two 
Property Rights: Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical review of the property rights framework adopted by 
the thesis. Section 2.2 summarises prevailing property rights approaches within 
environment and natural resources literature, describing a range of institutional options 
for managing scarce resources and the influence of the Tragedy of the Commons model 
underlying arguments for and against different property regimes. The chapter then 
critically explores the philosophical underpinnings of property in section 2.3, arguing 
that an analysis of the western liberal concept of property is crucial to understanding the 
congruence between economic, juridical and political theories in prevailing property 
rights approaches. Section 2.4 discusses a broad conceptualisation of property rights as 
political institutions, raising complex processes of power, exclusion, distributional 
conflict and competing rights claims. In section 2.5, an analytical framework is 
proposed to explore the political aspects of property rights institutions and to shed light 
on the complex processes by which property rights institutions are established and 
modified. By focusing on factors such as distributional conflict, relative bargaining 
power and ideology in a historical context, the framework can offer insights into why 
property rights institutions are chosen, why certain parties win whilst others lose and 
how property rights institutions evolve over time. In particular, by defining property 
rights as political institutions establishing reciprocal relations between heterogeneous 
and differentially endowed social actors (both “owners” and “non-owners”), the 
assumed neutrality of economic approaches to property rights in regard to efficient
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resource allocation is challenged and the shifting power relations inherent in property 
rights institutions are highlighted.
2.2 Property rights and natural resources
There is a growing body of literature that discusses property rights and natural 
resources. This literature tends to discuss the theoretical and empirical case for different 
property rights regimes, presenting a range of institutional options for successfully 
managing scarce resources so that they are not overexploited. Traditionally, the debate 
has focused on the relative merits of private property regimes compared to state 
property regimes or state regulation. Much of this work is underpinned by concepts of 
collective action problems, such as presented in the influential Tragedy of the Commons 
model which states that resource users will inevitably overexploit resources in the 
absence of externally imposed regulations or private property regimes. The literature 
on common property regimes has made a significant contribution to clarifying 
misconceptions about the commons and to understanding the circumstances within 
which communities are able to self-organise to manage resources successfully. This 
section describes the Tragedy of the Commons model followed by a brief summary of 
the property rights regimes described in the literature.
Current thinking on property and natural resources is heavily influenced by Garret Hardin's 
oft-cited paper, published in 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons”. It describes the 
inevitability of the process by which exponential population increases (as described by 
Malthus) lead to an absolute decrease in the per capita share of a finite world. His example 
involves a pasture open to all - in his term this is a "commons". Each herdsman can be
3 For further discussion o f  collective action problems and critiques o f  this approach see North (1990); 
Ostrom (1990); Ensminger (1996).
expected to keep as many cattle as possible because, as a rational being, each herdsman 
seeks to maximise his gain. Whilst this process will not cause any problems for possibly 
centuries there inevitably comes a point where the carrying capacity of the commons has 
been reached. This is when the "inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates 
tragedy" (Hardin 1968:1244). At this point, each herdsman, on reviewing what is the 
utility to him of adding one more animal, weighs up the advantages and disadvantages.
The advantage is +1, in that the herdsman receives all the benefit from the additional 
animal. The disadvantage is only a fraction of -1, because the negative impact of 
overgrazing is shared by all the herdsmen. Therefore, according to Hardin, each herdsman 
independently concludes that his best interest is served by adding another animal, and 
another and another, with disastrous consequences:
"But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein lies the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all." (Hardin 1968:1244).
In short, according to Hardin, unsustainable use is an inevitable consequence of.the
"Tragedy of the Commons". This paper has generated much debate since publication in
1968, in particular around the definition of “commons” and the appropriate property
institutions to manage natural resources. Responses to the “commons dilemma” have
shifted according to the political climate of the time, so that in the 1960s and 1970s the
solution was seen as government intervention (the approach which Hardin himself
advocated), whereas in the 1980s and 1990s the solution was seen as privatisation
(Mishan, 1993). The model lends itself to either approach depending on ideological
viewpoint: "The popularity of the [Tragedy of the Commons] model may be related to its
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ability to generate both liberal and conservative political solutions” (McCay and Acheson, 
1987:5).
Critics have argued that Hardin's paper encapsulates the misconception that the 
“commons” equate to open access resources, and that this misconception underpins 
mainstream theory and policy with regard to the management of common pool natural 
resources such as fisheries, water, forestry and rangelands. Scholars argue that the 
management of such resources as common property regimes have often been ignored by 
policy makers, with privatisation or state control being considered as the only management 
options (for discussion of this, see: Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1989; McCay and Acheson, 
1987; Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop,1975). Hardin himself later qualified his model as 
being “the Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons” (Hardin, 1990), acknowledging that in 
small communities (up to 150 individuals), resources could be communally managed 
through peer pressure.
\
The study of property rights regimes has been a fruitful area of research, in particular in 
assessing the different institutional arrangements that may be the most effective in 
conserving natural resources. As described above, property rights approaches to the 
environment and natural resources are heavily informed by Hardin’s model, with common 
property often being mistakenly associated with unregulated open access resources. The 
classic presentation of property rights is of open access at one end of the spectrum and 
either state or private property at the other, with the achievement of state or private 
property regimes being the optimal arrangement. For example, Muller and Tietzel (1999) 
suggest two solutions to the “problem of common property”: regulation and 
privatisation. Which option is chosen will, they contend, depend on the type of resource
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and on the transaction costs. Individuals are likely to define and enforce exclusive rights 
if the net gains are positive. When marginal governance costs exceed marginal 
exclusion costs, users of a common pool resource will adopt a privatisation strategy; 
otherwise, regulation will be optimal (Muller and Tietzel, 1999). Critics argue that this 
approach often ignores institutional alternatives to private or state property (Swaney,
1990). Berkes (1989) argues that resources can be held under a number of different 
property regimes or a mix of regimes: open access (non property); state property; private 
property; common property. The main characteristics of these regimes are described 
below.
Open access resources are subject to a ’’free for all" and are defined as res nullius or "non­
property". Resources are open access, that is open to anybody and with nobody having a 
property right claim, either because the resources have never been incorporated into a 
property management regime or because the regime has broken down as a result of 
institutional failures in former private, state or common property management regimes 
(Bromley, 1991). It is open access resources that are subject to the tragedy of over­
exploitation described by Hardin above. The two most commonly prescribed 
management options to deal with this have been state control or privatization, and these 
are described next.
A state property regime is one where control of the resource rests with the state, which 
can then in turn grant use rights to individuals and groups (Bromley, 1991). The most 
widespread ideological adoption of this approach was state ownership in the communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe; indeed the failure of communism is seen by some as a 
failure of state property and a vindication of private property, a view that has particular
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popularity in the USA (see for example Ely Jr, 1998; Yandle, 1995). Apart from this 
pure form of state ownership, state control of resources in the public interest is 
common, for example in national parks and forest reserves. The state has played a key 
role in property rights and natural resources throughout history. Access to and control of 
natural resources has often been either the motivation for, or a profitable consequence 
of, colonial expansion, as in the case of the British Empire. Territorial claims to natural 
resources are often a cause of conflict between states, as in the case of fisheries disputes 
such as between Britain and Iceland in the 1970s. National sovereignty can therefore be 
viewed as an expression of rights claims: "Technical or emotional, 'sovereignty', like 
'self-determination' or 'nationalism', is shorthand for the assertion of preferential rights" 
(Demarest, 1998, p.30).
However, national sovereignty over natural resources does not equate to state ownership 
nor does it mean that states keep direct control of natural resources, with states often 
deciding on the mix of property rights within their jurisdiction. The philosophical 
arguments for private property justified European colonisation of native American lands 
on the grounds that private property and individual ownership rights were civilising and 
led to economic development. This in turn justified the failure to recognise traditional 
communal rights (van Meijl and von Benda-Beckmann, 1999; Thompson, 1993). In the 
wake of colonialism, independent governments have often continued the appropriation 
of land and natural resources that was traditionally communally held. The state then 
decides the legal arrangements by which resources are managed: it can either directly 
manage and control the use of natural resources or it can allocate the resource to private 
• users for specified uses and time periods. In establishing tenure arrangements, the state 
is the decision-maker regarding the mix of private and public control over scarce
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resources. Private property rights are generally accepted to represent the most efficient 
way to allocate scarce resources4 and states adhering to this political and economic 
paradigm therefore often act as facilitators for private property arrangements of natural 
resources through allocation decisions and the passing of laws and regulations to protect 
private property rights (Marchak, 1995). The state’s role is thus one of promoting and 
protecting property rights: "Property is a benefit stream, and property rights constitute the 
assurance of the state that it will protect that benefit stream" (Bishop and Welsh, 1993).
Private property rights are viewed by many as the most complete form of property 
rights, being understood to confer exclusive, long-term rights to individuals or firms: 
private ownership is "any property structure where full (or nearly full) rights to possess, 
use, manage, alienate, transfer, and gain income from properly are granted to 
individuals" (Christman, 1994:15), see figure 2.1. Private property regimes are 
associated with formal rules and rights upheld by laws, that others have a duty to 
respect.
Figure 2.1 Attributes of private property rights
Key elements of private property rights
• Rights to use
• Rights to exclude others
• Rights to transfer (alienation)
• Rights to produce
• Rights to income
• Rights to dispose___________________
Private property rights are commonly viewed as the most efficient and wealth-maximising 
form of property rights. States often facilitate private property regimes on the grounds
4 See section 2.3 for a discussion on the philosophical foundations o f  prevailing property rights 
approaches
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that they are wealth maximizing and economically efficient. Globalisation and ever- 
increasing involvement of foreign firms and donor agencies in national economies have 
increased the discourse of property rights and the type of regime most suitable to 
attracting foreign inflows of capital - usually, private property arrangements (van Meijl 
and von Benda-Beckmann, 1999).
In regard to natural resources and the environment, private property is often viewed as 
the most economically attractive option because the owner can make management 
decisions and investments knowing that the full benefits will accrue to the owner 
(Bromley, 1991). Central to the economic approach to property rights is that the more 
exclusive and full the right, the greater the opportunity for the rights holder to reap the 
benefits of the resource and investment in it: "the more completely and privately the 
property rights to an asset are defined, the more will its holder be inclined to maximise 
the full value of the resource". (Muller and Tietzel, 1999:40). A particular advantage of 
private property rights is the potential to transfer or alienate a share of the resource, 
allowing resource users to generate higher returns from the resource. For example, tradable 
pollution permits can be sold to those who most value them. The theory advocates the 
privatisation of resources and security of rights to resources so that rights holders have 
an incentive to plan for the longer term and are more likely to internalise externalities 
(Boyce, 2002). Private property rights are considered to be an effective way to deal with 
the externalities associated with environmental problems such as pollution (Turner, Pearce 
and Bateman 1994) and the management of common pool resources (Devlin and Grafton, 
1998). Within this paradigm, resources that are not clearly and exclusively held under a 
formal property regime (that is a private property regime, which is the most amenable to 
market solutions advocated by liberal economists), are deemed to be “no property” and
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therefore subject to over-use. For example, Muller and Tietzel (1999) identify over-use 
of common pool natural resources as being a consequence of the absence of formal and 
exclusive property rights: "Commonplace examples of overuse of resources to which no 
property rights are devised are those of natural resources where formal rights are non­
existent. Air, fishing grounds, oil pools, forests or groundwater basins are cases in 
point." (Muller and Tietzel, 1999:43, emphasis added).
Common property regimes (CPRs) are local institutions that have evolved to establish 
self-governance of common pool resources, such as fisheries, pastures, water and 
forests. A growing body of literature argues explicitly that, rather than these resources 
being subject to the tragedy of the commons articulated by Hardin, access to and 
conservation of these (scarce) resources can be and often are controlled by local 
institutional arrangements. CPRs involve a clearly defined community of people with 
specific rights and obligations enshrined in formal or informal institutions, the community 
having the right to exclude non-members (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Berkes 
1989). -
Common property rights have often been dismissed by scholars as being inferior to 
private property rights, often being identified as open access resources (Posner, 1998; 
Thompson, 1993). Alchian and Demsetz (1973) argue that communal property rights 
are inherently unstable and advocate the conversion of communal to private property 
rights, the alternative being state regulation and control. By defining common property 
as being synonymous with community property, that is property used communally by an 
identified group of people with rules of exclusion (Reeve 1986; Bromley 1991; Pearce 
1991 and Berkes 1989), then the misconceptions about common property resources
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associated with the "Tragedy of the Commons" (or more properly, the "Tragedy of 
Open Access") approach are avoided. Indeed, some authors cite cases where it is when 
traditional common property regimes are disrupted, for example through nationalisation 
or privatisation of a resource or eco-system, that the "Tragedy of the Commons" 
develops and local people are encouraged to over-exploit (Berkes 1989; Bromley and 
Cemea 1989; Ostrom 1990).
There is now a substantial body of literature that outlines the theoretical and empirical 
case for common property regimes (see, for example, Runge 1986; McCay & Acheson 
1987; Wade 1987; Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Jodha 1992) and the work of Ostrom has 
made a particularly significant contribution to developing the theoretical framework in 
this field, focusing on “design principles” for the development of robust CPRs. Figure
2.2 presents a synthesis of the group characteristics and rules found in successful CPRs. 
However, the research to date has usually been limited to studying the internal 
characteristics of common property regimes in successful and failing situations, rather 
than in relation to the external context (Cardoso, 1999).
Figure 2.2 Attributes of common property regimes (CPRs)
Characteristics of group CPR rules
• Power equitably distributed
• within cultural context
• socially cohesive group
• institutions are fully participatory
• knowledge of the carrying 
capacity
• proximity of social group to 
resource
• prospective net collective benefit
• boundaries of community clearly defined
• monitoring and enforcement
• conflict resolution mechanisms
• autonomy to change institutional 
arrangements
• rules of appropriation and allocation reflect 
local conditions
• boundaries of resource clearly defined
Source: Ostrom, 1990
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The literature on common property regimes has been important in presenting the 
conditions by which common pool resources can be managed successfully by 
communities using rules devised by themselves. Thus, a more complete picture has 
emerged of ways to avert the “tragedy of the commons” described by Hardin rather than 
the privatisation or state regulation models that have traditionally prevailed.
The analysis of property rights regimes described above is helpful for understanding the 
formal rules and informal norms by which natural resources can be managed in the long 
term. Whilst this approach is useful in describing different types of property rights 
regimes that could be used to effectively manage natural resources, there is an 
assumption that, depending on the resource and users, there is a “right” property regime 
to be chosen from amongst the institutional options (Muller and Tietzel, 1999). 
Certainly, this framework provides a useful analytical tool for understanding the various 
property rights regimes that can be used to manage forest resources. As such, it is a 
technical and managerial approach to property rights institutions and the management of 
natural resources (Mehta et al, 1999). However, a shortcoming of this approach is that it
does not take account of the power relations inherent in the allocation of property rights
<
nor the complexity of rights and rights claims that can occur in relation to natural 
resources. These themes are explored in the rest of this chapter, and an analytical 
framework for investigating the political processes associated with the establishment 
and modification of property rights institutions is developed. First, the next section 
critically examines the political, economic and juridical foundations of prevailing 
property rights approaches.
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2.3 Mainstream approaches to property
In every day language, property is viewed as a material object and ownership of 
property conveys the relationship of the owner to that object, specifically in terms of 
their rights to the use, benefit and disposal of the material object (Bromley, 1991; Ryan, 
1984). Property has become synonymous with bricks and mortar or land in the 
developed world. Whilst property rules differ from country to country, they are 
ubiquitous, directly affecting everyone’s lives (Denman, 1978). However, property is a 
far more complex concept than is inferred in everyday usage of the term. Property is a 
key concept in defining and providing a link between the institutions that encapsulate 
society and also in defining relationships between individuals within that society (Reeve, 
1986).
Property and ownership are viewed as synonymous by western societies. According to 
Macpherson (1978), there is in contemporary times a misuse and consequently a 
misunderstanding of property on two levels. Firstly, in common usage property means 
"things" - material objects that one can own. In fact, the true meaning is "rights in or to 
things". Secondly, is the fact that property has become synonymous with private property, 
that is an exclusive right of individuals. This perspective has emerged most strongly in the 
USA (Thompson, 1993; Yandle, 1995). Ownership equates with the liberal 
individualistic approach to property, manifested in private property: the unlimited right 
of an individual to use, limit others' use, dispose of and derive benefit from property 
(Macpherson, 1978). This approach has political, economic and juridical foundations, 
which are explored below.
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The predominant view of property rights has emerged from liberal theory and the pre­
eminence of private property as the representation of individual political freedom and 
the right to wealth maximisation as protected by a body of laws. The philosophical 
foundations of private property are based on individualistic and liberal notions of rights 
of individuals in isolation, who should be free to act how they wish within their defined 
boundaries of rights (Carter, 1989). According to Bromley (1991:7), libertarian thinkers - 
economists or political theorists - see property rights as an ’’immutable and timeless 
entitlement that can only be contravened with difficulty, and then only if compensation 
is paid by the state to make the property holder whole".
In the field of economics, property rights are rights to a benefit stream (Bromley, 1991) 
and private property rights are commonly viewed as the most efficient and wealth- 
maximising institution. The economic assumptions associated with property rights are 
that scarce resources need to be allocated efficiently and property rights are a way of 
allocating resources amongst competing demands (Whynes and Bowles, 1999; Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1973). The economic foundations of analyses of property rest on 
reciprocal relations between property rights and economic behaviour: property rights 
create incentives and transaction costs that affect economic performance; economic 
factors in turn influence changes in property rights (Pejovich, 2001). Central to the neo­
classical economic approach to property rights is that wealth maximisation is best 
achieved by exclusive property rights. Private property is the most amenable to market 
solutions advocated by neo-classical economists because it is the most exclusive and 
complete form of property right. According to Marchak (1995), markets and private 
property rights are inextricably linked together.
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Within legal theory, property rights are expressed within a defining set of positive laws 
that derive from a state's constitution, statutes, common law and other governmental 
regulations (Pejovich, 2001). According to Posner (1998), there are three parts to 
common law5 that are relevant to property rights: the law of property is concerned with 
creating and defining property rights, which are the rights to the exclusive use of 
valuable resources; the law of contracts is concerned with facilitating the voluntary 
movement of property rights to those who value them most6; and the law of torts is 
concerned with protecting property rights. Over time, the body of laws related to 
property rights reinforce the status quo underlying property rights allocations, making 
change that much more difficult. The state has a dual role; it is the protector of property 
rights through the enforcement of laws; and the legislator also acts as the giver and taker 
of property rights, for example being in a position to allocate and reallocate titles to land 
and resources (Denman, 1978). This dual role of the state is of central importance in 
considering property rights and is separate from the possibility that the state can also be 
an owner of resources (see section 2.2 above).
As outlined above, private property rights have become synonymous with individual 
ownership. Private property rights are therefore usually interpreted as conferring rights 
to the individual in relation to things, and their freedom to control the use of the thing.
In legal terms, property rights are relational, not only conferring bundles of rights to the 
owner but also determining the relationship of the owner to non-owners. Bromley 
(1991), Munzer (1990) and Carter (1989) refer to Hohfeld (1966) with regard to 
clarifying the legal correlates of private property rights: private property rights confer 
rights to the individual in relation to things, and they can control the use of the thing.
5 Common law is the body o f  law shaped by judicial precedents rather than by the legislature
6 O f course, they must also possess the ability to pay. This point is picked up in section 2.4 in relation to 
distributional justice
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However, the correlate of this is that others are excluded from the use of the thing 
without the permission of the owner. Hohfeld identified four correlates that define the 
complex set of relations between the owner and non-owners. The claim right of the 
owner to prevent others from entering the land or causing damage to it is linked to the 
duty of non-owners to not enter the land nor to cause damage to the land; the privilege 
of the owner to enter and use the land and do what they like within legal boundaries is 
linked to non-owners having no right to prevent the owner from doing this; the power 
of the owner to transfer the property to someone else or allow someone else to enter is 
linked to the non-owners’ liability to be subject to these changes; the immunity of the 
owner from the power of someone else in relation to the property and immunity from 
extinguishments of the owner’s rights and privileges or those granted by the owner to 
another person is linked to non-owners’ disability from subjecting the owner to their 
demands, from removing the owner’s rights and privileges or to interfere with the rights 
and privileges granted by the owner to someone else (Hohfeld, 1966; Carter, 1989). 
These correlates are summarised in figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3 Legal correlates of private property rights
Owner Non-owners
Claim right of owner
• Others shall not enter the land
• Others shall not cause physical harm to 
the land
Duty of others
• Not to enter the land
• Not to cause physical harm to the land
Privilege
• Entering the land
• Using the land
• Harming the land
• Freedom to act (within legal 
boundaries)
No right
• Cannot prevent the owner from 
entering or using the land
Power
• Of alienation to another
• To create a life estate in another or 
reversion
• To create a privilege of entrance to 
another
Liability
• Others are subject to the changes in 
jural relations exercised by the owner
Immunity
• Non-liability or non-subjection to a 
power of another person
• No other person can extinguish the 
owner’s rights and privileges
• No other person can extinguish the 
privileges granted by the owner to 
another person
Disability
• Others cannot subject the owner to their 
demands
• Others cannot remove the owner’s 
rights and privileges
• Others cannot interfere with the 
privileges granted by the owner to 
another
Source: Hohfeld 1966; Carter 1989
This conceptualisation of property is significant because it explicitly recognises 
property rights as reciprocal relationships between owners and non-owners, thus raising 
concepts of power and presenting a framework for including all social actors, whether 
they have formally recognised rights or not. This theme is explored further in section 
2.4.
By synthesising the political, economic and juridical approaches to property rights, it is 
possible to identify linkages between them (Reeve, 1986). Friedman (1994) argues that 
there is a strong similarity between three types of rights: those that libertarians consider
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to be just, those that are economically efficient and those that are recognised and 
protected by western societies. This congruence between political, economic and 
juridical systems has evolved over time and is an expression of the overall western 
liberal view of property. Thus, by examining the philosophical foundations of property, 
property rights assumptions can be understood in terms of the dominant liberal tradition 
that has in turn led to the evolution of political, economic and juridical systems 
favouring private property rights as an expression of political and economic goals, 
facilitated by the juridical status quo. Within this liberal tradition, the freedom and 
rights of the individual are highly valued, the individual’ s right to property being one of 
the cornerstones of the paradigm. Private property is seen as the most complete form of 
property right and the one most conducive to wealth maximisation. States are often the 
facilitators of private property and the juridical system has evolved to protect these 
rights, see figure 2.4 below. Thus, the congruence between political, economic and 
juridical systems favours the predominance of private property rights both in a 
normative and practical sense (Friedman, 1994).
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Figure 2.4 Congruence of western liberal views of property
Economic system
Juridical system
Political system
Individual liberty 
Right to property
Wealth
maximisation by 
individual/firm 
Efficient resource 
allocation 
Market based 
economy
Defining and 
creating exclusive 
rights to resources 
Facilitating 
transfer o f  
property rights via 
contracts 
Protecting 
property rights
Private property = 
ownership
Rights to use 
Rights to exclude 
others
Rights to transfer 
(alienation)
Rights to produce 
Rights to income 
Rights to dispose
In summary, the previous section highlighted the influence of the Tragedy o f the 
Commons model in property rights regimes approaches to natural resources, 
traditionally lending itself to either state regulation or privatisation models. Scholars
and theoretical study that communities can, under certain circumstances, develop 
institutions to successfully self-govem resources. However, this section has discussed 
the underlying concepts of property within the western liberal paradigm, explaining 
how the predominance of private property has been established as a result of the 
congruence of economic, political and juridical processes within the liberal tradition.
This functional approach to property rights implies that, from an array of management 
options, there is an optimal property rights regime depending on the type and location of 
the resource or some set of clearly definable circumstances, such as the demands of the 
market. In other words that there is a "right!' solution to the property rights conundrum 
and that the solution lies in either private property or common property or state 
property. However, the following section will argue that a broader conceptualisation of 
property is needed in order to capture the political dimensions of property rights 
institutions and the complexity of rights and associated relationships.
2.4 Political dimensions of property rights
This section examines the political dimensions of property rights in terms of complex 
processes of control and decision-making, exclusion, distributional conflict and 
differing, often competing, rights claims. By focusing on these issues, a broad 
conceptualisation of property rights is developed that highlights the dynamic nature of 
property right institutions as mediating relationships of power between social actors 
rather than simply being a manifestation of rules or norms to. govern resource access and 
use. The use of the term property right institution in this section rather than property 
right regime is intended to convey the distinction between the functional nature of 
property rights regimes described in section 2.2 and the dynamic processes surrounding
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the establishment or modification of property rights (Reddy, 2002) described in this and 
the following section.
The term “ownership”, as described in section 2.3, is associated with western liberal 
concepts of property and defining the exclusive right of the individual or corporate 
entity towards an object. However, ownership in reality is rarely so absolute as may be 
theoretically implicit in the liberal concept described above. Individuals rarely have 
absolute power over a thing in relation to others, as this is usually circumscribed by 
societal norms or dissipated through share ownership, mortgages etc. However, by 
identifying who has control of and decision-making power over a resource and who has 
the right to the benefit stream can be more significant than the ’’owner” of the resource 
(Christman, 1994). Jacobs (1991) argues that the central issue regarding the 
environment is how resources are allocated and not ownership per se, and his example 
is that different types of companies, whether privately, co-operatively or state owned, 
operate in a variety of different resource allocation mechanisms, from free market to 
centrally planned. It would seem to be reasonable then to propose that a consideration of 
property rights should extend beyond actual ownership of the resource to include 
control of management and decision-making regarding resources, on the understanding 
that these can be assigned to different actors. Bromley (1991) cites Leman (1984 p. 117) 
on this point: “How lands are managed, rather than who owns them, is the key to 
efficiency”. This brings us closer to the true definition of property rights as bundles of 
rights to a resource, and makes it clearer as to how those bundles can be allocated in 
different ways. Property rights thus become much more complex institutions, with 
different rights being held by different actors. Alchian and Demsetz (1973) describe 
private and state property regimes as the two mainstream options for managing common
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pool resources and, whilst they are advocates of private property rights, they accept that the 
distinction is itself ambiguous because the bundles of rights to a particular resource can be 
held by different parties, with some rights to a resource being state controlled and some 
being privately controlled. There could thus be movement along a continuum from state to 
private property as more of the rights pass to private control, and this can lead to 
difficulties in defining whether a change in ownership has taken place between state and 
private property. A practical example of this point is the case of state-controlled 
common pool resources, such as forests, that are contracted out to private parties in the 
form of private property-type arrangements. Although the state retains control over 
public resources, private property-type functions, such as rights to use the forest 
resource, rights to transfer the right or product to others and rights to the benefit stream, 
are contracted for a given period to another party who then becomes responsible for the
n
management of the resource, often in the form of private property tenure arrangements.
Thus, the allocation of control and decision-making are important functions of property 
rights and are imbued with power relations. Libecap (1989) and North (1990) point to 
this political dimension of property rights: they not only determine the distribution of 
benefits, but also confer decision-making authority. Denman (1978) describes the 
“pragmatic function” of property as a power base of critical importance. He argues that 
a property right is a form of power, conferring a sanction and authority for decision­
making. Blauert and Guidi (1992) have noted that in Mexico, ownership of forest 
resources was not in itself sufficient for communities to be empowered to manage 
forests communally. As a result, the state was able to allocate timber concessions to 
companies without involving communities in decision-making, even though community
7 See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion on private property-type arrangements to forests
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tenure existed to forests. Public listed companies are often controlled by their 
management rather than their shareholders. Shareholder actions are becoming more 
prevalent, as shareholders in their position as “owners” of the company try to influence 
the board of directors regarding decision-making, directors’ pay, ethical issues etc. But 
such actions are notable because of their rarity -  normally, the managers and directors 
of a company have decision-making authority and financial control, regardless of share 
ownership. Thus, not only ownership, but also control and decision-making are equally 
or sometimes more important for identifying who has the decision-making authority and 
right to a benefit stream. In analysing property rights, it is important therefore to 
consider where the decision-making authority and control of a resource lies, as well as 
tenure and rights.
As discussed in section 2.3, the significance of property rights in establishing reciprocal 
relationships between rights holders and others has been identified by theorists such as 
Hohfeld (1966), Carter (1989) and Bromley (1991). In essence, with rights come duties 
of others to respect those rights. Rights holders are in a reciprocal relation with non­
rights holders, being able to exclude them from the resource. Those who are excluded 
are expected to abide by the property rights allocation; the law protects the rights of 
rights holders against non-rights holders. By incorporating the notion of reciprocal 
relations at the heart of a property rights framework, it is possible to include the roles 
and relationships of non-owners as well as owners into the property rights analysis. 
Critical analysts have for many years focused on property rights as conferring power on 
the rights holders over others, in particular in relation to private property conferring the
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right to exclude others.8 The United States Supreme Court has noted that the right to 
exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property” (cited in Cole and Grossman, 2002:324 fn 14). Zucker (2001) 
argues that liberal theories of property justify a right to highly unequal property because 
they claim to treat people as equal to start with, regardless of outcomes. However, 
Libecap (1989) points out that in many cases, there is no homogeneity amongst 
bargaining parties, and so they do not start from a position of equality, either in terms of 
access to information, wealth or political contacts.
Within this conceptualisation of property rights as political institutions, incorporating 
the concept of rights holders and non-rights holders linked together in unequal power 
relationships regarding resource allocation and use, distributive conflict can be 
considered. The distribution of property rights inevitably leads to winners and losers, the 
winners often being those in the strongest position politically (Libecap 1989) or 
economically (Boyce, 2002). By exploring the political nature of property rights in terms 
of concepts of power, access and control, the assumed neutrality of mainstream economic 
approaches to property rights in regard to efficient resource allocation are challenged. 
Boyce (2002) argues that the dominant wealth-based approach focuses on the goal of 
efficiency whilst downplaying the importance of the distributional inequalities of power 
and wealth. This critique has relevance in considering environmental issues. Redclift 
argues that it is an illusion to believe that environmental objectives are "other than 
political, or other than distributive" (Redclift 1984:130) and advocates an analysis of 
power structures in relation to the environment (Redclift 1987). By focusing on
8 Critiques o f  private property are not new. In Property, Profits, and Economic Justice, Held (1980) 
publishes extracts from essays by legal theorists such as Cohen and MacPherson, the former arguing in 
1927 against the injustice inherent in aspects o f  private property and the latter publishing in 1962 a 
critique o f  the possessive individualism o f  private property. Both pointed to the right to exclude others as 
being a form o f  power relationship between owners and non-owners.
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distributive issues regarding access to resources, we inevitably have to look at property 
rights as a multidimensional concept, rather than simply as a range of tenure options 
(Peluso, 1999).
Not only is the assumed neutrality of economic approaches to property rights 
challenged in this broad conceptualisation of property rights; so too is the status quo 
regarding juridical arrangements and property rights. The positive nature of the juridical 
system means that the weight of law is based on protecting property rights that have 
already been assigned. Inevitably in such a system, written, contractual rights associated 
with private property are given greater protection than informal, unwritten rights and 
rights claims that are often held by the poorest and most marginalized sections of 
society such as pastoralists and forest dwellers. The limitation of this approach is that it 
does not consider issues of distributive justice and often fails to recognise informal 
rights and rights claims outside the juridical status quo or indeed alternative systems of 
law such as traditional laws (von Benda-Beckman, 2001). The latter are therefore 
susceptible to be ignored or discounted as not being of equal value as those rights 
recognised by the juridical system, regardless of issues of distributive justice: "..billions 
of people, now and in the past, base much of their behavior on respect for property 
claims that seem either morally arbitrary or clearly unjust" (Friedman, 1994:2). As it 
tends to be the wealthy and powerful who obtain property rights, this creates powerful 
vested interests who benefit from maintaining the status quo, regardless of the 
underlying moral acceptability of such claims (North, 1990; Ensminger, 1996). These 
vested interests are therefore in a strong position to resist challenges to the status quo 
property rights arrangements that favour them, or at the very least demand 
compensation for loss of rights (Boyce, 2002; Bromley, 1991).
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By considering distributional conflict and power relations within a concept of property 
rights, those who have been excluded from the rights to a resource can be explicitly 
included in the analysis of rights claims and conflict over resources. This has 
significance in current debates about sustainable development and the environment. 
According to the influential World Commission on Environment and Development, 
inequitable access to resources is one of the key impediments to achieving sustainable 
development (WCED, 1987). According to Rees: ’’Unless the distributional question is 
addressed none of the suggested mechanisms (prices, standards, etc.) for achieving 
sustainable development will be achieved" (Rees 1990:443). Redclift (1987) describes 
resources as being contested, with decision-making regarding their use being based on 
the exercise of power and resistance to it. By examining power structures and conflict 
over use and access to resources, Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that many 
environmental problems are social and political in origin. Equitable distribution and 
access to resources is a theme that has emerged strongly in development and 
environment literature (see for example, Daly and Cobb, 1990; Ecologist, 1993; Adams, 
2001). The validity of the liberal concept of property equating to ownership has been 
challenged in relation to property institutions and tenure in developing countries 
(Hirschon, 1984). Rather, it has been argued that the powers and privileges of people 
and groups are derived from the relationships between people and their roles in society 
“and not from an anterior or superior idea of property” (Neale, 1985:953). For example, 
indigenous cultures have been described as conceptualising their relationship to 
resources based on stewardship rather than ownership, whereby they are part of a 
tradition of caring for the land and resources, holding it in trust for future generations 
(Ecologist, 1993). However, others consider that idealised views of communities belie
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the fact that within communities, varied power relations exist between the social actors
and this is reflected in different claims to natural resources and environmental priorities:
"These factors point to the importance of diverse institutions operating at 
multiple scale levels from macro to micro, which influence who has access to 
and control over what resources, and arbitrate contested resource claims"
(Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1997: 6).
There is a growing recognition of the legitimacy of community interest in protecting the 
environment and natural resources, both as a right and as a pragmatic way to achieve 
sustainable development (Ghai and Vivian, 1992). Community participation in local 
resource management has been included on many organisations’ agendas for 
environment and development options. Much of the debate surrounding community 
involvement in natural resource management has centred on their participation, whilst 
critics have argued that empowerment of communities is more meaningful in this 
context. The distinction between participation and empowerment can be viewed at least 
partly as a property rights issue. Participation on the whole is about bringing local 
people into mainstream resource management programmes or economic development 
objectives imposed from above, without devolving control of resources and decision­
making to the local level. These projects are still conceived and implemented by 
external agencies (state or intergovernmental) remote from the local community itself 
(Utting, 1993), and often with little understanding of local resource control issues 
(Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1997). Under this system, status quo power relations are 
top-down in nature, with an elite within the state or the commercial world dominating 
the decision-making processes and the management and control of natural resources.
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Empowerment, on the other hand, is about local communities having control of the 
resources and the planning and decision-making processes themselves and has a much 
more radical basis than participation:
"To call for 'empowerment' of local people is to challenge social structure.
Profoundly, one is dealing with 'politics' not 'policies', with 'struggle' and not
'strategy'" (Taylor and Mackenzie, 1992:1).
Thus, empowerment is intimately linked to social and power relations that are often 
manifest in sets of property rights. As described in section 2.2 above, a growing body of 
literature gives prominence to common property regimes (CPRs) as viable institutions 
for managing common pool resources, although such studies have largely been limited 
to studying their internal characteristics rather than analysing CPRs in a broader 
external context (Cardoso, 1999), and others suggest that the potential of CPRs is 
overstated (Campbell et al, 2001). Based on their research in southern Mexico, Blauert 
and Guidi argue that what is needed is local control of the resource base and 
empowerment and inclusion in decision-making regarding allocation and use of the 
resource: “..the provision of means to encourage local ‘participation’ in resource 
management is insufficient where local-level control over natural resources does not 
exist” (Blauert and Guidi, 1992:189, emphasis in original).
The significance of communities feeling in control of decision-making through 
recognition of their property rights has been noted by Mitchell and Carson (2001) in 
regard to the siting of hazardous waste facilities. Their research found a correlation 
between willingness by communities to accept such sites in their neighbourhood with 
recognition of their property rights. In particular, the authors argue that the holding of a 
binding referendum giving the local community the power of acceptance or rejection is
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a clear message by the state and the developer that the community’s de facto property 
rights are acknowledged. The authors argue that this path not only often neutralises pre­
emptive protest movements, it also creates incentives for state and developer to engage 
meaningfully with the community regarding benefits and compensation packages in 
order to persuade them to accept the development and is thus more likely to lead to a 
positive vote by the community. However, these examples could also reflect 
asymmetries in knowledge or power, with community members not necessarily having 
access to all of the information, or with certain community members having 
inducements to influence outcomes.9
In summary, communities living close to common pool resources are involved in 
complex relationships with other social actors and each other, as well as experiencing an 
array of institutional arrangements in relation to the resource. If, as is mostly the case, 
they have no legally recognised, formal property rights to the resource or its benefit 
stream then the juridical status quo categorises them as being excluded from the 
resource and obliged to respect the rights of the rights holder. However, this does not 
mean that they do not have morally legitimate claims to the resource, and may also have 
informal use rights that have evolved over long periods. In such cases, resources are 
contested and different rights claims can conflict with each other. However, given the 
economic, juridical and political systems within which property rights have evolved, the 
rights of the powerful are often those that are valued most by enforcers of laws. As a 
means of addressing the legitimate claims of communities, there has been an increasing 
focus on participatory arrangements for managing resources. Often, though, definitions 
and practices of participation do not include the devolution of decision-making, control
9 See the Solomon Islands case study for examples o f  how asymmetries in power within communities 
influences outcomes
and access to the resource to community level institutions. In other instances, the 
success of community control through common property regimes has been recognised 
and the circumstances leading to success or failure of such institutions are increasingly 
the focus of academic research.
This section has discussed some of the complex issues raised when considering the 
political dimensions of property rights institutions. By focusing on issues of decision­
making, exclusion and competing rights claims, a broad conceptualisation of property is 
proposed that addresses the power relationships between social actors. The following 
section presents an analytical framework that moves beyond a functional approach to 
property rights as an array of management options and helps investigate the complex 
processes surrounding the allocation and evolution of property rights institutions.
2.5 Analytical framework
As described in section 2.2, the property rights regimes approach is useful for 
understanding the formal and informal rules by which natural resources can be 
managed. However, it is less helpful for analysing how and why different property 
rights institutions evolve. Nor does it take account of the political nature of property 
rights allocations or the fact that there can be competing rights claims to a particular 
resource. In other words, the dynamic processes by which property rights institutions 
are chosen and how they change over time require a framework that incorporates 
complex contextual and temporal aspects of institutional analysis.
This section presents the analytical framework for the thesis, based on a 
conceptualisation of property rights as complex political institutions described in the
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previous section. The framework places property rights institutions within a context of 
bargaining power, distributional conflict and ideology over time, where these are factors 
that influence not only the type of property rights institutions that are chosen, but also 
how and why such institutions are chosen and how they influence other social actors.
By adopting this framework, the thesis aims to analyse the complex processes 
surrounding institutional choice and also how property rights institutions evolve over 
time. The section discusses the literature that develops a political theory of institutions 
and then synthesises this with the concepts discussed in the rest of the chapter to 
develop the analytical framework for the thesis.
Within political economy, institutional theory has developed explicitly to give insights 
into the complex processes, incentives and constraints that shape the formation and 
evolution of institutions, where institutions are the formal rules and informal norms that 
influence human behaviour. Property rights are social institutions that “define or delimit 
the range of privileges granted to individuals to specific assets, such as parcels of land 
or water” (Libecap, 1989:1). The economic and political importance of property rights 
institutions are recognised within this literature, given that property rights not only 
determine the distribution of benefits, but also confer decision-making authority. The 
theory provides a framework for understanding how institutions are established and how 
they evolve over time, where institutions are the formal rules and informal norms in a 
society. Figure 2.5 summarises the relationship between rules, institutions and the 
source of their authority, in both formal and informal settings.
59
Figure 2.5 Rules, institutions and their sources of authority
Rules Development Institutions Sanctions
Formal
(Private Property; 
State property)
State
• Legislators
• Judiciary
• Civil servants
Constitutions 
Statutes 
Common law 
Other governmental 
regulations
Fines
Imprisonment
Informal
(Common Property 
Regimes)
Norms of behaviour
• Spontaneous
• Repeated human 
interactions
• Test of time
• Prevailing ethos
Traditions 
Customs 
Moral values 
Religious belief
Expulsion from 
community 
Ostracism 
Loss of reputation
Source: Pejovich, 2001
Institutional theory has developed explicitly to challenge .some of the assumptions 
associated with neo-classical economic theory. It has been used to explain the 
persistence of seemingly inefficient institutions and why different outcomes evolve 
from similar institutional bases. North (1990), whilst recognising the contribution of 
neo-classical economics to an understanding of scarcity and competition, argues that the 
assumptions of zero transaction costs, wealth-maximising individuals and complete 
information do not hold in the real world. He argues that a theory of institutions, and the 
effect institutions have on the economy and historical development, should assume that 
individuals act on incomplete, subjective and often erroneous information and that 
individuals do not necessarily act to maximise individual wealth. According to 
Ensminger (1996), institutional change does not always move in the direction of 
increasing efficiency or economic growth and institutional theory attempts to analyse 
why this is so.
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Of particular relevance to this thesis, scholars have broadened the scope of institutional 
theory beyond market settings and economic growth to consider politics and ideology. 
For example, Bates (1989) argues that public policies do not evolve due to objective 
decision-making by government in pursuit of optimal efficiency, but rather as a result of 
the struggle between competing interests: . .policy is the product of the interested
actions of private parties who bring their resources to bear upon politically ambitious 
politicians and the political process” (Bates, 1989:5). His analysis of the processes 
leading to Kenyan independence suggests that even when institutions are formed for 
economic reasons, for example types of property rights to land in the Highlands, they 
also have political significance, generating positions of power and political incentives.
In an interesting development on the theory of common property, Reddy (2002) 
advances a theorisation of common property institutions as political agents, explicitly 
negotiating power with the State in order to survive and assert territorial control. She 
uses the term common property institutions instead of common property regimes in 
order to highlight the possibility of institutional change and institutional agency. In her 
case study of communal forests in Guatemala, she found that a particular community 
was using a community institution in order to express power and authority and thus 
maintain control over local resources vis a vis the State.
Libecap (1989) also stresses the political processes involved in the formation of
property rights. He identifies factors such as the relative bargaining power of actors and
their underlying value systems (motives) as well as past distributional norms and
decisions as influencing property rights institutions. His framework:
“focuses on the political bargaining or contracting underlying the establishment 
or change of property institutions, and it examines the motives and political 
power of the various parties involved. This approach is taken because ownership 
structures are politically determined, and they assign both wealth and political
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power in a society. Property rights are viewed here as being more than remnants 
of past legal and social traditions, although they are affected by them, and as 
being molded by political manoeuvring and bargaining among many competing 
interest groups. The stands taken by influential parties and the concessions made 
to reach political agreement on the allocation and definition of rights critically 
fashion the institutions that are adopted at any time. Accordingly, it is important 
to identify the parties involved, the determinates of their bargaining positions 
and political power, and the factors that can lead either to the establishment of 
new or modification of existing property rights institutions.” (Libecap, 1989:10- 
11).
By focusing on the political nature of institutions, scholars are able to study institutional 
choice and change as a result of asymmetries in power and distributional conflict. 
Because property rights distribute rewards in society, they therefore provide incentives 
for some interests to seek changes in property rights institutions whilst others have a 
vested interest in preserving the status quo. The outcomes produce winners and losers. 
The relative bargaining power of the parties and competing interest groups (whether 
individuals or organisations) influences the distributive outcomes, with potential losers 
having the incentive to impede change, whilst potential winners have the incentive to 
support and facilitate property rights change (Knight, 1992; Libecap, 1989). Bargaining 
power is based on factors such as financial and other resources (for example, 
technological) that can be used to influence outcomes, the knowledge base of the 
bargaining parties and their links to those with political power. Ensminger (1996:6-7) 
defines bargaining power as:>
“one’s ability to get what one wants from others. It may come from greater wealth 
or social position or the ability to manipulate the ideology of others... Bargaining 
power is determined by the preexisting institutional, organisational and ideological 
configuration... [and] can also be used to effect changes in each of these domains”.
Bargaining power can be based on voluntary and involuntary exchange, the former 
being for example when wealth is used to effect change and the latter when force is used 
to compel others to comply with change. The political nature of property rights
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institutions is revealed by analysing the way that bargaining parties have different levels 
of power to influence outcomes, and that those with the most power (financially, 
politically or technologically) are most likely to get the property rights institutions they 
want. This undermines the neutral approach to property rights assumed by prevailing 
economic and legal approaches described in section 2.3 above, that implies the choice 
of property rights is linked to socially and economically efficient resource allocation. 
Ensminger argues that, given that some actors have more bargaining power than others, 
as well as different goals, then the institutions they promote rarely lead to the most 
efficient outcome for society as whole. The distribution of any gains from institutional 
change are not necessarily or even usually evenly spread through society, with some 
being worse off -  as Ensminger notes: “This outcome is ultimately related to the 
preexisting division of power in the society, which may be marshalled to revise the 
institutional structure to further the gains of small interest groups even more” 
(Ensminger, 1996:28). North also explicitly breaks any link between institutions and 
efficiency: “Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially 
efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of 
those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (North, 1990:16) and argues that 
the bargaining strength of individuals and organisations is fundamental to whether 
property rights changes occur or not: “only when it is in the interest of those with 
sufficient bargaining strength to alter the formal rules will there be major changes in the 
formal institutional framework” (North, 1990:68). Using the same logic in reverse, 
based on a comparative analysis of four natural resource case studies in the USA, 
Libecap (1989) argues that vested interests in the status quo will resist changes to the 
institutional framework that they perceive would make them worse off economically or
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politically10. Bates’ analysis (1989) reveals that commercial interests do not necessarily 
hold the most bargaining power, as shown in the context of a political climate in Kenya 
supporting redistributive policies that found electoral favour with large swathes of the 
rural population. This is also echoed in the findings of Libecap (1989) and his case 
study of 19th century forest lands in the USA: private timber interests failed to establish 
private rights to large areas of timber lands because such a policy went against the 
existing precedent of small lots for small farmers and homesteaders that was politically 
popular and therefore important for Congress members, even if, according to Libecap, 
not necessarily the most economically efficient allocation.
The role of ideology as a factor in institutional choice and change has been identified as 
a significant one. Ideology is variously described by institutionalist scholars as the 
subjective models that individuals have to explain the world around them, which are 
often based on incomplete or erroneous information (North, 1990) and as the values and 
beliefs that determine people’s goals and shape their choices, which can involve 
altruism as well as self-interest (Ensminger, 1996). North states that such ideologies 
exist at the microlevel of individual relationships as well as at the macrolevel of 
organisational ideologies (his examples are religion or communism), and that these 
theories are influenced by individuals’ normative views of how the world should be 
organised. Any decision-making is thus influenced by the subjective beliefs and 
motives of the actors and therefore actors’ perceptions matter (North, 1990: 137). 
Ensminger defines ideology as “the values and beliefs that determine people’s goals.and 
shape their choices” (1996:5). It is ideology that shapes people’s notions of fairness and 
justice, including the fairness of different systems of rights. This in turn affects peoples’
10 The four case studies Libecap (1989) analyses are mineral rights, federal land policies, fisheries and the 
utilization o f  oil fields.
willingness to comply with particular systems of rights. Ensminger uses ideology as a 
way of explaining non-rational behaviour, citing the example of people with strong 
ideological convictions about environmental protection who may advocate changes in 
property rights that they deem will best accomplish this .end, regardless of the economic 
implications of this change. Her case study of the Orma in Kenya identifies property 
rights changes that have evolved as a result of a number of factors, amongst which is 
ideology regarding the proper distribution of benefits within the society (other factors 
identified are the economic consequences and the bargaining power of various interest 
groups). Wang (2001), in his case study of the evolution of property rights to fishery 
resources in Longlake, China, identifies ideology as a key factor in local responses to 
property rights change. He found that local fishermen used a Chinese proverb “the law 
does not punish the multitude” to justify continued fishing despite the new state- 
imposed fishing rights that were introduced. In essence, the proverb “implies that the 
law is not a law when a multitude of the population whom it intends to rule oppose it” 
(Wang, 2001:429). However, ideology is not fixed and people’s values and beliefs 
change over time. Wang explains the Longlake fishermens’ eventual acceptance of the 
new property rights in large part as a result of shifting ideological beliefs.
A final factor identified as significant by institutional theorists which is worth 
considering within the analytical framework developed for this thesis is the role of 
history, in particular the concept of path dependence. This is defined as the constraints 
placed on future behaviour by the existing institutional and ideological structures in a 
society (Ensminger, 1996). Whilst North (1990) stresses that path dependence does not 
mean that the future is pre-determined by the past, and that there are always a number of 
choices along the path of institutional evolution, nonetheless he proposes that the
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“cultural inheritance” of a society can influence the ability of bargaining parties to 
effect institutional change. Libecap sees path dependence as a limiting factor to the 
range of possible institutional solutions: “Past legislation and court actions help to 
define both existing property rights and the range of possible institutional changes 
within the current political system” (Libecap, 1989:22). He cites the example of 
fisheries in the USA, whereby two legal traditions have, he argues, effectively ruled out 
the consideration of private property rights to fish stocks: firstly, private rights to fish 
are traditionally assigned only upon capture; and secondly, the long-standing protection 
of low-cost access to fisheries by all citizens. Libecap argues that, although the nature of 
the constraints posed by history depend on the case in question, in order to understand 
the process of institutional change one has to take account of the “prevailing 
distributional norms, past political agreements, the precedents they foster, and the 
vested interests they create” (Libecap, 1989:116). Thus, historical path dependence is an 
important factor in constraining institutional choice. However, an analysis of historical 
processes can also help illuminate factors that influence institutional change. For 
example, changing ideologies and changing power relations between actors over time 
can all influence institutional choice and change. They can create a facilitative 
environment for new institutional approaches, enabling modifications to existing 
arrangements. Ensminger (1996) found that an understanding of past institutions and 
ideology was an important element in tracing the path of institutional change amongst 
the Orma of Kenya.
In summary, the theoretical literature identifies four key factors that influence how 
property rights institutions are chosen and how they are modified over time, see figure
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2.6 below. An analysis of these factors can help explain some of the dynamic processes 
that shape property rights institutions and modifications over time.
Figure 2.6 Factors affecting the establishment and modification of property rights 
Institutions
• Distributional distribution of benefits and decision­
conflict making in society; 
winners and losers
• Bargaining power asymmetries in financial and political 
resources and knowledge between 
bargaining parties;
- competing interest groups; links to those 
in political power;
- pre-existing division of power in society
• Ideology subjective beliefs of 
individuals/organisations; 
- different worldviews
• Path dependence - history matters;
- past institutions and ideology can 
influence future path of institutional 
evolution
As described above, institutional theory provides a rich analytical framework for 
examining the complex processes encapsulated in a broad conceptualisation of property 
outlined in section 2.4. In that section a number of themes were raised, highlighting the 
complexity of issues related to property rights: control and decision-making; power; 
exclusion; distributional conflict and competing rights claims, particularly those of local 
communities, were raised in relation to issues of sustainable development and equitable 
access to and control of resources. The analytical framework elaborated in this section 
recognises that by allocating rights and decision-making authority between often 
competing claimants, property rights institutions are based on distributional conflict, 
with the losers being excluded from the resource; it allows for the study of actors as 
heterogeneous bargaining parties, with those with the most power being in a stronger 
position to influence outcomes and therefore being more likely to get or maintain
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property rights institutions that suit their own interests; it treats as endogenous issues of 
ideology, and that people’s or organisations’ subjective systems of beliefs and values 
affect institutional outcomes; and it recognises the significance of past decisions and 
traditions in constraining and shaping future choices.
Within this framework, prevailing approaches to property rights and natural resources 
can be seen to be influenced by ideology, with the tragedy of the commons and western 
liberal ideologies both being influential in justifying a functional approach to property 
rights based on the efficient management of scarce common pool resources. The 
framework enables an analysis of the power relations inherent in this functional 
approach to property rights institutions and it presents factors that can help explain the 
processes by which property rights institutions are chosen and how they evolve over 
time.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the prevailing property rights approach in environment and 
development literature, identifying the Tragedy of the Commons model as a highly 
influential paradigm within which a focus on the institutional arrangements for the 
management of scarce common pool resources are studied and different property rights 
regimes are proposed. The chapter then discussed concepts of property that are in 
common usage, discussing how the dominant western liberal tradition has led to the 
evolution of political, economic and juridical systems that favour private property rights 
as an expression of political and economic goals, facilitated by the juridical status quo. 
The chapter then considered other aspects of property rights, notably issues of power, 
exclusion and distributive justice. Property rights concepts can be seen to be
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ideologically based and to confer power through the distributive nature of resource 
control and decision making. Using institutional theory, an analytical framework can be 
adopted that explicitly recognises that the establishment and modification of property 
rights institutions are political processes, with factors such as distributional conflict, 
bargaining power, ideology and historical path dependence all being influential. Before 
using this framework to analyse the empirical cases in Chapters Five and Six, the 
following chapter looks at forest management through the property rights lens, using the 
themes raised in the property rights framework elaborated above to analyse dominant 
approaches to forest management and the implicit property rights assumptions of the 
dominant paradigm in relation to forest communities’ rights and access to forest 
resources.
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Chapter Three 
Forest Management and Property Rights
3.1 Introduction
Chapter Two elaborated a comprehensive framework for analysing property rights and 
natural resources that considers the complex political dimensions of property rights 
institutions and the processes surrounding institutional choice and change. Within this 
framework, themes of power relations regarding who has access to the resource, 
competing rights claims and the nature of conflict over access to and control of 
resources can be explored. This chapter provides a context to the case studies by 
considering the dominant forest management regime described in Chapter One, that is 
timber production and conservation, in the light of the theoretical framework elaborated 
in Chapter Two. It explores the multiple layers of rights claims to forests, particularly in 
relation to forest communities’ rights and access to forest resources. Section 3.2 argues 
that the managerial and technical approaches to forest management are based on the 
ideological models of the tragedy of the commons and the western liberal tradition, 
which in turn have led to the dominance of forest management regimes facilitating state 
and corporate control of forest resources. Section 3.3 examines the property rights 
regimes adopted to manage forest resources, discussing the private property-type 
characteristics of the dominant timber regime regarding contracts and concessions, the 
state property characteristics underpinning conservation policies and the growing 
recognition of common property regimes as viable institutions for managing forest 
resources in certain circumstances. Section 3.4 argues that this property rights approach 
masks the fact that forests are contested domains, with forest-dependent communities’ 
rights often at odds with the dominant production/protection regime, despite the
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growing interest in community forest management both as a concept and as a policy 
option. .
3.2 Forest management and prevailing property rights paradigms
As described in Chapter One, the dominant forest management regime is based on 
forests as production units, primarily of timber, and also as providers of globally 
significant ecological services that need protecting from over-use. As a result, the 
dominant ownership pattern of forests is that of state control of public forests, 
accounting for 77% of the world’s forests (White and Martin, 2002), that are then 
subdivided into production or protection forests. The ratio of forests allocated to 
production compared to protection is 8:1 (Johns, 1997). Thus, the two primary goals of 
forest management are production of timber and protection of ecological services, 
with production being predominant. By adopting the property rights framework 
proposed in Chapter Two, the managerial and technical approaches to forest 
management can be seen to have emerged from the tragedy of the commons and the 
western liberal property rights models, with their underlying property rights 
assumptions about state regulation or private property-type rights being the most 
appropriate management options.
The dominant forest management regime takes a centralised, technical and managerial 
approach to forests that, although being essentially ahistorical in approach, is in fact 
often embedded in the colonial histories of many forest-rich countries. An historical 
perspective on how and why property rights to forests have developed is useful because 
it illuminates the political .significance of forests and the processes by which they have 
become increasingly controlled by a central state. Forest management has evolved from
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a European model hundreds of years old. This European model took a utilitarian 
approach to forests as a source of timber for ship-building and construction, fuelled by 
expansionist political objectives. Forest management thus became synonymous with 
timber production, with calculations of sustained timber yields first being applied in 
Germany over 200 years ago (Rietbergen, 1993). In turn, colonial expansion provided 
new supplies of timber in both tropical and new world continents. Under this system, 
areas of forest were identified to be gazetted as part of a Permanent Forest Estate, that is 
those areas of forest to be held by the state to be managed in the long term as forests 
rather than being converted to other land uses. The primary goal was timber production, 
and the secondary goal was conservation of ecological services. For example, a 
significant concern of the British Empire was how to extract timber in order primarily to 
ensure a continued supply of teak for shipbuilding (Palmer, 1989) and railway sleepers 
(Nadkami, 1989) from its dominions and colonies under a systematic timber harvesting 
regime that ensured long-term supplies (Duly, 1924; Bryant, 1997). Modem tropical
i.L
forest management began in India and Burma in the 19 century, and then was 
introduced to Africa and other tropical forest areas. Forestry management techniques 
were introduced based on silvicultural practices and research developed by the colonial 
powers and administered by them (Mather 1990, Palmer 1989). Underlying the 
technical and political objectives of forestry management was the imposition of state 
control over the forest resource, with government forestry departments being 
established to administer forestry policies and protect forest resources for central state 
objectives, regardless of the existing tenure arrangements, with foresters policing the 
forest resources, guarding against "illegal encroachment" by local people: "Few colonial 
foresters saw any connection between forests and the people who lived in, around and 
off them" (Hisham et al, 1991:5). This reflected western ideas of conservation and
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management and often resulted in alienation of forests traditionally held by forest
communities, which in turn paved the way for persistent problems and disputes
(Mather 1990, Palmer 1989). Under this system, the colonial administration's
predisposition would be to ignore or fail to explore adequately the existing tenure
systems and to impose instead alien tenure systems that suited the colonial project of
providing resources to the colonial power, based on the western liberal concept of
ownership of land and natural resources as a source of wealth:
"In each of these countries [in South East Asia] the early 20th Century saw the 
development of new but essentially similar legal frameworks that conferred 
upon central governments immense power and control over land ownership. 
These laws reflected a Western concept of land ownership and political control: 
land ownership was the root of Western wealth. The pattern of land 
management was therefore based on this alien Western concept rather than on 
the traditional Eastern one of land as a communal resource." (Hurst 1990:245)
State control persisted in post-colonial developing countries, as did management 
objectives, perceptions and techniques, although sometimes with a loss of experienced 
colonial forestry staff (Hisham et al, 1991; Palmer, 1989). From the 1960s onwards, the 
development of the commercial forestry sector in tropical countries was seen as one of 
the main agents for tackling economic underdevelopment, through raising foreign 
exchange earnings by the export of timber products for the international forest products 
industry, and was therefore actively promoted by intergovernmental organisations and 
national governments (Westoby, 1987). Local forest communities, amongst the most 
marginal in societies, were often blamed for deforestation as national priorities for 
economic development required the continued central control of forest resources for 
"sustained" production of timber or conversion to agricultural or other uses (Poore, 
1989:151).
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The growing awareness of the ecological significance and fragility of forests has led to 
an increased interest in protection policies as a complementary tool in forest 
management strategies, although the concept of national parks and wilderness
i L
protection first became popular in the 19 century. The establishment of national parks 
has meant that local people are often excluded from continuing with former activities 
within the forest on the grounds that they are responsible for forest degradation and 
over-use (Ghimire 1991). Conservation objectives have been conceived with little or no 
thought for the role the area demarcated as a park or reserve has played in supporting 
local livelihood systems. Thus, local people have often been displaced and/or denied 
access to resources they previously had relied upon for their livelihoods! Not only have 
they been either at worst removed from parks altogether or often not invited to 
participate in planning protected areas, there are occasions when they have not known 
that they were living within a newly created park’s boundaries. For example, in Costa 
Rica’s Barra del Colorado Wildlife Refuge, local residents were informed that 
traditional activities such as hunting and tree cutting now constituted illegal activities 
and all those who did not possess formal land rights were to be expelled (Utting, 1993). 
Another aspect to conservation policies is that they have often allowed commercial 
interests to continue to use the forest resources within a protected area whilst limiting or 
excluding the activities of local people (Shepherd, 1992; Fortmann, 1988): 
"Understandably, such conservation is seen as highly unjust by local people and their 
compliance must be obtained by force" (Shepherd, 1992:9-10).
Thus, the tragedy of the commons model that presents local people as unable to 
sustainably manage common pool resources and the western liberal approach that 
property ownership and wealth creation go hand in hand underlie the dominant forest 
management approach of sustainable production of timber and conservation of
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ecological services. This in turn has justified the appropriation of forest resources from
forest communities by the state:
"In many countries, the term sustainability has served as an ideological decoy 
for governments wishing to appropriate forest resources and extinguish local 
people's customary rights to use them: the latter's forest management systems 
were labelled "unsustainable" and in need of replacement by "rational" 
practices" (Rietbergen, 1993:4-5).
This dominant forest management regime linking production and protection goals has
associated property rights regimes, and these are described in the next section.
3.3 Forest management and property rights regimes
As described in Chapter Two, the regimes approach to property rights is widespread in 
the literature on common pool resources. This is equally applicable to forests as it is to 
other common pool resources such as fisheries, and informs and is informed by forest 
policy developments. The classic presentation of a regimes approach to forests is of an 
evolution in property rights institutions, where common property regimes are a feature 
of the pre-capitalist world, followed by the emergence of state control in Europe and 
colonial rule in the Americas, Asia and Africa, followed by control by independent 
nation states in the post-colonial world; in each of these stages primitive, indigenous 
systems are viewed as giving way, as a matter of course, to state control and modem 
development through increasing privatization (FAO, 2001b; Mather, 1990).
In recent years, increasing attention has focused on the role of communities in managing 
forest resources, not least through the wealth of theoretical and empirical research on 
common property regimes (CPRs) around the world, as described in Chapter Two. This 
has led to increased dialogue at the policy level on the promotion of community 
management as a viable institutional option in managing forest resources (see below for
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a further discussion on CPRs and forest resources). Nevertheless, as discussed in 
Chapter One, states claim control of the majority of the world’s forests. Analysis of 
legal tenure of global forests indicates the predominance of state control of public 
forests, at 77%, followed by 12% being owned by corporate private interests and 7% by 
indigenous and community groups, with a further 4% of state controlled land being 
reserved for indigenous and community groups (White and Martin, 2002).
Given that the majority of the world’s forest lands are controlled and administered by 
governments, how the state administers and allocates these public forest lands is 
significant when considering forest control and management. Governments have in the 
main chosen to grant access rights and to a greater or lesser extent have devolved 
management authority to corporate entities via contractual arrangements to harvest 
timber (White and Martin, 2002, FAO, 2001c). In return for security of access to timber 
for a specified period of time, companies undertake to pay royalties and other fees to the 
governments. This system of privatising rights to timber is widespread and most 
productive forests11 in the world are already licensed to private commercial interests 
(FAO, 2001a; D'Silva and Appanah, 1993).
The current system of forest management prioritises large-scale corporate development 
of timber resources; the belief is that industrial timber production needs large areas to be 
allocated for harvesting and a clear, centralised regulatory framework. The optimal way 
to achieve large-scale timber production is seen as private property-type arrangements 
and privatisation is becoming increasingly important in forest management (FAO,
11 That is those forests that contain commercially available timber stocks
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2001b; Barbier et al, 1994). The main justifications given for privatisation in the forest 
sector are summarised in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 The main justifications for privatisation in the forest sector
• Inappropriateness of direct government 
involvement in commercial forestry
• Improved efficiency through the separation of 
commercial and non-commercial activities
• Improved transparency at the operational level
• Generation of revenues through the sale of state 
forest assets
• Increased efficiency of forest industry
• Reduced public expenditure
Source: FAO, 2001b
Usually, the status of forests as public forests under state control is retained and private 
contracts are awarded to corporate enterprises for such activities and services as timber 
harvesting and processing, forest inventory and monitoring. Less common is the 
privatisation of the forest itself (FAO, 2001b). As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
dominance of the private property-type approach to natural resources is based on the 
premise that private property rights are the most efficient means of allocating scarce 
resources, and that property rights are the right to a benefit stream. Within the dominant 
forest management regime this means the allocation of commercial forest resources 
through tenure, contractual arrangements and rent capture. Thus, states allocate permits 
for timber exploitation, usually either as licences to log a given volume of timber in a
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particular area or, more usually, through allocating forest areas themselves as timber 
concessions. This is the most commonly adopted tenure arrangement in tropical 
rainforest countries (FAO, 2001b). Given the size of the permits (both in terms of 
volume of timber and area), it is usually the corporate sector that is able to exploit 
timber from forestry concessions, and sub-contracting the timber extraction to another 
company is common. Increasingly, due to globalisation within the forestry sector it is 
transnational corporations who control concessions (Dudley et al, 1995; ILO, 2001). 
Although concession allocation data have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy by 
governments, information about concession locations and concession holders are 
increasingly being made public (see Forests Monitor, 1998 and 2001; Global Forest 
Watch, 2000). The publication of concession allocation data, and the mapping of 
concession areas, indicate the level to which many highly forested countries have 
allocated forests to private timber producers.
Within the economic approach to property rights described in Chapter Two, concessions 
can be viewed as a form of property in terms of a bundle of rights to an economic 
stream that others have a duty, enforceable by law, to recognize. The usual 
characteristics of a concession contract confer rights to the concession holder similar to 
those rights associated with private property regimes, such as exclusive rights to the 
resource within the specified area, the main difference being that they are allocated for a 
fixed duration only. Responsibilities associated with the concession award include 
payment of fees and taxes, and concession holders are bound by the laws and 
regulations applicable to the development project (FAO, 2001c). Concessions are 
favoured for allocating large areas of forest and when long term tenure is required to 
attract private investment. Other types of forest allocation include licences, which are
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normally shorter term and for smaller areas of forest. They can be volume-based only, 
that is they allocate the right to extract a specific volume of timber or other forest 
products and are usually less complete rights than concessions, with state involvement 
being greater. There are also permits, which are short-term and often apply to small- 
scale operations. Sometimes they are used within larger forest management units by 
governments to authorise specific activities such as annual cutting rights or road 
building activities. Figure 3.2 summarises the main differences between types of 
contract. The types of tenure agreement are in descending order of “completeness”, that 
is those types of rights most closely associated with private property regimes. These are 
the types of tenure arrangements most favoured by private firms and governments. For 
governments, they represent an effective way to develop forest resources and thus 
generate revenues. For companies, concessions provide long-term, secure access to the 
forest resource without the full responsibility of complete ownership: they are therefore 
often seen as a cheap way to obtain the rights to timber (Sarre, 2003).
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Figure 3.2 Main characteristics of forest allocation contracts
Tenure
type
Use
rights
Exclusivity Transferability Right to 
benefit
Private
Property
Freehold Full Exclusive Complete Complete, 
subject to taxes 
and laws
Concession Varies Exclusive Sometimes
restricted
Complete, 
subject to 
charges, taxes 
and laws
State
Regulation
Licence Restricted Varies:
often
exclusive
Often restricted Limited to 
permited 
activities, 
charges, taxes 
and laws
Permit Restricted Varies: 
often not 
exclusve
Normally
restricted
Limited to 
permitted 
activities, 
charges and 
laws
Source: FAO, 2001c
Thus, although the forests remain public forests controlled by the state, and broad 
management objectives are regulated by forestry and related laws, in the case of forest 
concessions in particular control of the forest resource passes to the private interest; 
what happens on the ground is determined to a large extent by the company undertaking 
the actual timber harvesting. Attempts to define sustainable forest management and 
operationalise it tend to lead to calls for larger areas to be allocated as individual 
concessions and with more secure tenure rights. Johns (1997), Whitmore (1991) and 
Poore (1989) point out that concession agreements rarely cover the length of a full 
harvesting cycle and the size of concessions is often too small for long-term forest 
management objectives, resulting in little incentive to implement long-term sustainable 
management practices. Therefore longer term contracts for larger areas are often 
advocated in order to achieve sustainable forest management. For example, a 
concessionaire in northern Congo, using the polycyclic system to harvest relatively few 
high value timbers dispersed through the forest, successfully argued for the award of
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larger concession lands in order to implement sustainable harvesting. The combined 
size of three adjacent concessions is over 1 million hectares (Forests Monitor, 2001). 
Given the remote location and lack of official presence, the company operates as a 
surrogate state locally, providing schooling and medical facilities not only to workers 
but also to other inhabitants in the area. Such private provision of infrastructure and 
services is a common feature of concession agreements, particularly in remote tropical 
rainforest areas. Whether the promised infrastructure and services materialise, or are of 
a satisfactory quality, depends entirely on the company. In the Congo example cited 
above, although this company seems to b&more responsible than many others operating 
in the region, nevertheless there have been complaints that certain groups of people 
have been excluded from using services (Forests Monitor, 2001).
To summarise, private property-type tenure agreements to large areas of forests mean 
that the private sector control significant forest areas worldwide, with the trend being 
towards increased privatisation (FAO, 2001b). Governments are therefore increasingly 
relinquishing control and management of forest resources either through privatisation of 
forests or state-owned enterprises (as has happened for example in Cameroon and 
Congo) or more commonly through concession arrangements (FAO, 2001c). The 
influence of the private sector is acknowledged in the international forest policy arena. 
The World Bank recognises the private sector as: “the principal financial actor in forest 
production in most countries. Altogether, the level of activity and influence of the 
private sector in forests dwarfs that of the international community -  and sometimes of 
the national government” (World Bank, 2003:8). Thus, regardless of the ownership of 
the forest resource globally, the private sector has become a significant player in 
controlling and managing production forests.
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Notwithstanding the dominant forest management approaches geared towards 
production of timber and protection of ecological services, increasing attention has been 
given to the capacity of local communities to manage forest resources successfully as 
part of the growing literature on the existence and feasibility of common property 
regimes (CPRs). The attributes of successful CPRs were briefly described in Chapter 
Two (see figure 2.2), based on the work of Ostrom (1990) and others such as Jodha 
(1992) and Berkes (1989). The emergence of CPR literature directly challenges the 
Tragedy of the Commons model and has established the concept of communities’ 
ability to self-govem common pool resources. This concept has since been accepted 
fairly widely, with international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN FAO 
not only acknowledging communities’ capacity to manage forest resources but also
1 9proposing such institutions as appropriate instruments in certain circumstances. CPRs 
are seen as particularly appropriate in rehabilitating degraded lands and in managing 
subsistence, non-commercial and locally marketed forest products (Arnold, 1998;
World Bank, 2003). Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000), developing on previous work, 
propose two sets of factors that are relevant to whether communities successfully 
manage forest resources. Developing from the design principles first elaborated by 
Ostrom (1990), which were based primarily on fisheries and water management, they 
identify specific characteristics common to forest resources and users in successful 
forest CPRs. The first set considers the attributes of the forest resource and the second 
set refers to the attributes of the users. These are summarised in figure 3.3 below.
12 For recent examples, see FAO (2001b) and World Bank (2003).
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Figure 3.3 Factors affecting communities’ capacity to manage forest resources
Attributes of the forest resource Attributes of forest users
Feasible
Improvement
There is detectible 
improvement in the 
forest resource
Salience Users are dependent 
on the forest for a 
major portion of their 
livelihood or for 
other important 
variables
Indicators Qualitative and 
quantitative changes 
in forest products 
accurately reflect 
general condition of 
the forest
Common
Understanding
Users have a shared 
image of the forest 
and how their actions 
affect each other and 
the forest
Predictability Availability of forest 
products is relatively 
predictable
Discount rate Most users have a 
sufficiently low 
discount rate in 
relation to future 
benefits
Spatial location, 
terrain, extent
The forest is 
sufficiently small 
given geography and 
communication 
technology that 
accurate information 
of external 
boundaries and 
internal
microenvironments 
are known and low- 
cost monitoring can 
be arranged
Trust and 
reciprocity
Users trust each other 
and relate to each 
other reciprocally
Autonomy Users are able to 
determine access and 
harvesting rules 
without external 
authorities 
countermanding 
them
Prior
organisational 
experience and 
local leadership
Users have acquired 
some level of 
organisational and 
leadership skills
Source: Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, 2000
In addition to the attributes of the users described in figure 3.3, the authors describe two 
others for which there is considerable theoretical debate: the size of the community and
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the heterogeneity of the community. Within the CPR literature, there has been a 
presumption that smaller groups are more likely to organise themselves successfully to 
manage common pool resources and overcome collective action problems (Hardin, 
1990), although case studies also indicate that smaller groups may be unable to monitor 
forest resources or enforce local rules through the courts (Agrawal, 2000). Linked to the 
size of groups is the issue of homogeneity. Another presumption in the CPR literature is 
that the more homogeneous the group, the more likely that there will exist a common 
interest in managing the resource. However, some have argued that if a heterogeneous 
group contains individuals with more power and resources than others within the group 
and those individuals are predisposed to initiating a CPR then they are likely to be able 
to establish a self-governance model (Ostrom, 1999).
Whilst much of the CPR literature is concerned with describing and analysing the 
internal characteristics of CPR user groups and resource attributes, there is also a 
growing interest in the external factors that can hinder or facilitate the success of CPR s 
(Cardoso, 1999; Ostrom, 1999). Commercialisation of forest resources is seen as a 
significant deterrent to the success of CPRs. In Ecuador, the emergence of a commercial 
timber industry has negatively affected the existing CPR institution as some individuals 
gain more financially from the new form of exploitation (Becker and Leon, 2000). 
According to Marchak (1995), community cohesion is difficult to maintain when the 
temptation of market opportunities is present. Arnold (1998) describes some of the 
negative impacts of commercialisation on a CPR. These impacts include increased 
pressures from users both within and outside the CPR, on the basis that the incentives to 
appropriate the commodity and not co-operate, that is to act in an individualistic 
manner, become higher. The breakdown in the mechanisms for exclusion and control
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have been noted when high value items bring incentives for bribery and corruption. The 
opportunity for short-term gains can lead to over-harvesting and degradation of the 
resource. Commercialisation has increased social stratification within the user group, 
with elites capturing the benefits and diverting resources from subsistence use and 
users, which in turn increases the likelihood of social conflict, further destabilising 
community cohesion. The increased value given to the resource as a result of 
commercialisation attracts privatisers and can lead to encroachment. The state has 
incentives to capture rent through royalties and resource appropriation.
On the other hand, citing research by McElwee (1994), Arnold (1998) describes the 
factors that can influence whether CPRs can be successfully established and maintained 
in a commercial environment. CPRs in commercial settings can be successful if user 
groups have the right to self-organise, or at least a guarantee of non-interference. If 
there has been a lack of colonial experience in the past, commercial CPRs are more 
likely to succeed, and if there has been a history of involvement in commercial 
production within the community. Strong group cohesion is an important factor, as is 
the equitable and transparent distribution of benefits within the community, so that they 
are not captured by elites or the state. If the item produced has cultural significance, 
such as native handicrafts, then commercialisation within a CPR setting can succeed. 
McElwee (1994) also found that where appropriate use rules exist or can be developed 
and where competition for the resource is limited and has not proved problematic in the 
past then commercialisation within a CPR setting could succeed.
In practice, CPRs tend to be promoted and sustained in forests where there is limited 
commercial interest (FAO, 2001b; Arnold, 1998). For example, in Nepal, where
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community forestry initiatives have had wide external support, over 12,000 Forest User 
Groups (FUGs) manage about 15% of Nepal’s total forest area. However, most of the 
activity is concentrated in the mid-hills region, where there are few commercial timber 
species, and the forest is managed primarily for subsistence use. In the Terai region, 
which contains most of Nepal’s commercial timber species, FUGs are far less common 
(Satyal Pravat, 2004).
In summary, the CPR literature establishes the theoretical and empirical case that 
communities can self-organise to successfully manage forest resources. This is being 
accepted by international forest policy-makers such as the World Bank and FAO, and 
therefore common property regimes for community forest management have become 
one of the policy options discussed when assessing the most appropriate form of 
institution for managing particular forest resources. Within this global forest policy 
context, community forest management objectives tend to be viewed as non­
commercial, such as rehabilitation of degraded forest lands or provision of subsistence 
goods and sevices such as fuel wood, range and fodder, or products aimed at local or 
specialised markets, for example native handicrafts. CPRs are therefore increasingly 
seen as a complementary institutional option to state regulation or private rights, 
appropriate to multiple resource use goals rather than single resource extraction, and as 
such are not seen as competing with the dominant forest management regime. This 
reflects the functional approach to property rights regimes described in Chapter Two, 
that sees property rights regimes as management tools with CPRs as one of the options 
available to efficiently manage forest resources in the right circumstances.
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So far this chapter has discussed the dominant technical and managerial approaches to 
forest management that have inherent property rights assumptions based on the 
predominant models identified in Chapter Two and discussed above, namely the tragedy 
of the commons model that assumes the inevitability of communities overexploiting 
common-pool resources in the absence of regulation or privatisation, and the western 
liberal tradition that sees private property rights as the most efficient means of 
allocating scarce resources to maximise wealth. The CPR literature has successfully 
provided an additional management option to regulation or privatisation. This functional 
approach to property rights regimes presents a range of non-competing institutional 
options for management of forest resources depending on clearly identified objectives. 
Thus, commercial timber production has been identified by policymakers as the 
predominant goal for forests and private property-type arrangements are widely 
accepted as the most efficient way to achieve that goal, including in public forests 
controlled by the state. In order to protect biodiversity and other environmental goods 
and services, relatively large protected areas have been established where human 
activities are prohibited or reduced, and these have been realised usually under direct 
state management, although management functions are increasingly being privatised. In 
both these cases, the role of forest-dependent communities in managing forests has 
traditionally been marginalized. Community forest management is increasingly being 
recognised as a viable management option in small-scale, non-commercially productive 
or low conservation value forest areas, that is those forest areas not identified as being 
part of the production/protection management regime.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the functional approach to forest management and 
property rights does not address the political dimensions of property rights issues, such
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as power relations, competing rights claims and distributional conflict. The next section 
uses these themes to help understand more fully the complexity of property rights and 
forest management that is masked by the dominant approach described above.
3.4 Forest management, property rights and power
This section argues that the managerial and technical approaches to forest management 
disguise the fact that forests are often contested domains, with forest-dependent 
communities’ rights often at odds with the dominant production/protection regime, 
despite the growing interest in community forest management both as a concept and as 
a policy option. This section explores the multiple layers of rights claims to forests and 
the complex web of inter-relationships between social actors within the political 
conceptualisation of property explored in Chapter Two. By defining property rights as 
relationships between social actors, rather than as relationships between people and 
things, issues of power, control, access to resources, exclusion, participation, 
empowerment and differing, sometimes competing rights claims, become central to the 
focus of analysis of forest management problems and solutions, challenging the status 
quo of the dominant forest management regime. This section develops these themes by 
reference to the forest literature, in particular by investigating the limitations of the 
implicit property rights assumptions of the dominant forest management regime in 
relation to forest communities’ rights and access to forest resources.
As described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 above, the dominant forest management regime is 
based on the view that forests are production units for timber and, to a lesser extent, 
storehouses of biodiversity and other ecological services that need protecting from 
human interference. The inherent property rights assumptions of the dominant regime
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are that large areas of forest are allocated to timber production and protected areas. As a 
result, state and private enterprises dominate forest management and control in terms of 
power structures and the consequent influence on forest tenure and who has access to 
forest resources. Indeed, timber industry chiefs are often closely associated with 
political figures (Whitmore, 1991; Hurst, 1990) and bribery and corruption in the 
forestry sector have been recognised as being prevalent in many countries, for example 
in the allocation of timber concessions (FAO, 2001a; Contreras-Hermosilla, 2001). 
Thus, access to forest resources invariably has political significance rather than being 
simply the interplay of market forces, with commercial interests tending to be the most 
powerful voice in influencing state decision-making (Bryant, 1997; Shepherd, 1992). 
The status quo regarding who has rights to forests is therefore dominated by powerful 
vested interests in the form of the state and the private sector, and these vested interests 
are resistant to change, making reallocation either extremely difficult or politically 
fraught (Dubois, 1997; Marchak, 1995).
Status quo property rights are protected by the juridical system and non-rights holders 
are legally obliged to respect the rights of rights-holders of the resource, regardless of 
the moral legitimacy of the allocation decision or informal claim rights. Highlighting 
the political nature of forest allocation challenges the economic and natural science 
foundations of the dominant technical and managerial approaches to forest 
management. The limitation of an economic approach to forest allocation, based on the 
principle of efficient allocation of bundles of rights to a benefit stream, is that it takes 
property rights assumptions as a non-contested given, not considering the legitimacy of 
the allocation decision, nor the basis upon which non-rights holders have been 
excluded. Natural sciences have only limited scope to consider institutional and other
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social constructs such as property rights. Both economic and natural science approaches
have underlying assumptions (either explicit in the case of economic approaches or
implicit in the case of natural science approaches) about control of the forest and the
objectives of forest management as described in section 3.2 above. These property
rights assumptions are themselves framed by western approaches to property rights as
being superior to other approaches (Hurst, 1990; Neale, 1985), and therefore they view.
alternative property rights systems and forest uses as anachronistic marginal activities
(Mather, 1990). At the forest level, such approaches favour property rights
arrangements that are top-down in nature, disregarding other rights claims and the fact
that forests are often contested domains:
"...state and national governments have no particular reason to acknowledge the 
rights or competence of community foresters since historically central 
governments have competed with local communities and local people for control 
of forest land. All over the world, for centuries, peasants and the state have been 
slugging it out in the forest" (Fortmann and Bruce, 1988:107).
Within the dominant forest management regime, forest communities’ informal rights or 
rights claims to forests are often not recognised because the basic premise of the land 
use decision favouring timber exploitation or protection is accepted as the status quo.
As a consequence, conflicts at the forest level are often ignored or downplayed, for 
example regarding the legitimacy of the timber concession system or its compatibility 
with community forest management and community claims to the same areas of forest. 
In Indonesia, the forest concession system that covers most of the productive forest in 
the country is being challenged by Indonesian NGOs who claim that the concession 
system itself is based on illegal appropriation of forest resources from local 
communities with traditional rights to the forest. Research by Peluso (1992) in 
Indonesia indicates that conflict at the forest level is in essence a conflict between 
competing rights claims, whether formal or informal. Indeed, resistance to colonial and
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post-colonial expropriation of forest resources is an ongoing process, with strategies of
resistance being common even amongst those with very little power (Bryant, 1997;
Pathak, 1994; Peluso, 1992). In India and Brazil, the well-documented struggles of the
Chipko movement and the rubber tappers respectively are in essence about rights to
resources at the local level (Cardoso, 1999; Bandyopadhyay, 1992), although these local
struggles are often appropriated by environmentalists; this can have the mutually
beneficial effect of dressing politically charged notions of distributive justice in the less
1 ^threatening language of environmental protection .
By explicitly considering the power relations inherent in the property rights approaches 
of the dominant forest management regime, the influence of forest communities can be 
seen to be very small compared with the vested interests that benefit from the status quo 
property rights, namely the private sector and state interests. Forest communities often 
have strong informal rights and rights claims to forest resources, and these are often the 
same forests for which formal rights have been awarded either for production or 
protection.
Notwithstanding the increased interest in community forest management as a concept
and as a policy option, as described in section 3.3 above, the amount of forest held
under community control is still relatively small. As shown in Table 1.2, research by
White and Martin (2002) indicates that a total of 11% of forest lands globally are
administered by or owned by community and indigenous groups. When disaggregated,
the figure rises to 22% in developing countries but is only 3% in developed countries.
However, whilst such data are a useful indicator of broad trends, they only present the
13 See Chapter Six for a discussion o f  this in the British Columbia case study. Although, as is shown in 
the Solomon Islands case study in Chapter Five, the two are not always compatible, for example when 
communities want to develop their resource.
status of forests recognised by states’ juridical, systems and do not reflect informal rights 
or rights claims, nor other tenure arrangements. In Mexico and Papua New Guinea, 
which have very high levels of community ownership of the resource (80% and 90% 
respectively), in both countries private sector interests control large parts of the forest 
under private property-type contractual arrangements, such as concessions (Alatorre and 
Boege, 1998; Filer, 1998). Of the 77% of public forests administered by government 
globally, much of this is allocated to private interests as concessions and other 
contractual arrangements, for example in Central African countries and Canada, 
whereas these same forests will also have community rights claims to them. Therefore, 
in many instances, there are layers of use rights and rights claims to forests that overlap 
and conflict, but this is not reflected in official figures. Informal local rights are often 
not officially recognised or accounted for, especially when they conflict with 
government-sanctioned rights. By using the property rights framework elaborated in 
Chapter Two to analyse communities’ rights and access to forest resources, these issues 
and a number of others become apparent, including issues of participation versus 
empowerment and an understanding of the interactions between communities and the 
production and protection regime, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Often, the language of community forest management is used as a means of 
encouraging community participation in broad forest management processes, rather than 
assigning rights to communities for self-governance of forest resources (D’ Silva and 
Appanah, 1993). This relates specifically to the issue of participation compared to 
empowerment, the difference between the two often being about whether property rights 
are assigned to communities or not, and the power they have in decision-making and 
control. Participation through mechanisms such as informing people about policies and
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trying to involve them as actors in community forestry, social forestry and agroforestry 
programmes is no guarantee of success (Utting, 1993; Poffenberger, 1990). The reasons 
for this failure are often associated with the continuing top-down nature of the 
techniques and policies and with a failure to consider the underlying property rights 
issues (Utting, 1993; Gregerson, Draper and Elz, 1989; Cemea, 1988). The problems 
which these policies are intended to resolve, such as soil erosion, poverty, fuelwood 
requirements, poor agricultural land, are often viewed as being technical in nature, 
requiring technical solutions being imposed centrally by national governments or 
international aid agencies, often in ignorance of the actual needs and structure of the 
communities who are involved (Leach, Meams and Scoones 1997; Gregerson, Draper 
and Elz, 1989) or the appropriate tree species for the site (Sargent and Bass, 1992). 
Local people see themselves as becoming unpaid forest guards or labourers in nurseries 
or plantations (Utting, 1993). Shepherd (1992) identifies one cause of negative feelings 
towards social foresters being as a result of local people perceiving that the government 
protects standing timber whilst they have to plant their own trees. These top-down 
policies also rarely consider existing tree tenure arrangements within a community and 
these tenure arrangements in relation to that of the land itself (Fortmann, 1988), 
whereby local people will be reluctant to plant trees if they do not have the rights to the 
use of the trees. Schemes are often introduced by those institutions that have in the past 
incurred the mistrust or outright hostility of the communities they are now trying to 
involve in these projects (Ngaiza, 1991). They are therefore treated with scepticism and 
lack of enthusiasm by groups, many of whom are already marginalised within society 
(Utting, 1993).
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Qualitatively, community forest management is often disadvantaged or undervalued 
because, on the one hand, even in those instances where communities are allocated 
tenure to forest lands, they are often given access to degraded or non-productive forest 
lands (Arnold, 1998; FAO, 2001b). In these instances, community forest management is 
seen as a cost-effective way of rehabilitating degraded land or providing goods and 
services to poor rural communities whilst the priority of timber production remains 
under the control of state and private sector interests. On the other hand, the most 
productive forests or those with the highest conservation value are retained by the state 
as production or protection forests, often regardless of existing rights claims by forest 
communities (Scherr et al, 2003). This leads to conflict and the undermining of forest 
communities’ rights to access forest resources they have often held for centuries.
Although not extensive, the literature on interactions between logging operations and 
local communities reflects some of the issues raised in a comprehensive property rights 
approach, including forests as contested domains, with overlapping and competing 
rights claims. Within the timber regime, there is growing recognition of good practice in 
forest management addressing community usufructuary rights within management plans 
and operational practices (Higman et al, 1999). However, the power of veto, which as 
discussed in Chapter Two is an important element in community control and decision­
making, is rarely accepted in actual timber management policies and operational 
plans.14
14 However, principle 3 o f  the independent certification scheme established by the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) regarding Indigenous Peoples’ Rights specifically states that “The legal and customary 
rights o f  indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, territories and resources shall be 
recognised and respec ted” (emphasis added). This is one o f  the main reasons why the FSC certification 
scheme is considered by environmental groups to be the most appropriate amongst the plethora o f  
schemes currently operating.
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In Guyana, concessions awarded in the early 1990s to timber companies such as the 
Malaysian-owned logging companies Barama Company Limited and Beijaya Group 
overlapped with indigenous communities’ pre-existing titled land rights and rights 
claims to land that they had inhabited without title for hundreds of years. The 
concessions were awarded without prior consultation with the communities and the 
process was widely criticised by indigenous and Amerindian associations and 
international environmental groups (Colchester, 1997, Forests Monitor, 1995). In 
response to criticism, one of the companies, Barama Company Limited, contracted a 
forestry consultancy firm to develop a management plan and undertake an 
environmental and social impact assessment o f the operations. Published in 1993, this 
report highlighted the fact that the majority o f Amerindians living within the concession 
were not living in legally designated Amerindian lands (ECTF, 1993). The report 
pointed to positive impacts expected by the communities, such as the expected 
employment opportunities and provision of improved infrastructure, schools and health 
services. However, it also indicated a number of serious potential environmental and 
social consequences of the company’s operations that would negatively impact the local 
populations, such as loss of traditional sources of food, shelter and livelihoods; friction 
with local communities and increased conflict within communities over jobs and 
markets; increased hunting pressure; pollution!. In a survey conducted in 1994 by the 
Amerindian Peoples Association (APA) and tlhe Forest Peoples’ Programme, of the 
hundreds of indigenous people interviewed wlho lived within the Barama concession, 
many had not even heard of the company or thie fact that they now lived within a 
logging concession: “so we just live on their concessions now. We’re like refugees. We 
have no place” (cited in Colchester, 1997: 122’)- Even in instances where local 
communities negotiated deals with logging coimpanies, the outcome was not as they had
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predicted. The Orealla community in Guyana negotiated contracts with Barama 
company and a Guyanese businessman to supply logs from their lands at prices three 
times higher than those offered by local traders (Sizer, 1996). However, problems soon 
arose within the community as they realised that production and transport costs were 
higher than anticipated; buyers changed shipment dates; long delays in payment led to 
high interest rates on credit for families locally; and greater economic insecurity. As a 
consequence, family diet suffered because men who normally undertook farming and 
food provision were involved in the supply of timber so food had to be bought and 
available cash decreased rather than increased. In addition, because extraction rates 
were high, timber stocks were rapidly depleted. Tensions within the community 
increased and women in particular complained that “log fever” was causing the neglect 
of basic community maintenance and farming activities (Colchester, 1997; Sizer, 1996).
In Cameroon, conflicts between logging companies and forest-dwelling communities 
are common over forest lands that, notwithstanding their legal status as state forests 
allocated as a forest concession, local people regard as still being their traditional village 
forest areas to be cultivated and used to harvest forest products. Under customary use 
rights in Cameroon, village territories are made up of three distinct areas: the village 
itself, consisting of dwellings and crop plantations, the forest close to the village up to a 
distance of about three kilometres away, and which is considered to belong to the 
village exclusively under a mix of individual and communal rules, and the distant forest, 
extending from around three kilometres to up to twelve kilometres away. This latter 
tends to be held in common by several villages with accepted rules generally being 
respected (Penelon, 1997). In one location, a company that had been allocated a forest 
concession ‘repeatedly blamed’ the Ministry for Environment and Forestry for being
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unable or unwilling to prevent local people from ‘uncontrolled’ forest destruction for 
agricultural purposes (Steinhauer-Burkart et al, 1997:21). Elsewhere in Cameroon, 
conflict between local communities and forestry companies are a regular occurrence, 
with complaints that promised infrastructure and other developments do not materialise. 
Also, conflict over particular trees is common: the moabi tree is one of the largest found 
in the Congo basin and is traditionally highly prized locally for its oil and edible fruits, 
providing subsistence and local cash products. However, it is also a high value timber 
species in great demand particularly in Southern Europe and thus conflict over moabi 
trees between villagers and companies is common, particularly in Cameroon 
(Schneemann, 1995). Often conflict is caused within communities, when certain 
individuals benefit from “gifts” to facilitate forestry operations, or when negative 
impacts fall inequitably on certain members of the community such as women, children 
and the elderly who rely more heavily on non-timber forest products (Lapuyade et al, 
2000).
Notwithstanding customary rights, Cameroon’s forest is state-controlled, and is divided 
into permanent and non-permanent forest estates. The former is primarily allocated as 
large forestry concessions up to 200,000 hectares to private interests whilst the latter 
contains the smaller forestry exploitation licences known as ventes de coupe, consisting 
of areas of up to 2,500 hectares, and community forests. Whilst the 1994 forestry law 
makes provision for the establishment of community forests, in fact these are much 
more difficult to establish than commercial forestry operations and thus rights to forest 
resources are skewed against local communities and in favour of private interests. The 
large forestry concessions, known as Unites Forestiere d ’Amenagement (UFAs), require 
management plans but can (and do) operate without them having been drawn up and
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implemented. The smaller forestry licences, ventes de coupe, do not require
management plans at all. On the other hand, community forests cannot be established
without a management plan and there is considerable bureaucracy and costs associated
with identifying forest areas and complying with the legislation (Egbe, 1997). Thus,
whilst commercial operations in the hands of private interests can be operational within
a few weeks or months, it takes at least one year to establish a community forest
(Penelon, 1997). Also, whilst community forests are required to be at the periphery of a
village and in forests not already allocated to forestry operations, there is no
corresponding limitation preventing the establishment of commercial forestry
operations on the periphery of villages (Egbe, 1997). This has resulted in a number of
applications for community forests going through the lengthy application procedures,
only for the same area of forest to be allocated to commercial interests in the meantime
(Forests Monitor, 2001). Even when community forests are established, it is only the
management of the resource which passes to the community, under the operational
guidelines established by the state; the state itself remains the de jure controller of the
resources and retains the right of forfeiture if the obligations of the agreement are not
upheld (Egbe, 1997). Even the World Bank, which was instrumental in the drafting of
the 1994 law, has identified the unfair advantage afforded private interests and the lack
of involvement of local communities in drafting forest policy. Its Operations Evaluation
Department 1999 review of the Cameroonian forestry sector stated:
“the international logging companies that dominate the sector continue to have a 
free hand in the development and use of the forest resources of Cameroon. Local 
communities were left out of the reform process, despite the declared objective to 
include them in forest resource management” (cited in World Rainforest 
Movement, 2002: 49).
In other forest-rich countries with concession systems, conflict and hardship for local 
communities are also common. In Cambodia, most of the areas that the state has granted
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as timber concessions are traditional common property areas to which communities 
have always had access to collect forest products. As a result of the designation as 
concession areas, these traditional rights are under threat or are being denied, causing 
significant hardship to local people and leading to conflict with logging companies 
(ARD, 1998). In the East Malaysian state of Sarawak, which is the largest producer of 
timber in the country, there have long been tensions between indigenous communities 
and the state and forestry companies. Despite the 1957 Sarawak Land Code recognizing 
and protecting indigenous land rights, they are often ignored in the allocation of 
licences to forestry companies, leading to conflict and hardship for indigenous 
communities (Aiken and Leigh, 1992). In particular, the practice of only recognizing 
native customary land as being that which is being cultivated at the time in effect robs 
local communities of their fallow lands and hunting territory, confining them to smaller 
parcels of land that are not ecologically suited to continuous cultivation. Also, trees, 
gardens and crops are often damaged by logging operations, and water sources are 
polluted. As a result, there is a long history of conflict between communities and 
forestry companies, with blockades and direct actions as well as legal challenges being 
mounted on a regular basis (World Rainforest Movement and Forests Monitor, 1998).
These examples demonstrate that forests remain contested domains, with multiple layers 
of rights and rights claims overlapping and often conflicting. However, the powerful 
vested interests that control the legal tenure and decision-making are the private sector 
and the state. In this system, forest communities’ rights are often undervalued, whilst 
commercial interests predominate the forest management decision-making environment.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter critically examines the dominant forest management regime using the 
conceptualization of property rights elaborated in Chapter Two. The chapter not only 
studies the regimes by which access to forest resources are allocated and managed but 
also looks at the ideologies underlying the dominant forest management regime. By 
defining property rights institutions as relationships between social actors (both rights 
holders and non-rights holders), the political dimensions of forest management can be 
explored in terms of unequal power relations, exclusion and competing, often 
conflicting rights claims. Within this property rights framework, the chapter explores 
the managerial and technical approaches to forest management that are based on 
production of timber and protection of environmental services. At the forest level, this 
involves property rights based on the western liberal model, favouring private property- 
type arrangements for timber production, and the tragedy of the commons model that 
supposes the inevitability of resource over-exploitation in the absence of state regulation 
or privatisation. The inherent property rights assumptions of the dominant forest 
management regime are that forests need to be appropriated by the state and bundles of 
rights to timber assigned to commercial interests as the most efficient way to allocate 
resources, and that certain high conservation value forests need to be protected from 
human activity, usually under direct control of the state.
The limitations of the property rights assumptions implicit in the dominant forest 
management regime are that the rights of forest-dependent communities are rarely 
considered. By expanding the property rights analysis to include issues of distributional 
conflict, those who are excluded by specific tenure arrangements, power relations and 
competing rights claims become central to the investigation. Within this framework, the
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prevalent approach to property rights by the dominant forest management regime can be 
seen as masking the fact that forests are contested domains, with forest-dependent 
communities’ rights often at odds with the dominant production/protection regime, 
despite the growing interest in community forest management both as a concept and as 
a policy option. The dominant forest management model ignores the historical 
appropriation of forest resources by the state, a process that in many cases extinguished 
or over-rode the pre-existing rights of local and indigenous communities. Despite this 
process, forest communities have continued to exercise their traditional rights to forests, 
often bringing them into conflict with the state and commercial interests. Concession 
management and other contractual arrangements introduced by the state to devolve 
management and control of the forest resource to the private sector have further 
undermined community rights to forests and created multiple layers of use rights and 
rights claims to the same areas of forest. By addressing issues of power and the often 
conflict-ridden inter-relationships between social actors (both rights holders and non­
rights holders), decisions about resource access and control can be seen within a 
political context. This in turn challenges the assumed neutrality of economic approaches 
to property rights and highlights the difficulty in changing the status quo which is 
supported by powerful vested interests.
Chapters Two and Three have analysed the political nature of property rights in order to 
illuminate complex issues surrounding access to and control of forest resources. Within 
this framework, a number of key questions can be posed to be explored by empirical 
research: how has the dominant forest management regime evolved? What are the 
property rights implications of the dominant forest management regime for 
communities? How do communities and the dominant forest management regime
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interact? These topics are investigated in the case studies presented in Chapters Five and 
Six, which analyse empirical evidence gathered in two locations: the Solomon Islands 
and British Columbia, Canada. First, the next chapter discusses the methodology used, 
within the analytical framework outlined in Chapter Two. It presents the rationale for 
adopting a case study approach to further investigate these questions and why these 
particular locations were selected.
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Chapter Four 
Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter elaborates the practical research design in relation to the theoretical 
framework described in Chapter Two and the research questions posed in Chapter 
Three. The next section synthesises the theory and research questions in relation to the 
aims of the thesis. Section 4.3 discusses the rationale for adopting a case study approach 
and the selection of the Solomon Islands and British Columbia, Canada as the locations 
for the case studies. Section 4.4 discusses the operationalisation of the research, 
including data sources and issues surrounding triangulation and comparability.
4.2 Aims, theoretical framework and research questions
Chapter One identified the aims of the thesis: firstly, to investigate the implicit property 
rights assumptions of the dominant forest management regime, particularly in relation 
to local forest communities’ rights and access to forest resources; and secondly, to 
explore how and why property rights institutions are chosen and how they evolve over 
time. A theoretical framework was elaborated in Chapter Two that focuses on the 
political dimensions of property rights, raising issues of power relations, exclusion and 
competing rights claims. In order to develop an analytical framework to study these 
political dimensions of property rights institutions, the literature on institutional theory 
was used. This literature identifies four key themes that influence how and why 
institutions are chosen and evolve over time: distributional conflict; bargaining power; 
ideology and historical path dependence.
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Chapter Three explored property rights and forest management, conceptualising forests 
as contested domains with different, often competing, claim rights to forests. The 
chapter identified three key research questions to be answered through empirical 
research: how has the dominant forest management regime evolved? What are the 
property rights implications of the forest management regime for communities? How do 
local forest communities and the dominant forest management regime interact? By 
investigating these questions, the aim of the empirical work is to understand how forest 
communities are affected by and interact with the dominant forest management regime, 
namely the state and private sector, regarding access to and control of the forest 
resource. As discussed in Chapter Two, issues of control and decision-making are as 
important as ownership in order to fully understand the property rights implications of 
forest policies and management practice (Blauert and Guidi, 1992; Bromley, 1991). The 
research strategy is therefore to understand the processes surrounding the development 
of property rights and forest management, in particular as they relate to local forest 
communities. The term ‘local forest communities’ is used in the thesis to mean groups 
of people living in forest areas and who have a close economic and social connection to 
these forests, either as a source of livelihoods or as a provider of environmental goods 
and services, for example potable water and soil stabilisation, or both. The term is not 
intended to imply that local forest communities are necessarily homogeneous or are 
socially cohesive. Whilst using the term to refer to groups of people living in villages or 
settlements in forest areas, the author recognises that individuals can identify 
themselves as belonging to several different communities, and allegiances need not be 
only place-based.
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Issues of power, control, distributional conflict and competing rights claims, as 
identified in Chapter Two, are central to the analysis of forest management undertaken 
in this thesis and are fundamental to an understanding of where property rights lie and 
how property rights change. Methodologies based on economic approaches to forest 
management have only a very limited scope for dealing with such issues. Natural 
sciences by their nature tend to ignore institutional and other social constructs such as 
property rights, assuming that control of forest resources is uncontested. What these 
approaches have in common is that they hold underlying assumptions regarding 
decisions about who should control the forest and the objectives of forest control and 
management, without addressing in any detail the contested nature of such authority and 
decision making, conflicting rights claims, distributional conflict, disputed access and 
control. Such issues invariably are political in nature. In the case of forest management, 
"forest use can only be fully understood in relation to the political processes which 
condition forest access" (Bryant 1997:2).
In order to analyse the political and dynamic nature of property rights institutions, 
Chapter Two identifies key analytical factors identified by the institutional theory 
literature that influence institutional choice and change. These factors are distributional 
conflict, bargaining power, ideology and historical path dependence. By using these 
factors to guide the analysis of the empirical data, the research aims to provide a 
framework for comparison and to investigate the complex and dynamic processes by 
which property rights institutions are chosen and how they evolve. The aim is therefore 
to examine the complexity of the web of evolving relationships within and between 
social actors, rather than casting forest communities as passive victims (Pathak, 1994; 
Utting, 1993). It also aims to avoid a structuralist approach that assigns fixed roles and
105
stations to categories of social actors within a hierarchy of influence that implies a 
homogeneous response by groups of social actors. Rather, the aim of the research is to 
explore the extent to which social actors interact with each other in regard to forest use 
and management; and it assumes that the inter-relationships between social actors are 
based on heterogeneous responses that are also significant in shaping forest policy. In 
his study of forest practices in India, Pathak (1994:14) describes the complexity of such 
relationships:
"The relationship between the state and peasants is not a macro-micro duality but a 
spectrum of linkages- running down from the state and the industrial-urban complex 
to the forest-dwelling communities. The state finds its extension in the elites of a 
stratified peasant society. This elite strata is characterised by a Janus-faced 
contradictory character: it is an outpost of the state and a part of the village 
community".
Thus, the thesis specifically aims to avoid the view of forest communities as passive 
victims of policy and decisions rather than having a role to play in influencing forest 
control and use, however limited their power may be. In their work on Burma, India and 
Indonesia, Bryant (1997), Pathak (1994) and Peluso (1992) unpack the layers of inter­
relationships between and within groups of social actors specifically within the context 
of complex political and social processes. By defining property rights as an expression 
of reciprocal relationships between social actors, whether rights holders or non-rights 
holders (see Chapter Two), this thesis explicitly recognises the power relations inherent 
in such relationships. Thus, it is important in empirical work to look not only at where 
the legal rights (tenure) are vested to a piece of forest and its accompanying land (both 
of which could be under the legal control of separate parties), but also to look at who 
has the day to day access and use rights to all or part of the forest and/or its land,
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whether usufructuary rights are vested separately in another group and whether there are 
competing rights claims to the forest resource.
4.3 Rationale for the case study approach
As well as explicitly recognising the political and dynamic nature of institutional choice 
and change, through an analysis of distributional conflict, bargaining power, ideology 
and historical path dependence, the analytical framework also provides a useful tool for 
the analysis of empirical case studies, as can be seen from the literature.15 By 
identifying key themes that can be investigated in different empirical settings, the 
framework allows scope for the individuality of each case to be explored whilst at the 
same time providing analytical tools for comparison. Libecap’s 1989 comparative study 
of four natural resource cases in the USA demonstrates the value of such an approach, 
in that the themes outlined above not only provided an explanatory framework for each 
individual case but also allowed for comparison across the cases, which in turn provided 
further insights into the theoretical approach. The analytical framework therefore offers 
much of value to a study of property rights institutions and the management of forest 
resources, in particular for examining the political nature of forest management and 
issues of how the dominant forest management regime has evolved.
Given that the thesis aims to study the complex processes underlying property rights 
and forest management, the case study approach has been identified as being the most 
appropriate for a number of reasons. Case studies are useful for focusing on analytical
15 O f the key texts on institutional theory referred to in chapter two, most are based on the study o f  one or 
more case studies: Bates (1989) and Ensminger (1996) both present case studies from Kenya; Wang 
(2001) from China; Reddy (2002) from Guatemala. Libecap (1989) presents four sectoral case studies, all 
from the USA. North (1990), on the other hand, uses case studies to illustrate theoretical points in his 
seminal theoretical contribution to institutional theory.
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social units and social processes rather than on individuals in the round (Hakim, 1987). 
They can answer “how” and “why” questions about contemporary events over which 
the researcher has no control (Yin, 1994). Where access to data can be difficult, case 
study research enables a number o f sources to be consulted and it is a useful tool for 
examining processes and relationships. The case study approach is common in the 
literature on forests, as this methodology lends itself to location-specific descriptions 
and analyses. This thesis presents data from two case studies, as this allows for 
comparisons between historical processes and contemporary events in order to 
investigate common themes in different situations. This is akin to literal replication 
(Yin, 1994), which is approached by developing theory and identifying key themes, 
selecting the case studies to predict similar results and designing the case study 
methodology, conducting each case study, writing individual reports, presenting a cross­
case analysis using the common themes which in turn can be used to modify the theory. 
This approach is summarised in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Research design and methodology
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The two case studies selected were the Solomon Islands and British Columbia. There 
were a number of reasons for selecting these two case studies. In both cases, forest 
management, and in particular timber production, was the main natural resource issue in 
the 1990s, generating much heated debate in both places. In both locations, sections of 
civil society mobilised against the timber industry and called upon the state to review 
forest management policies.
In the Solomon Islands, although forest tenure was communal, the state had established 
policies, aided by international donors, to encourage an industrial forestry sector. 
However, there was resistance to this:
“It is a sad thing to learn that the leaders tend not to be aware of the people’s 
concerns and keep on striving their very best to convince people of Russells to 
come to some sort of agreement in order to give an okay for the company to 
carry out logging on the island.” (Ernest Bhuli Kolly, letter to the editor, 
Solomon Star 17th May, 1995).
In British Columbia forest resources were state controlled, with an extensive concession 
management system in place. Civil society protests against the prevailing forest 
management approach reached new heights in the 1990s:
“The government has allowed multinational corporations such as MacMillan 
Bloedel the rights to rape and pillage our forests. What power do the people really 
have? What legal, democratic options are left?...Civil disobedience is the refusal to 
obey certain government laws or demands for the purpose of influencing legislation 
by nonviolent public actions.” (Jane Saville, representing herself at the Clayoquot 
Sound mass trials, British Columbia, September 14, 1993, cited in Maclsaac and 
Champagne, 1994).
Thus, in both locations, the 1990s marked a period of heightening tension between 
social actors regarding control and use of the forest resource. For this reason, both areas 
provide exemplary case studies (Yin, 1994) of processes and relationships relevant to an
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examination of the issues surrounding property rights and forest use and management, 
such as distributional conflict, competing rights claims and power relations between 
rights holders and non-rights holders. These two case studies are interesting 
comparatively not only because of the processes which a property rights analysis can 
expose but also because of these processes in relation to land and forest tenure itself. 
Tenure in the Solomon Islands is almost the diametric opposite of tenure in British 
Columbia. In the Solomon Islands, 87% of land and forest resources were held under 
customary tenure that is formally recognised by the state. In British Columbia, 94% of 
the forest resources were public forests controlled by the provincial government. The 
two case studies therefore provide an opportunity to investigate property rights themes 
under different tenure arrangements.
Having decided on a case study approach and having selected the two case studies, the 
next stage was to decide on how to operationalise the research by deciding on what data 
was to be collated and which methodologies to use. This is described in the next section.
4.4 Operationalisation of the research
One of the first tasks was to identify as far as possible how closely matched data 
sources were likely to be in each of the case study locations, a critical step in producing 
valid and comparable data. In considering data sources, a key issue was access to 
materials. It was assessed that access to materials would be more difficult in the 
Solomon Islands, given the lack of a highly developed bureaucracy or culture of 
transparency at the government level, and so it was decided to use the Solomon Islands 
as the benchmark for data collection, with the British Columbia case being required to 
match the data that was available in the Solomon Islands. The second task was to decide
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on how to collate data. It was decided that field work would form an integral part of the 
research design in order to give an opportunity to gather information about 
contemporary processes within the actual context of each location. A pilot study was 
undertaken, involving visits to both locations in 1995.
From September to mid November 1995 a pilot study was undertaken with visits to the 
Solomon Islands and British Columbia. The aims of this pilot study were to develop the 
overall research strategy in greater detail in the light of on-site experience and possible 
problems; to refine the research task; to identify the units of analysis most appropriate 
to the research questions; to identify sources of primary and secondary data for the 
thesis; and to start data collection. The helpfulness of pilot study work in an overall 
research design has been identified by a number of people (see, for example, Yin, 1994 
and Oppenheim, 1992). The pilot study provides an opportunity to refine data collection 
plans (Yin, 1994) and to develop themes to be explored in semi-structured and/or depth 
interviews (Oppenheim, 1992). The pilot study also provides an opportunity to identify 
an appropriate sampling strategy and the unit(s) of analysis. It is useful for assessing the 
language to be used in questionnaires and interviews. It is also a useful tool for 
developing conceptualisation.
Other significant advantages of a pilot study are that exploratory interviews can help 
identify the variables to be measured and the scales to be used (Oppenheim, 1992) as 
well as identifying valid data for comparison. This was of particular importance for this 
thesis given that the case studies were in two different regions. In summary, the pilot 
study offered the opportunity to assess the relevance to the research questions of a 
comparative case study approach; the appropriateness of the two case studies; the 
identification of suitable data sources; and it enabled a more “on the ground”
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assessment of whether matching data sources existed to provide sound comparative 
data.
These points proved to be of significance during the course of the pilot study. For 
example, ownership and “landowners” were found to be problematic terminology in 
that, although “landowner” was commonly used by Solomon Islanders to indicate their 
interest in a particular piece of land and/or forest, the term was a product of the 
introduction of the concept of “ownership” which, according to Solomon Islanders 
interviewed, was not an accurate reflection of customary tenure in that, traditionally, 
there were no “owners” of land. This point ties in with the discussion about 
conceptualisation of property rights and regimes as presented in Chapter Two. It 
highlights the significance of clarifying the distinction between western concepts of 
ownership and property rights systems operating in other cultural and social systems. 
Thus, in the light of this finding, the Solomon Islands case study refers to “land holders” 
unless citing the terminology used by an interviewee or other data source. The pilot 
study also confirmed that the forest management issue was indeed a highly politicised 
one in both locations with access to forest resources being contested both within the 
realm of policy development and on the ground. This helped with developing a case 
study protocol and refining the questions to be asked in each location. The pilot study 
also allowed for an assessment of data sources to be undertaken and the comparability 
of such data between the cases.
The importance of triangulation to this research was recognised early on as a means of 
neutralising bias. Triangulation in a case study allows for contextualisation and this is 
important given that part of the aim of the study is to investigate the relationships 
between social actors. Its importance became even more apparent, given the finding that
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forestry was a highly politically charged and sensitive issue within the Solomon Islands 
and British Columbia, involving complex processes that influenced and were influenced 
by forest policy developments. As Bulmer and Warwick (1993:327) state: "In complex 
areas of policy or where public debate about the research findings is likely to occur, 
multiple rather than single methods should be used."
Given the sensitive nature of the topic of forestry in the Solomon Islands and British 
Columbia, the potential methodological dilemma was in how to produce research data 
that was not the product of politically charged viewpoints (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993) 
and which could produce methodologically valid data within the constraints of sensitive 
research. One of the aims of the pilot study was to ascertain the general level of 
awareness about forest use as a political issue. The case study protocol was developed 
after the pilot study, once the high levels of awareness of forest management issues in 
both locations became apparent. According to Yin (1994), the case study protocol is the 
blueprint for how to conduct the specific case study, incorporating the project 
objectives, the data collation procedures and the questions used to guide the overall case 
study research, including where appropriate for guiding qualitative interviews. The 
drawing up of a case study protocol enabled the research design to be refined and the 
data collection and analysis to be more focused (see appendix 1).
Within the case study approach, it was decided to use the following methods. Focused 
sampling was used to select respondents for qualitative interviews, in order to gain the 
opinions of key individuals. This complemented the focused sampling strategy used in 
selecting the case studies themselves, where focused sampling is:
“the selective study of particular persons, groups, or institutions, or of particular
relationships, processes or interactions that are expected to offer especially
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illuminating examples, or to provide especially good tests for propositions of a 
broad nature.” (Hakim, 1987:141-142).
Because the case studies evaluate forest policy, administrative records and documents 
were part of the reality being studied and therefore were a useful source of primary data. 
An analysis of administrative records (including archival records) also provided a sound 
basis for a historical review and international comparison. The initial research trip 
highlighted the significance of a historical approach to examining processes and 
relationships on three main counts: it offered one research method which could 
complement others; it provided a longitudinal dimension to the research rather than a 
simple snapshot approach; it illuminated some of the processes behind forest policy 
developments (Ludvig, Hillbom and Walters, 1993; Marchak, 1995). Data sources 
identified for this historical review included a review of the development of colonial 
legislation and land alienations in both areas, royal commissions to assess and 
recommend forest policy and administrative records.
The research methods employed aimed for triangulation of data, using a number of data 
sources, including official and other institutional documentation, historical references, 
newspapers, interviews with key informants and some non-participant observation. The 
aim was to ascertain who had the property rights to the resource and identify conflicting 
claims, identify the structures of communication and inter-relationships between state, 
local communities and economic interests and to put this in a historical context of 
property rights developments.
After the pilot study, further fieldwork was undertaken in each location at different 
times. In August/September 1996 a further research trip was undertaken to the Solomon 
Islands. The data gathering was an extension of what had been collated in the previous
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year. The data gathered over the course of the two trips included documentation, trips to 
forest concessions, non-participant observation, group discussions and qualitative 
interviews with key informants (see appendix 2 for a list of key informants). Interviews 
were carried out with government representatives purposely selected because they dealt 
directly with sustainable forest policy development and the contribution of forestry to 
the economy of the country, NGO representatives and local forest community members. 
Observation of one particular businessman and two community members revealed how 
negotiations were undertaken in practice. Correspondence with and between relevant 
actors was analysed. Administrative documents were collated which were relevant to 
the focus of the study and the research questions. These included site assessments of 
company operations, company documents including those filed with the Registrar of 
Companies for the Solomon Islands and policy and legal documents.
A number of secondary sources were used. A review of the two Solomon Island 
newspapers was undertaken for 1995, noting all articles and letters related to forest 
issues. Other newspaper and magazine articles relevant to the issue were sourced as well 
as documentation from NGOs and commercial operations. Secondary materials were 
also collated at the Law Library of the University of the South Pacific. After the return 
from the field, extensive archival research was undertaken for the Solomon Islands 
using official documentation held in the archives at the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science and the University of London Law Library. In addition, 
correspondence was undertaken with key informants and other sources.
Further British Columbia research was undertaken in January and February 1999. The 
British Columbia fieldwork consisted of collecting both primary and secondary data in
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Vancouver, the provincial capital of Victoria and the Nelson forest region. It was 
decided to focus on a particular region after the pilot study revealed the logistical 
difficulties presented by the distance and cost of travel within the province. The Nelson 
forest region was selected because it presented opportunities to study two separate 
community initiatives within relatively close proximity of each other and within the 
same Ministry of Forests administrative region. Key informants were interviewed in 
each of these locations, as well as in Vancouver and Victoria, and were selected because 
of their involvement in and knowledge of forest management and policy in the province 
and locally (see appendix 2). Key informants were government officials of the Ministry 
of Forests, provincial NGOs and local forest community representatives.
Archival materials were collated at the libraries of the University of British Columbia 
and the University of Victoria as well as being gathered from key informants. Official, 
private sector and civil society policy documents and other administrative records were 
important sources of primary data. Official documents and other interest groups’ 
publications are extensively published on the worldwide web, and this provided a 
comprehensive method of collating additional administrative records. Secondary data 
included newspaper articles, NGO materials and the large body of literature on forest 
management in British Columbia. Additional archival and official documentation was 
collated at the British Library of Political and Economic Science.
4.5 Conclusion
In order to study the complex processes behind the evolution of forest management 
policies and property rights institutions, and to investigate the inter-relationships 
between social actors, it was decided that a case study approach would be the most
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appropriate way to gather relevant data. Two case studies were selected in order to 
provide a more rigorous empirical basis for using the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter Two. A number of data sources were used to provide data triangulation and to 
improve the comparability of data between the two case study locations. The pilot work 
was significant in helping to refine the research task in the light of empirical evidence 
available, making the research task more practically achievable and helping to narrow 
the research focus. This in turn helped to refine the future research strategy for the 
further data collection phase. In total, both case study locations were visited twice 
between 1995 and 1999. Additional archival, official and other policy documentation 
and media reports were collated in the UK. The following two chapters present the case 
study findings and Chapter Seven provides a cross-case analysis, comparing findings 
and relating them to the analytical framework developed in Chapter Two.
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Chapter Five 
Solomon Islands Case Study
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents empirical data on the property rights dimensions of forest 
management and control in the Solomon Islands. It is based on interviews with key 
informants, logging concession visits and non-participant observation conducted in 
1995 and 1996 as well as an analysis of archival records from the 1950s and 1960s in 
order to address the three research questions identified in Chapter Three: How has the 
dominant forest management regime evolved? What are the property rights implications 
of the forest management regime for communities? How do local forest communities and 
the dominant forest management regime interact? The analytical framework elaborated in 
Chapter Two that identified four key factors influencing property rights choice and 
change was used to guide the analysis of the data, the four factors being distributional 
conflict, bargaining power, ideology and historical path dependence. All proved to be 
relevant in the context of forest management in the Solomon Islands and how it 
evolved, helping to explain some of the processes shaping and constraining the 
establishment and modification of property rights institutions over time.
Section 5.2 provides a contextual setting for understanding the Solomon Islands case 
study. After a brief description of forest resources in the Solomon Islands, the section 
describes the key characteristics of Solomon Islands society, notably the role of custom 
and customary land tenure. Section 5.3 then analyses the development of forest 
management since the colonial period, highlighting the role of the state in introducing a 
policy framework to facilitate commercial exploitation of timber and the response of 
Solomon Islanders to these developments. It then looks at forest management in the
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1990s, and in particular the emergence of a powerful timber industry. Section 5.4 
describes the nature of the interactions between Solomon Islanders and the timber 
industry in the 1990s, highlighting the political nature of processes surrounding access 
to and control of the forest resource, in particular the asymmetries in power between the 
actors and issues of distributional conflict.
5.2 Case study context
The Solomon Islands, situated in the south west Pacific, north and east of Australia, east 
of Papua New Guinea (see map 5.1), are a scattered double chain of islands, stretching 
in a south-easterly direction for 1,400 km. It is the third largest archipelago in the South 
Pacific, covering 1.28 million km2 of sea, and with a total land area of 28,349 km2, 
comprising 992 islands. There are 6 main islands (varying in length from 140 km to 200 
km and in width from 30 to 5 km), 40 smaller but significant ones and the remainder 
being largely tiny coral atolls and cays. Part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, in the zone of 
convergence of the India-Australia and Pacific plates, the Solomon Islands are 
geographically young and dynamic, with a susceptibility to earthquakes. Cyclones are a 
frequent phenomenon and are the main cause of natural large-scale vegetation 
disturbance. Most of the country is mountainous and 80% covered by tropical 
rainforest, although the botanical composition of the forests varies across the islands, 
according to the geological zone and history of plant and animal dispersal in the region 
(AIDAB/MNR, 1995).
119
Map 5.1 Solomon Islands
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The significance o f Solomon Islands forests from a biodiversity perspective has been 
noted by scientists and environmental non-governmental organisations, and is 
particularly related to the levels o f species endemism which exist, even between the 
islands o f the Solomons. The country is renowned for a high degree o f bird endemism. 
Lees (1990) reported that 72 o f the 163 species o f land birds that breed in the Solomon 
Islands are endemic. A survey in 1995 found three rare species o f flying fox (which is 
dependent on undisturbed natural forest for habitat), including the monkey-faced flying 
fox (Pteralopex anceps), which is only found on Choiseul (Solomon Islands) and 
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) (Solomon Star, 1996a). Dr Jared Diamond stated that 
"there is no other place in the world...where biological phenomena o f  speciation and
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population variation among islands are so obvious" (Diamond, 1976 cited in Lees, 
1990:47). A number of ecological surveys have recommended the designation of 
protected areas, but of the 26,687 km2 of total forest area in the Solomon Islands, the 
amount protected in reserves is virtually non-existent. According to Lees (1990), 
protected areas cover 0.2% of the land area, including one turtle and six bird 
sanctuaries, none of which are managed or effectively protected, one national park to 
the south of the capital, Honiara, which is now degraded logged over forest and an 
ecological reserve on Kolombangara, Western Province, which has since been 
selectively logged. All these reserves were established in the colonial period up to 1978 
and are regarded as being too small to be significant in protecting representative forest 
areas, even if they were effectively protected. No protected areas have been successfully 
established since, although the Maruia Society, under contract to the Australian 
National Parks and Wildlife Service, undertook a survey in 1990 to identify a potential 
protected forest system for the Solomon Islands (Lees, 1990).
The Solomon Islands marine and reef eco-systems are also recognised as of global 
significance from a biodiversity perspective, with the Marovo Lagoon being the world’s 
best defined double barrier island enclosed lagoon, and one of the world’s largest 
lagoons; as a result, it has been proposed for World Heritage Site status. The Solomon 
Islands are also valued because they present rare undisturbed eco-system transitions 
from the sea to mountain tops, including mangrove, lowland and montane forest. The 
maintenance of healthy reefs is dependent on undisturbed forest to prevent siltation and 
is demonstrative of the link between forest and sea environments that is prevalent in the 
Solomon Islands.
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Although there is very little formally protected forest in the Solomon Islands, in fact a 
large-scale threat to the country’s forests only emerged since the 1980s, with the 
increasing presence of industrial-scale logging activities. The lack of formally protected 
areas is mainly a result of the tenure system in the Solomon Islands, with 87% of the 
land being under customary tenure of local clans. A spokesman for the Marovo 
inhabitants stated in 1990 that, although they wanted to protect their land and sea from the 
destructive practices of logging, fishing and mining companies: “We can’t have anything 
like what they call a national park here in Marovo...White men who talk about “conserving 
the natural beauty of Marovo” have the wrong idea. They don’t care too much about 
people, but we want to see people as part of what we look after” (cited in Hviding, 1996: 
56).
Prior to the arrival of colonial forces at the end of the 19th century, which established 
the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1893, there was no unifying vision amongst 
this group of islands, although there were cultural, geographical and physical 
similarities between all Melanesian peoples in the region (Ipo, 1989; Bennett, 1987). 
Land was the basis of cultural identity, with people having an immensely strong 
attachment to land, which continues to this day (Hviding, 1996; Burt, 1994; Larmour, 
1979). Although no written records exist of societies in the Solomon Islands16 prior to 
contact with the European world, descriptions by the initial wave of outside visitors and
16 The Solomon Islands as an identity only emerged with the imposition o f  a British colonial administration 
but the term is used here to refer to the group o f  islands which became the Solomon Islands at independence 
from Britain in 1978 and which prior to that were part o f  the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.
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the oral histories of Solomon Islanders themselves all describe strongly communal units
1 n
based on kinship living in small, dispersed village areas . A common theme amongst 
most authors is the significance of land and the environment to Solomon Islanders, and 
in particular the customary tenure and management of natural resources as a primary 
function and responsibility of clans. Communities lived (and largely still do live) in 
close proximity to the forest resource, using physical and cultural features in the 
landscape such as ridges, streams, nut groves and ancestral shrines to identify clan 
boundaries (Ipo, 1989). They planted gardens within the forest for food, hunted and 
collected fruit and nuts from the forest, used forest plants for medicine and trees for 
constructing houses and canoes. According to Clarke and Thaman (1993), the 
sustainability of traditional agroforestry systems has been established through 
archaeological work, with production being maintained over millennia and the 
environment being protected if not enhanced. Thus, Solomon Islanders’ lives were 
intimately bound to the surrounding environment.
According to the literature, power distribution, whilst not strictly equitable, did not 
generally favour individual gain at the collective expense. Bennett (1987) describes 
slaves and women as having inferior roles to men of the clan, so it seems that the power 
structures favoured the maintenance of customary ways rather than being equitable in 
absolute terms. Chiefs earned their position partly through inheritance but also partly by
17 There are a number o f  ethnographic accounts o f  Solomon Islanders by missionaries and more latterly by 
academics, as well as other historical records such as accounts by former civil servants, which describe 
Solomon Islands societies. See, for example, Ivens (1927); MacQuarrie (1945); Bennett (1987); Allan 
(1990); Keesing (1992); Burt (1994); Hviding (1996). Whilst these need to be read in the context o f  the 
authors and the period in which they wrote, together they present a clear picture o f  the subsistence 
livelihoods and communal societies which made up the Solomon Islands prior to European contact and 
which continue in varying degrees to this day. In addition, there is a small amount o f  published material 
written by Solomon Islanders which records customary laws and tenure, both past and present. See in 
particular chapters in Crocombe and Tuza (1992); chapters in Laracy ed, (1989); Fifi’i, (1989); chapters in 
Larmour ed, (1979).
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their actions in proving they were "Big Men", based on providing for the clan at 
communal feasts and in leading relations within and between clans, including warring 
with other clans18. Whilst clans may have recognised chiefs, these chiefs did not have 
the automatic right to make decisions on behalf of communities but rather were seen as 
wise guardians of custom and genealogies and any decisions were traditionally arrived 
at by consensus of the community (Fifi’i, 1989; Fingleton, 1989). The literature 
describes the traditionally fluid nature of chiefdom and its association with trusteeship 
rather than authority, the latter being a convenience of the colonial administration 
(Hviding, 1996; Fingleton, 1989; Bennett, 1987). Hviding (1996) describes leaders as 
being the guardians of the Marovo Lagoon, in terms of knowing genealogies and the 
environment. The status of chief became enhanced during the colonial period, as this 
facilitated the imposition of colonial rule through dealing with a single identifiable 
representative (Fifi’i, 1989; Fingleton, 1989). Bennett (1987) describes the colonial 
appointment of headmen to facilitate the imposition of government in the villages, and 
that these were not necessarily the same as the traditional chiefs in some parts of the 
Solomon Islands, leading to tensions within communities. Colonial policies and 
missionary activity weakened the power of traditional leaders and many lost it 
completely, and often the fluidity associated with changing big men was replaced with 
more permanent positions of power (Bennett, 1987). Fifi’i (1989) and Keesing (1992), 
describe the Kwaio societies of Malaita as traditionally not having chiefs as such, but 
that these were established in response to political pressures associated with colonialism 
and anti-colonial movements.
18 See Bennett (1987:14-16) for a description o f  the role o f  chiefs.
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Social cohesion, one of the attributes that contribute to robust common property regimes 
as identified by Ostrom (1990) and others, was strong within communities. The details 
of social organisation varied, for example between islands and between "bush" and 
"saltwater" peoples19 but there appear to be universal features throughout Solomon 
Islands culture and society such as communal land and resource tenure, the cultural 
significance of genealogies, the worship of spirits, the development of gardens for food 
and the performance of certain tasks and ceremonies at the clan level. Crocombe and 
Tuza (1992), Fifi’i (1989) and Laracy et al (1989), reveal the pivotal importance of 
Solomon Islanders' relationships with their land and resources and in particular the role 
of custom with regard to social organisation and land tenure. There are 87 identified 
languages in the Solomon Islands, so a shared local language provided a bond between 
local clans and villages, but the primary bond was kinship. A clan comprises a number 
of families which claimed descent from the first settler of the land (Ipo, 1989). Land 
transfers occurred between generations according to his or her descent from a clan. 
Melanesian land tenure systems exhibit great complexity in the different levels of use 
rights accorded to various members of the clan that have no direct comparison within 
western concepts of ownership (Hviding, 1996; Kaitilla, 1995; Burt, 1994). Burt (1994) 
and Hviding (1996) describe the multiplex series of relationships and use rights based 
on “cognatic” or “ambilineal” inheritance through both male and female descent lines. 
Everyone within the clan had varying rights to the territory and responsibilities to each 
other. Interdependent relationships existed not only within communities but also 
between the communities and their territory: “the mutualism between defined units of
19 "Bush" dwellers are those living inland who do not tend to use the resources o f  the marine 
environment, depending primarily on land-based resources for food. "Saltwater" people are the coastal 
dwellers who fish. The communities would generally exchange surpluses but there remained a mistrust 
between them (Hviding, 1996).
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people and their environment is seen to be constitutive of the continued lives of both” 
(Hviding, 1996: 132).
Scholars analysing contemporary social relations in the Solomons as well their history, 
such as Hviding (1996), Burt (1994), Keesing (1992) and Bennett (1987), give detailed 
descriptions of how custom has evolved since the colonial period, with clans adapting 
traditional practices to changing circumstances around them, demonstrating the inherent
0C\ • •flexibility of the institutional arrangements . Custom as social organisation and 
mediator of the relationship between communities and the environment was still the 
predominant force in rural life at the time of field visits in 1995 and 1996. 85% of the 
population of around 400,000 lived a largely subsistence lifestyle in rural villages 
(Gegeo, 1998) and 87% of the land remained under the customary tenure of local clans. 
The day-to-day social interactions afforded by the subsistence or local cash economy were 
the most significant relationships in terms of rural Solomon islanders’ everyday lives. This 
still involved dependence on forests and the sea for food, building materials and medicines. 
The ecological significance of the forest was also important for every day livelihoods: 
potable water; shellfish and fish breeding areas are all dependent on healthy forest 
ecosystems. Despite the fact that more and more Solomon Islanders made journeys 
between islands and had visited towns and the capital, Honiara, the clan remained the 
primary social institution for giving Solomon Islanders their identity and clan ties
20 Hviding's (1996) detailed account o f  the clans in the Marovo Lagoon and the customary management 
institutions which have evolved for their marine environment describes the complex series o f  
relationships between people and place. This work has been particularly helpful in adding depth to my 
understanding o f  issues in the Marovo Lagoon, as described later in the chapter. Keesing's (1992) 
descriptions o f  the Kwaio culture are founded on the concept o f  the Kwaio as seeking to preserve their 
culture in the face o f  increasing westernisation and Christian evangelism, and as such uses the language o f  
resistance and confrontation to describe their actions. Bennett's (1987) monograph is a definitive history 
o f  the Solomon Islands, and, as with Hviding's monograph, has been a significant reference for my work 
on the Solomon Islands. Thematically, it looks at Solomon Islanders' relationships with their 
environment, each other and the outsider world, in terms o f  continuity and change.
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remained strong even when members may have moved away to work in the cash economy: 
“We only survive as a country because of the fact that we have access to land for food 
production and not commodity production” (Paroi, 1996).
However, the literature describes how the colonial period did undermine traditional 
relationships between clans and their environment, and this had relevance for the 
development of forest management policies. For example, colonial anthropologists 
introduced the concept of land being inherited through a single descent line (either 
“matrilineally” or “patrilineally”) and this gained common acceptance as the appropriate 
model within the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. Burt (1994) argues that this 
view was based on anthropological models first researched in Africa and adopted by the 
colonial service in the Pacific, in large part to conform with ideological beliefs 
regarding economic development: “It is no coincidence that unilineal inheritance is 
easier to reconcile with western notions of property, which have proved more 
appropriate to capitalist rural development projects” (Burt, 1994: 318). In addition to 
applying inappropriate inheritance models, attempts were also made to expropriate 
lands. A series of “Waste Land” regulations were introduced between 1900 and 1904 that 
alienated lands classified by the colonial administration as unoccupied, unused and 
unowned in order to establish large-scale commercial copra plantations (Bennett, 1987). 
Customary tenure and the colonial processes to adapt and undermine it have influenced the 
development of forest policy, as outlined in the rest of this chapter.
5.3 The evolution of forest management in the Solomon Islands
This section looks at the evolution of forest management in the Solomon Islands, 
focusing on the property rights assumptions of the dominant management approach and
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its implications for Solomon Islanders. As noted in Chapter Three, there are prevailing 
ideological foundations to the dominant forest management regime based on 
assumptions regarding the most appropriate property rights structures for development 
of the forest resource. The evolution of forest management in the Solomon Islands can 
be understood in terms of the influence of these foundations in relation to customary 
tenure and the bargaining parties involved. Section 5.3.1 studies the development of the 
timber industry in the Solomon Islands and its origins in the colonial period, when the 
British attempted to introduce a forest management model that had been established in 
other colonies such as Burma and India. This model was based on expropriation of 
forest resources by the state for timber production and protection of environmental 
services, with the underlying principles being that the native population did not have the 
technical skills to develop a commercial forestry sector and that customary tenure was 
not appropriate for commercial timber exploitation. The section explores how attempts 
to establish a Permanent Forest Estate were largely unsuccessful in the Solomon 
Islands, allowing for direct bargaining between the industry and landholders. Section
5.3.2 explores forest management in the 1990s, and in particular the structure of the timber 
industry and its relations to the state. In the 1990s, the power of the timber industry grew, 
as the number of timber companies and the levels of timber production grew. The section 
describes how the timber industry was able to operate virtually unchecked due to the weak 
nature of the state, establishing itself as a powerful actor in terms of management and
9  icontrol of the country’s forest resources.
21 Bennett (2000) presents a comprehensive history o f  the forestry sector from 1800 to 1987, published 
after this case study was researched. It provides detailed insights and analysis that support the findings o f  
this case study and is an insightful companion reference alongside her 1997 book.
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5.3.1 Developments up to independence
Since the inception of a Forestry Department in 1952 under the colonial administration,
state forest policy had as its primary goal the development of the forest resource for
large-scale timber production. The Forestry Department was established in 1952 as part
of the post-war identification of natural resources in the Solomon Islands to be exploited
to provide economic development and to ensure that the colony “paid its way”, rather
than the situation to date where the colony had been heavily underwritten by Britain.
The post-war period saw the returning British administrators determined to increase the
productivity and achieve profitability of the Solomon Islands by broadening the
agricultural and resource base, such as forestry, mines and fisheries. Alongside the
identification of timber as a resource to be exploited commercially came the prevalent
property rights approach to such development, namely central colonial control of a
Permanent Forest Estate. The need to establish a Permanent Forest Estate was identified by
F. S. Walker in his inventory of Solomon Islands forests in 1948:
“to control the utilisation of forest resources on the broadest grounds for the future 
welfare of the Protectorate, by protection of water supplies, prevention of erosion, and 
exploitation of timber and other forest produce in such a manner that the productivity 
of the land is not impaired but improved...To achieve these objectives, Government 
must assume a large increase in power” (Walker, 1948:59-60, cited in Bennett, 
1995, emphasis added).
Although broad conservation objectives had been identified alongside timber production, 
by the time a Forestry Department was up and running in the mid 1950s, the emphasis was 
firmly on commercial timber exploitation as the main goal of forest management and 
tenure:
"Forest policy...continues to stress the priority of securing an adequate forest estate for 
the territory. In the prevailing economic conditions, it is accepted that emphasis must 
be directed to areas that can be put to early productive use" (BSIP FD, 1957: p.l).
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Whilst the Forestry Department had few resources during the 1950s, this was a period 
when forestry policy and the first requisite regulations were drafted that would enable a 
push for growth of the timber industry in the 1960s. During 1957, samples of hardwood 
species potentially suitable for trade were sent to timber merchants in Australia, Hong 
Kong, Japan and Karachi, with the intention of establishing overseas commercial interests 
in exploiting timber in the Solomon Islands (BSIP FD, 1957).
Given that customary tenure of land and forests was the predominant form of tenure in the 
Solomon Islands, the objective of establishing commercial timber production on a 
Permanent Forest Estate inevitably meant that the Forestry Department required large- 
scale alienation of forest lands from customary landholders in order to establish a 
Permanent Forest Estate of a sufficient size to allow commercial exploitation. Thus, the 
development of forestry policy was intimately bound to developments in land policy; 
regulations for the former could not be passed until land regulations had been passed. This 
was the dilemma in 1957: whilst forestry legislation had been drafted with the main objects 
of "providing for creation, protection and management of forest reserves and controlling 
the working of forests on "private" lands", the department had to wait for the completion of 
the review of land policy and legislation. "Until such legislation has been passed, the 
activities of the department are of course most severely restricted and the contribution it 
should make to the development of the territory correspondingly delayed" (BSIP FD 
1957:1).
Customary tenure was generally held to be an impediment to development by the colonial 
administration. Colin H Allan was charged with leading a special land commission “to 
recommend in what way the use and ownership of.. .land to which no validated claim is
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found to exist, can best be controlled” (cited in Allan, 1990:171) and produced his report 
on customary land tenure in 1957. However, in his memoirs of his time in the Solomon 
Islands, Allan recalled the predominant “African” viewpoint of many of the District 
Commissioners in the Solomon Islands who just wanted to see land policy implemented, 
with little interest in the complexities of customary tenure as identified by Allan in his 
report (Allan, 1990). He recalled the director of forestry, Keith Trenaman, as being “grimly 
determined that land in which no interests could be found should be dedicated as forest 
estate and managed in perpetuity in the interests of correct forestry management as seen at 
the time” to the detriment, Allan believed, of other more important matters (Allan, 1990: 
186-187).
The significant features of land and forestry regulations for the Forestry Department were 
as follows: the land regulations provided for "vacant" lands to be adjudicated and used as 
"public" lands with title vested in a Trust Board. Forest regulations provided for the legal 
dedication of land to forest use as "forest reserves" and for their proper management, and 
for the constitution of other valuable forest tracts as "forest areas". Thus, the land 
regulations were to identify and obtain vacant land which could be used in the public 
interest and the forest regulations made provisions that such vacant lands could be used as 
part of the Permanent Forest Estate.
The Land and Titles Ordinance [CAP. 56] 1960 allowed for the establishment of a 
Solomon Islands Land Tmst Board, with the chairman of the board being the High 
Commissioner and including 11 Solomon Islanders (Larmour, 1979). It was the duty of the 
board to bring vacant land under public control to "further the use of land in the 
Protectorate for the benefit of the people thereof' (CAP. 56:13(1)). The Board had the
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power to "purchase, take, hold and dispose of land, interests in land, and other property for 
the purposes of this Ordinance" (CAP. 56:13(2)). Vacant land was defined as being any 
land which was neither native customary land nor public land nor registered land. Native 
Customary Land was defined also by the Ordinance, having the following characteristics: 
land which was not registered and which was owned by a Solomon Islander or group of 
Solomon Islanders. This land had to have been cultivated or occupied by the owner(s) 
some time in the 25 years prior to 1st January 1958, or the owners should have received 
payments during those 25 years for permitting someone else (including the government) 
for occupying, cultivating or exercising any rights over the land, or if the owners had been 
identified in court proceedings.
Although the colonial intention towards the forest resource was clear in the 1950s and 
1960s in attempting to gazette a Permanent Forest Estate, they largely failed to establish 
the concept of public interest in land (Larmour, 1979; Bennett, 1995). Indeed, despite the 
land and forestry regulations introduced in 1959 and 1960 respectively, the area of 
government-controlled land available for forestry did not grow beyond that which had 
been obtained during the initial wave of land alienations prior to 1914 (Larmour, 1979). 
This failure was due to resistance by Solomon Islanders, who since the imposition of 
colonial rule in the late 19th century had firmly opposed the colonial administration taking 
over customary lands22. In the early 1960s, the Land Trust Board established by the Land 
and Titles Ordinance failed to find any “vacant” land which could be used as forest 
reserves and the Board was wound up in 1964: “Invited to implement a policy they had no 
say in making, they politely refused to collaborate” (Larmour, 1979: 111). Thus, Solomon
22 See Bennett (1987) for a detailed history o f  colonial attempts to acquire land rights for various 
development proposals and the Solomon Islanders’ responses. Also, Larmour (1979) summarises the 
significant land developments in relation to forestry and the orderly indigenous resistance to these moves.
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Islanders found ways to resist the imposition of colonial land and forest management 
practices that went against their interests.
The 1960s saw the slow start of inclusion of Solomon Islanders in the administration and 
decision-making institutions of the colony, as part of the British plan to withdraw its direct 
rule. This proved to be a decisive period in thwarting once and for all the attempts by the 
colonial administration to establish an expanded Permanent Forest Estate. Debates in the 
Legislative Council throughout the 1960s and culminating in the heated debate 
surrounding the 1968 forestry White Paper and subsequent legislation demonstrate clearly 
the wide gap between the intentions of the colonial Forestry Department and the 
aspirations of Solomon Islanders and their representatives regarding control of the forest 
resource.
By as early as 1963 doubts as to the benefit of the type of development being initiated were 
already being raised (BSIP LC, 1963, p66-85) and conflict was emerging, with the 
establishment of two timber businesses that year by overseas companies, one Japanese (the 
British Solomons Forestry Company by Nanpo Ringyo Kaisha on the major part of Baga 
island) and one British (Levers Pacific Timbers on Gizo island), with other companies 
exploring forest resources elsewhere. There was strong concern expressed by unofficial 
members of the legislative council that the large scale development being welcomed to the 
protectorate, including overseas timber interests, was in fact not in the best interests of 
Solomon Islanders and amounted to exploitation rather than development. They urged that 
Solomon Islanders be given opportunities for developing the resources themselves rather 
than being given to outside companies where profits would go abroad and the natural
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resources may be stripped. The argument was articulated expressly in terms of property
rights to land and forest resources:
“ Be careful, sir, that some of this development does not in the end amount to 
exploitation by taking away the very assets and the only assets that the people of these 
islands have and that belong to the people of these islands. Don’t let the excitement of 
seeing additions to the revenue cloud the big issue of the natural resources of the 
Solomons which belong to the Solomon Islanders” (BSIP LC 1963, p66-67).
Concern was also expressed at the loss of food sources which were currently available to
be harvested by local people which would be reduced or lost due to commercial
exploitation by outside interests, the net gains in business terms not being comparable to
the loss in food sources. One unofficial member of the Legislative Council queried
whether the actual returns would be anythinglike those being anticipated by the
administration, with locally established companies being:
“just a tool or a subsidiary, subjected to the directives of a central Combine who will 
control the marketing and production of everything concerned with it. I see great 
danger in this form of development and I think we could easily be deceived and misled 
into inviting capital at a cost too great to ourselves” (BSIP LC 1963, p73).
The official response to Solomon Islander concerns expressed in the Legislative Council 
about the impacts of forestry and associated land legislation on the resources and people, 
including the potential problems of encouraging foreign investment in the forestry sector, 
was uncompromising in its assertion that Solomon Islanders could not undertake such a 
task:
“The development of certain Natural Resources is, as I am sure everyone appreciates, 
extremely technical and complicated. It is nonsense to believe that small men here 
can take them on or are competent to do so. They are not. Timber extraction is one 
which if it is to succeed has got to be done by outside interests.” (Financial secretary, 
in BSIP LC 1963, p81, emphasis added).
Despite the failure to find “vacant” lands and despite the Solomon Islander opposition to 
forestry objectives established by the colonial administration in the 1960s, the director of
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forestry (known as the ‘Conservator’), K.W. Trenaman, was unchanged in his approach to 
forestry and his belief that there were large tracts of unproductive and vacant lands waiting 
to be pressed into use for national interests. He presented for debate the White Paper on 
forestry to the Legislative Council in November 1968. Objectives remained fundamentally 
unchanged, in that the priority was on developing production forestry in the protectorate, in 
the short term logging forest areas and in the longer term aiming to replant with faster 
growing and more valuable species. In order to achieve these objectives, the Conservator 
stressed that the main forest areas should be dealt with as a national asset, i.e. under the 
control of the state - “This, I would submit, needs to be the root of all our thinking and 
decision on forest policy” (K W Trenaman in BSIP LC, 1968:33). Two of the methods to 
achieve these objectives were the creation of a production forest estate on publicly held 
land and the encouragement by private enterprise or international loan funds in 
reafforestation work, the latter depending on control of the forest resource by the state for 
its success. In order to allay fears, he stressed that land would only be bought with the 
permission of the owners, removing the power of compulsory acquisition, and that they 
would be very careful to ensure that ample land was left for local peoples’ own use: “the 
long term object is to bring into production for the good of the whole country land which 
otherwise, in the foreseeable future, would remain idle and unproductive” (BSIP LC, 
1968:33).
In response to the conservator, Solomon Islander members of the Legislative Council and 
clergy expressed profound concern, particularly in regard to Forest Areas and the property 
rights implications of the policy. The debate between the official and unofficial members 
of the Legislative Council epitomised the differences in approach to property rights and the 
failure of the colonial administration to grasp the significance of customary tenure to
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Solomon Islanders. It also highlighted the distinction between customary tenure and de 
facto control of the forest resource for timber extraction, a distinction which the Solomon 
Islander members were very aware of: “Trees to the Solomon Islanders, as many of the 
members on this side of the House [the unofficial members] will agree with me, are like a 
property, or are a property...so it is wrong to destroy forest areas or property which to 
Solomon Islanders is their property and they feel they have the sole right to that property 
and even the pigs and things in the bush in those areas” (BSIP LC, 1968:36). Members 
raised the fact that people on the ground were not kept informed of developments and had 
a mistrust of a forestry policy which they felt would take away their land and access to 
resources they depended upon. Despite the fact that the declaration of a Forest Area did not 
affect ownership in legal terms, in practice it diminished control by landowners as they 
could be declared without their consent and traditional activities were limited unless 
licences were obtained from the Conservator of Forests or his appointees. They also tied 
up effective control (even though not “ownership”) of forest resources for a long term 
without necessarily being developed for forestry at all. It was urged therefore that Forest 
Areas should only be designated with the agreement of the landowners, a point which the 
Conservator of Forests did not agree with: “...we must accept that in the last resort the 
Government must do what it thinks necessary to control this asset” (BSIP LC, 1968:43- 
44).
The outcome of the intense debates was that the Conservator of Forests made substantive 
changes to the Draft White Paper, whereby all Forest Areas would be cancelled and a 
system of timber licensing for commercial exploitation would take their place. This was 
presented as not altering the ownership of the land and not involving control of the 
landholders’ use of the land and resources for their own use. Subsequently, the Forests and
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Timber Bill was drawn up on the basis of the amended White Paper. This Bill produced a 
certain amount of debate in the Legislative Council based around similar concerns: 
Solomon Islander rights to control the resources on their land, to use forest areas for 
hunting, gardening and other uses which might be designated as Controlled or State 
Forests, the right to appeal against the granting or non-granting of timber licences, and the 
control of the forestry industry by overseas interests (BSIP LC, 1969). Nevertheless, the 
Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Ordinance was passed in 1969 and remained the 
basis of forestry law in the 1990s, with a series of amendments having been passed in the 
meantime. The most significant change was the extension of the licensing system to 
customary land in 1977 as a means of extending the area of forests which could be 
commercially exploited.
In conclusion, the 1950s and 1960s were a fundamentally important period for establishing 
both future forest policy and the seeds of discontent regarding that policy. There were three 
important strands which continued to resonate in the 1990s: 1) the colonial administration 
actively sought to establish a commercial timber industry in the Solomon Islands based on 
soliciting foreign companies to develop the resource, rather than encouraging an 
indigenous-based industry, which was criticised as being exploitation rather than 
development; 2) in order to achieve this vision of a commercial forestry sector, the colonial 
administration actively sought to increase the area of forested land under their direct 
control, despite opposition from Solomon Islanders who successfully resisted further large- 
scale land alienations; 3) Solomon Islanders believed this vision of commercial timber 
production was incompatible with their traditional uses of forests and that, regardless of 
legal tenure, they would lose control of forest resources if the policy was pursued.
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Nevertheless, despite the reservations expressed by representatives in the 1950s and 1960s 
of the likely benefits of a commercial timber industry developed by non-Solomon Island 
businesses, by the 1990s large areas of the country’s forests were indeed under timber 
exploitation plans, largely controlled by overseas interests.
5.3.2 Forest management in the 1990s
This section examines forest management in the Solomon Islands in the 1990s. The 
increasing power and influence of the timber industry in terms of the management and 
control of the forest resource in the 1990s is reflected in the increase in the number of 
companies and the extent of their operations, as well as the relative impunity with which 
they were able to operate. An analysis of the structure of the timber sector and its operating 
environment is useful for understanding how private corporate interests became 
increasingly influential in terms of forest control and management at an operational level 
and were, in the main, able to function with minimal effective controls on their activities 
both in the forest and in terms of economic returns to the country. The ownership structure 
of the timber industry, and in particular the extent of foreign control of Solomon 
Islands-registered timber companies, is relevant for two principal reasons: it facilitated 
legal and illegal transfer pricing activities, whereby the majority of profits made by the 
industry accrued overseas; and it added to the sense of distance from, and therefore lack 
of accountability by, companies managing the forest resource for timber extraction, both 
to landholders and to the state, as described below and in section 5.4.
Up to the early 1980s, most logging took place on government-owned land or customary 
land leased by the government. After that, most commercial logging took place on 
customary land as government-owned land became depleted (Fraser, 1997; Bennett, 1995).
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Although the colonial Forestry Department actively sought to develop the timber 
industry in the 1960s, it was not until the end o f the 1980s that the industry started to 
expand, with the number o f operations granted licenses to log and the volume of timber 
cut increasing markedly. Logging accelerated rapidly in the 1990s to as much as three 
times the government’s annual sustainable harvest rate o f 325,000 cubic metres, see 
figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Log exports from Solomon Islands 1990-1996
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Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands, 1992 and 1995; AIDAB/MNR, 1995; 
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In the 1990s, the Solomon Islands was a significant exporter o f tropical hardwood logs, 
with most o f the country’s timber industry involved in the export o f round logs to the 
South East Asian markets o f Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (FAO, 1999). The industry 
was the primary contributor to GNP and regularly contributed over 50% o f export 
earnings through fiscal measures at the national level (see Central Bank o f Solomon 
Islands, 1992 and 1995). The Solomon Islands national economy was therefore heavily 
reliant on the industry, although the lack o f effective control over the industry meant 
that most o f the profits from logging were not captured by the central government.
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When initially established, the timber industry was largely dominated by Australian, 
British and Japanese logging interests but these companies changed hands over the 
years plus the number of companies operating increased. Despite an increase in 
Solomon Island-registered logging companies in the 1990s (Fraser 1997), many of these 
ostensibly Solomon Islander-controlled licences were in turn owned by, or the 
operations were run by, foreign logging companies and individuals. An analysis of 
records held by the Solomon Islands Companies Registrar carried out during the first 
field trip in 1995 confirmed the widespread opinion amongst all key informants that the 
industry was dominated by Malaysian and Korean interests, with some being held by 
offshore companies (see figure 5.2). However, changes in ownership of licences and 
companies occurred frequently during the 1990s and as a result customary landholders, 
and responsible officials, were often unaware of who was operating the logging licence. 
For example, in September 1995, a visit was made by the author and a colleague in the 
company of a Solomon Islands Development Trust representative to a logging concession 
approximately 15 miles west of Honiara on the Tambea road. Neither of the Forestry 
Department officials interviewed after the visit knew who owned the operation, although 
they knew about it, claiming that it “just appeared one day”. In addition, company records 
were not always up-to-date. For example, in 1993 the Malaysian company Kumpulan 
Emas Berhad bought four logging subsidiaries in the Solomon Islands making it the 
second largest owner of logging licences in the country (Mellor, 1995b). However, the 
Solomon Islands Companies Registrar still showed the previous owners on its company 
records in 1995. In fact, these particular Solomon Island subsidiaries changed hands 
four times between 1990 and 1993 (Forests Monitor, 1996).
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Figure 5.2: Solomon Island registered companies with majority ownership and directorships by foreign nationals
Name of company Current Directors (at date of last entry) Current Shareholders (at date of last entry) Date of last entry
Allardyce Lumber 
Company Limited
D G Minchin (British);
Taiswis Enterprises Ltd (Hong Kong co.); 
Frampton Investments Ltd (Hong Kong 
co.);
J Dixon (Australian) - alternate director 
for Frampton Investments Ltd.
Taiswis Enterprises Ltd (Hong Kong co.): 
Ordinary 8,944 
Preference 107,334
Scripts Ltd (Hong Kong co.):
Ordinary 3,062 
Preference 36,738
1990
Dalsol Ltd Hu Zhuo Lin (Chinese) 
Hong Zhi Ming (Chinese) 
Mo Wulin (Chinese)
Xiao Haojie (Chinese) 
Dong Ming Xun (Chinese)
Zhong Xing Investment (SI) Ltd (SI registered 
company):
Ordinary 278,914
1994
Eagon Resources 
Development
Youngjoo Park (Korean) 
Kyesoo Juhn (Korean) 
Hoyoung Lee (Korean)
Youngjoo Park:
Ordinary 1
Kyesoo Juhn:
Ordinary 1
Eagon Industries Co Ltd: 
Ordinary 1,999,998
1994
Earthmovers Solomons 
Limited
Tiang Ming Sing (Malaysian) 
Teo Keng Seng (Malaysian) 
Hai Ai Ing (Malaysian)
Tiang Ming Sing: 19,999,999
Hai Ai Ing (in trust for Tiang Ming Sing): 1
1994
Eastern Development 
Enterprises
Teo Keng Seng (Malaysian) 
Walter Jones (Solomon Islander) 
Tiang Ming Sing (Malaysian) 
Hai Ai Ing (Malaysian)
Tiang Ming Sing: 180,000 
Walter Jones: 120,000
1993
Golden Springs 
International (SI) Ltd
Kang Wibisono (Indonesian)
Jenny Wibisono (Indonesian) 
Soelistioyati Wibisono (Indonesian) 
Yu Li (Chinese)
Netta Liu (American)
Wong Kin Chun (Hong Kong)
Kang Wibisono: ordinary 400,000 
Jenny Soelistioyati Wibisono: ordinary 50,000 
Soelistioyati Wibisono: ordinary 49,998 
Wong Kin Chun: ordinary 1 
Yu Li: ordinary 1
1993
Goodwill Industries 
Ltd
Ging Hii Yii (Malaysian)
C K Tie (Malaysian)
Dr Philip L K Ling (Malaysian)
Goodwill Resources Ltd (British Virgin Islands): 
ordinary 1
Hii Yii Ging: ordinary 1
1994
Integrated Forest 
Industries (SI) Ltd
Lai Kim Teng (Malaysian) 
Ong Chin Guan (Malaysian) 
Teo Siak Kui (Malaysian)
Axiom Forest Products Ltd (British Virgin 
Islands):
Ordinary 999,999
Axiom Forest Resources Ltd (Hong Kong - in trust 
for above co):
Ordinary 1
1992
Isabel Timber 
Company
Lai Kim Teng (Malaysian)
Harry N G Kim Fan (Malaysian) 
Ong Chin Guan (Malaysian) 
Maraia Wainibu Oakei (Solomon 
Islander)
Axiom Forest Products Ltd (British Virgin 
Islands):
100%
1992
Kalena Timber 
Company
Tiang Ming Sing (Malaysian) 
Hai Ai Ing (Malaysian)
Earthmovers Solomons Limited: 39,999 
Tiang Ming Sing: 1
Directors: 1993 
Shareholders: 1990
Mavingbros Timber 
Company
Robert Belo (Solomon Islander) 
John Hii Kiong Mee (Malaysian) 
Ling Chung Kok (Malaysian) 
Richard Lee Koh Leng (Malaysian) 
Anthony Mark Honey (Australian)
Nila Wood Industries Sdn Bhd (Malaysia): 599 
Hii Kiong Mee (in trust for Nila Wood Industries 
Sdn Bhd): 1
Directors: 
July 1994 
Shareholders: 
May 1994
Mega Corporation Hii Yii Ging (Malaysian) 
Jimmy Luhur (Indonesian) 
Susiwaty Luhur (Indonesian) 
Tie Ching Kiong (Malaysian)
Mega Investment pte ltd (Singapore): 
ordinary 600,000
Directors: 
June 1993 
Shareholders: 
March 1994
Silvania Products Axiom Forest Products Ltd (British Virgin 
Islands):
100%
1991
Star Harbour Timber 
Company
Derek Chin Chee Seng (Malaysian) 
Tan Chee Yion (Malaysian)
Yeong Chee Thong (Malaysian)
1994
Waibona Sawmill and 
Logging Company
Kang Wibisono (Indonesian)
R K C Wong (Hong Kong)
Jenny Soelistiowati Wibisono 
(Indonesian)
Soelistiowati Wibisono (Indonesian)
Dorio Development Company Ltd (Solomon 
Islands):
4,000
Tashio Hashimoto (Japanese): 16,000
Directors: 
September 1992 
Shareholders: 
February 1992
source: information taken from company files held by Registrar of Companies in October 1995.
Other links were known to exist between Solomon Island-registered companies and 
overseas companies and individuals, although often such data are difficult to collate. 
Somma Limited, a company owned by the then Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, had 
links with Ging Hii Yii, director and shareholder in Goodwill Industries Ltd. Ging Hii Yii 
was one of the company secretaries of Somma Ltd. in 1993. Tiang Ming Sing, who was 
the majority shareholder of Earthmovers, Kalena Timber Company and Eastern 
Development Enterprises, also owned Lee Ling Timber Sdn Bhd, a Sarawak-based timber 
company (Mellor, 1995a).
Whilst an analysis of the information presented above indicates a strong presence of 
foreign control of Solomon Island timber companies, if one considers the extent of the 
licences held by such companies the trend of overseas control becomes even more 
marked. The two largest licence holders in the Solomon Islands at the time of field work 
were Kumpulan Emas and Earthmovers (Mellor, 1995a and 1995b). Kumpulan Emas 
had logging rights to 468,494 hectares across its four Solomons subsidiaries, which was 
reported to be 40% of all concessions in the Solomons (Standard Chartered Securities, 
1993), and Earthmovers Solomons Ltd was reported to be the largest logger in the 
Solomons (Mellor, 1995a).
The extent to which the timber industry controlled the forests of the Solomon Islands in 
the 1990s is clear from the quantitative and qualitative data collated during field trips. 
According to a Forestry Department official interviewed in October 1995, by that time 
logging licences had been issued for 4 million cubic metres of timber per annum and 
there were eight major companies operating, all of whom were foreign-controlled. 
Whilst the 4 million cubic metres included forests that were inaccessible at the time,
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accessibility changes with logging techniques23. According to the interviewee, the 
accessible amount using techniques current in 1995 was 1.5 million cubic metres a year, 
whereas the official sustainable harvest rate was 325,000 cubic metres per year, and the 
actual harvest rate in 1995 was around 750,000 cubic metres. Figure 5.3 summarises the 
status of the various tenure and control rights to forests. As already discussed, the 
country is predominantly forested and 87% of land is held under customary tenure.
With 4 million cubic metres of timber licensed in 1995, of which 1.5 million cubic 
metres was technically harvestable, the timber industry was a dominant force in terms of 
actual forest management and control. The two largest timber companies operating in 
the country were estimated to control around 1 million hectares of forests for timber 
production, which was the equivalent of 37% of the total forest area of the country, and 
almost twice the estimated merchantable timber area.
Figure 5.3 Tenure and control of the Solomon Islands forest resource
Total land area 2,754,600 ha
Total forest area 2,668,700 ha
Area under state control 365,800 ha
Area under customary control 2,388,800 ha
Merchantable timber area 598,500 ha
Sustainable timber area 278,221 ha
Sustainable harvest per annum (volume) 325,000 cu m
Actual harvest 1995 (volume) 749,000 cu m
Actual harvest 1996 (volume) 791,000 cu m
Licensed volume 1995 4 million cu m
Harvestable volume 1995 1.5 million cum
% of land area designated as protected 
areas
0.2%
Sources: Solomon Islands Statistical Bulletin (1987); Lees (1990); A
(1995); interviews with Forestry Department, officials, October 1995; interviews 1996.
23 For example, helicopter logging allows extraction o f  trees on steep slopes which were previously 
physically difficult to access. Helicopter logging had just been introduced at the time o f  the first field 
visit in August-September 1995.
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Thus, it is clear that, despite the failure by the colonial administration to establish a
Permanent Forestry Estate, their objective of establishing a large-scale timber industry
developed by overseas operators was nevertheless realised. The timber industry
perspective is rarely revealed, although a stockbroker’s analysis of the Kumpulan Emas
Berhad subsidiaries in the Solomon Islands specifically addressed the customary tenure
system as a source of potential difficulty and conflict for timber companies:
“PNG and Solomons share similar land tenancy systems, whereby native 
communities lay claim to the land (as opposed to the government). Potential 
conflict may emerge over land rights and access, where non-concession lands are 
infringed upon to reach concessions further inland. This problem is likely to be far 
less acute [In the Solomon Islands]...as: the largely Melanesian population is less 
hostile than communities in PNG;...” (Standard Chartered Securities, 1993: 8-9).
Although the Forestry Department failed to expand the Permanent Forestry Estate 
during the 1950s and 1960s, commercial logging took place on government-controlled 
land until the 1980s, after independence had been achieved. Whilst Bennett (1995) and 
Larmour (1979) identify the failure to establish an expanded Permanent Forestry Estate 
as a weakness in the development of effective forestry policy, in those areas where the 
state did have control they did not prove themselves to be competent managers. For 
example, during the colonial period, when a strong state might be expected, the Forestry 
Department did not have the financial or human resources to establish an effective 
reforestation programme on those areas of land which were under its direct control. 
Partly due to this, and partly due to a lack of effective on the ground control over 
logging companies, state forests became depleted (Fraser, 1997; SGS Forestry, 1995). 
This increased the momentum to look to customary lands for new sources of timber and 
legislation was amended in 1977, on the eve of independence, to allow logging licences 
to be granted on customary as well as alienated lands.
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It was not only the colonial administration that had problems controlling forestry
operations. Independent governments also proved themselves unable to control the
industry on government-controlled land. One of the largest and most active logging
operations in the Solomon Islands in the 1990s was Silvania Forest Products, a
subsidiary of Kumpulan Emas Berhad. This logging licence was wholly on government-
controlled land on the island of Vangunu, Western Province. Environmental damage
and breaches of logging codes were documented several times, with the logging licence
being temporarily suspended four times between 1993 and 1995 (World Rainforest
Movement and Forests Monitor, 1998). In an independent assessment carried out under
the auspices of the National Forest Resources Inventory Project (NFRIP), in August
1993, a survey of a plot on the Silvania concession found "The degree of canopy
removal and soil disturbance was the most extensive seen by the authors in any logging
operation in tropical rainforest in any country" (AIDAB/MNR, 1993:18). Reports of site
visits to Silvania operations in 1994 describe both environmental and cultural (tambu)
site damage caused by the company:
"In summary, the environmental impacts of Silvania’s logging operation on 
Vangunu are among the most serious observed to date in Western Province. This 
is particularly disturbing site. An immediate consequence of the logging operation 
is deposit of silt in Marovo Lagoon from rivers flowing down from the eastern 
slopes of Vangunu Islands." (Western Province, 1994a)
"The tambu sites were clearly marked and it would have been difficult not to 
observe the bright red paint emblazoned on the trees on the site. For this reason, it 
appears that the damage caused by the logging operation is the result of a lack of 
understanding of what the tambu site markers represent or else there is total 
disregard for these sites by those involved in the logging process." (Western 
Province, 1994b:4)
Dauvergne (1997) in his comparative study of Indonesian and Solomon Islands state 
forestry policy and management, highlights the administrative weakness of the Solomon 
Islands state resulting in its inability to control the activities of commercial timber
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companies and enforce environmental legislation, leading to unsustainable timber harvests 
and environmental degradation of natural forests: “In the Solomon Islands, state capacity is 
undercut by weak state legal powers over forests, attitudes of decision makers, cultural 
pressures on state members, political instability, bad policies, inadequate bureaucratic 
resources, and to a lesser extent, ties among state officials and corporate executives” 
(Dauvergne, 1997:2).
An oft-quoted feature of the political economy of the forestry sector in the 1990s was 
the close ties between national political figures and the logging industry, sometimes 
manifesting itself in bribery and corruption allegations and the common reference to the 
Solomon Mamoloni administration as being a “pro-logging” government. For example, 
Dauvergne (1997) and Fraser (1997) both point to the increased strength of the ties 
between political figures at the national level and the logging industry as a significant 
contributor to a failure to achieve a sustainable industry. There were claims that vested 
interests in the timber industry were responsible for the downfall of the NCP 
government in November 1994 after defections of MPs across the floor of parliament 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995; Solomon Star, 1995a). Whilst the NCP government 
had been attempting to introduce sustainable forestry policies, the SINURP government, 
which took over the reigns in November 1994 until the next elections in 1997, was 
under the leadership of Solomon Mamaloni, who himself had a logging company. 
Several of his ministers and other senior officials were accused of taking bribes from 
logging companies (Solomon Star, 1995b).
However, even though the NCP government was actively working with bilateral aid 
donors, primarily Australia, Britain and New Zealand, to introduce sustainable forestry
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policies and practices in the early 1990s, including the strengthening of the Timber
Control Unit to monitor logging operations and exports, they failed to reduce the ever-
increasing levels of round log exports or to stem illegal logging and transfer pricing
activities. A consultant’s report for the Ministry of Forests, funded by Australian
bilateral aid money, investigated allegations of fraudulent activities and transfer
pricing24 within the industry (Duncan, 1994). According to this report, which analysed
export and import data and logging and shipping costs, log export prices had been
substantially under-reported in the Solomon Islands, a form of illegal transfer pricing.
Duncan elaborated the extent to which the people and government of the Solomon
Islands were being deprived of suitable revenues from logging activities:
"For the Solomon Islands, the loss of economic surplus to loggers in 1993 was at 
least SI$36 million. There is convincing evidence that the Solomon Islands has 
also been losing large sums of money through under reporting of log prices. For 
1993, when this problem could have been most serious, the loss is estimated at 
SI$94 million. Thus, in terms of timber revenue foregone in 1993 because of the 
form of the logging contract and the likely loss due to under reporting of log prices, 
the Solomon Islands' total loss for 1993 is estimated at SI$130 million - about four 
times Australian aid to that country in 1992-3" (Duncan, 1994:12).
Duncan calculated the amount of revenue loss and compared this to what could have 
been developed in terms of Solomons infrastructure with the same amount of money, 
being equivalent to 1,171 health clinics and 7,189 primary school class rooms.
The governor of the Bank of the Solomon Islands believed that transfer pricing was 
common practice in the Solomon Islands. According to the governor during an 
interview in October 1995, a report into transfer pricing activities was carried out by the
24 Transfer pricing is undertaken by companies to minimise taxes such as corporation tax, royalties and 
export taxes, and in the case o f  the Solomon Islands is undertaken to transfer profits out o f  the country. 
Methods o f  transfer pricing include manipulation o f  book-keeping entries, under-valuing timber prices, 
selling to related companies outside the country at low mark-up rates, double-invoicing, mis-declaring 
species, under-declaring export volumes, under-grading etc (see Callister, 1992 for details o f  transfer 
pricing and other fraudulent activities in the tropical timber trade in the Asia Pacific region).
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Solomon Islands Government but had never been made public. Analysis by Forests 
Monitor (1996) indicated that Kumpulan Emas Berhad (KEB) was involved in transfer 
pricing, as its Solomon Islands subsidiaries did not declare any profits within the 
country whereas the parent company’s group accounts published in Malaysia showed 
that the Solomon Islands operations were the most profitable within the group. At the 
KEB annual meeting in December 1994, Chief Executive Lim Fung Chee said the 
company’s timber division had accounted for 72% of pre-tax profits in the 1994 
financial year despite timber accounting for only 13% of the year’s turnover (Mellor, 
1995b).
In conclusion, the above evidence indicates that the state successfully encouraged the 
development of a large-scale timber industry controlled by overseas private interests, 
even though it failed to establish a Permanent Forest Estate due to Solomon Islander 
resistance. However, the state subsequently failed to control the industry in a number of 
areas crucial to ensuring sustainability, in particular on economic and environmental 
grounds. Although it introduced regulations for the industry, it did not succeed in 
enforcing those regulations. Indeed, links between politicians and the private sector 
sustained and facilitated the growth of the private sector and its control of the forest 
resource. Not only was logging taking place at nearly three times the sustainable level in 
the 1990s, but also environmental damage was reported to be widespread. Although the 
central government was heavily reliant on income from the industry, analysts believed 
that the full value of log exports was not being realised due to poor policies, lack of 
enforcement and fraudulent activities within the industry. Thus, the weak state 
contributed to the increasing power of the timber industry, particularly in relation to its 
bargaining power regarding control of forests. The following section studies the
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relationships between the timber industry and communities, exploring how the timber 
industry was able to dominate forest control in the Solomon Islands even on customary 
held lands.
5.4 Interactions between local forest communities and the timber regime
This section examines the interactions between local communities and the timber 
industry. By using the analytical framework outlined in Chapter Two, and in particular 
by focusing on issues of power imbalances between the bargaining parties and 
distributional conflict over the benefits and costs of timber exploitation, some of the 
complex and dynamic processes behind the relationships between local people and the 
timber industry can be analysed in relation to property rights institutions. Since the 
forest act was amended in 1977 to extend commercial logging to customary land, timber 
companies and local communities were involved in direct negotiations with regard to 
the assignation of timber cutting rights, according to formal procedures established by 
the state, with the communities retaining customary tenure of the land. For those who 
argue that local communities should be active participants in the development process, 
this may suggest a more equitable system, with landholders directly involved in forest 
management decisions, rather than having their land alienated by the state to form a 
Permanent Forest Estate. This was certainly the intention behind Solomon Islanders’ 
resistance to land alienations for a Permanent Forest Estate during the 1960s described 
in section 5.3.1. However, an analysis of the relationships between the social actors 
reveals that these direct interactions have reflected the imbalances in power between the 
bargaining parties and have frequently led to distributional conflict, both between 
communities and the timber industry and within communities themselves.
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In discussing the interactions between the timber industry and local communities and 
the subsequent influence on the evolution of property rights institutions, there are three 
key stages of the inter-relationships that can be identified, although in practice they 
form a continuing web of interactions. This section looks first at the assignation of 
timber cutting rights on customary land, including both formal and informal processes, 
and how asymmetries in power between the bargaining parties affected outcomes; it 
then discusses the effects of logging operations on local communities and the conflicts 
generated within and between communities and with logging companies; and finally, it 
presents data on the emergence of new social networks and institutions which have been 
established as a direct result of opposition to large-scale logging by a foreign-controlled 
timber industry.
5.4.1 Negotiating timber cutting rights
An examination of the negotiation of timber cutting rights needs to consider the formal 
procedures established by law and the informal processes that operated ubiquitously 
throughout the Solomon Islands in order to understand how the processes were 
manipulated to produce outcomes favourable to those with greater bargaining power. As 
described above, forest management policies in the Solomon Islands were geared 
almost exclusively towards commercial timber production by an overseas-controlled 
timber industry. Thus, whilst they retained customary tenure of the land, local 
communities were in effect agreeing to a timber company assuming control of the forest 
resource for timber exploitation. The formal procedures for the allocation of timber 
cutting rights involved a complex and lengthy set of procedures which included organs 
of the state at national, provincial and local levels as well as local communities and 
companies. The following is a description of the steps that were legally required.
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A company wishing to log a particular piece of customary land was obliged, before 
starting negotiations with landholders, to obtain the consent of the central government 
to negotiate. It therefore made an application (called a ‘Form 1 ’) to the Commissioner 
of Forests (national government), paying a licence fee at this stage. If the Commissioner 
accepted the application, notification was sent to the provincial government and the 
relevant local Area Council chairman. The Area Council was then responsible for 
organising a Timber Rights Hearing and for giving one month’s notice of the date, 
location and time of the meeting. The meeting was supposed to involve all relevant 
landholders, who identified themselves as a result of the notification of the Timber 
Rights Hearing. The meeting therefore had to be advertised in an appropriate manner 
(e.g. by radio and/or newspaper) so that the relevant landholders would know of the 
meeting and attend. At the Timber Rights Hearing the landholders and Area Council 
were supposed to discuss the application for logging on their land and whether all the 
relevant landholders were present, they were supposed to decide what timber rights 
were to be given and how the profits would be shared by the landholders, and they were 
to decide how the provincial government would take part in the operation. Written 
minutes of the Timber Rights Hearing were taken. At this stage, if the application to log 
was rejected or if there was no agreement amongst landholders on any of the points 
requiring discussion, then the application was rejected and notification was sent direct 
to the Commissioner of Forests, who advised the company. If there was agreement on 
all points at the Timber Rights Hearing, then a list of all landholders and the 
recommendation to proceed were drawn up and advertised by way of a Public Notice 
for one month. If the agreement was disputed at this stage by any of the landholders 
then the dispute was referred to the Customary Land Appeal Court. If there was no 
resolution of the dispute by this court then the Commissioner of Forests was notified
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and the company advised that timber rights had not been allocated. If the dispute was 
resolved, or if there was no dispute during the one month’s public notice, then a 
Certificate of recommendation and land ownership was issued (known as a ‘Form 2’) 
and sent to the Provincial Secretary who passed it to the Commissioner of Forests who 
notified the company.
At this stage, the company was required to carry out detailed resource surveys and 
identify those areas to be excluded for environmental and social reasons. They were 
required to draw up a Five Year Plan, a Harvesting Plan for the first year and a 
Reforestation Plan. A copy of this information was supposed to be given to each 
relevant landholder group and the company was to brief a provincial representative and 
a forestry division representative of its plans, timescale and proposed terms and 
conditions. The company was obliged to publish the plans and maps and give two 
months’ notice to the community for the date, time and place for the public negotiation 
of the Standard Logging Agreement (known as a ‘Form 4’). At this meeting, the 
landholders and company were present together for the first time, and both parties could 
have legal advisors present. In addition, the both the province and the forestry division 
could have observers present. If agreement was reached, then Form 4 was signed by the 
company and at least 5 representatives chosen by the landholders. Within 14 days of 
this agreement the company notified the Provincial Secretary and the Commissioner of 
Forests.
The Commissioner of Forests then discussed with the Provincial Secretary whether all 
proper procedures were followed and if in agreement the Provincial Secretary issued a 
Certificate approving the Standard Logging Agreement Negotiation (called a ‘Form 3’).
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Rejection or approval at this stage was notified to the Commissioner of Forests who 
then advised the landholders and company within 14 days. The company then prepared 
annual logging plans which were given to the Commissioner of Forests who then gave 
them to. the Provincial Secretary who advised the former if they were acceptable. He 
then in turn issued the licence to log. This was the point at which logging could 
officially commence. A new plan was supposed to be drawn up by the company each 
year which was to be approved by the Commissioner of Forests and Provincial 
Secretary who then issues the annual licence. Figure 5.4 gives a schematic diagram of 
the various stages in the procedure. The diamond shapes on figure 5.4 represent the 
stages where the application for timber cutting rights can be rejected.
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Figure 5.4 Formal procedures and informal processes for allocation o f 
timber cutting rights
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An analysis of the timber rights negotiation process itself, highlighting the key decision­
making stages, is useful for identifying inherent power imbalances. The procedure 
remained top-down in that negotiations started between timber companies and central 
government, filtering down through the tiers of government to reach local communities 
last of all. Both national government in the shape of the Commissioner of Forests and 
provincial government in the shape of the Provincial Secretary were in a position to 
accept or reject the proposal at certain stages.
The landholders first heard of the timber cutting application after it had been submitted 
to the national, provincial and local governments. The local Area Council advertised a 
Timber Rights Hearing, at which all legitimate landholders were supposed to attend.
The practical difficulties of ensuring that all legitimate landholders were made aware of 
the Timber Rights Hearing were great, given the remoteness and isolation of many 
villages, accessible only by canoe or on foot and the lack of telecommunications 
facilities. The radio was the most accessible way of communicating, but there was no 
guarantee of reaching the target audience. And despite the fact that the whole concept 
of timber cutting rights arose because local communities wanted to deal directly with 
timber companies, the only occasion of the whole procedure when land holders and the 
company met face to face was for the negotiation of the Standard Logging Agreement, 
which took place after timber cutting rights had been assigned to the company.
The state did little to try to redress the power imbalance between timber companies and 
local communities. Although producing leaflets to inform local communities about 
formal procedures, the formal procedures themselves remained complex and efforts by 
the Timber Control Unit to explain them in leaflets did little to make them more
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transparent, particularly given the high levels of illiteracy and the fact that the leaflets 
were in English, although this was not widely understood in the rural communities. 
There are 87 local languages in the Solomon Islands, and these represent Solomon 
Islanders’ first language. Solomon Islands pijin is the lingua franca but is not spoken 
by everyone, particularly old people. English is the language of government and 
business but is usually the third language for those Solomon Islanders who speak it. All 
forestry laws and regulations, for example, are in English. The complexity of 
procedures, the geographical remoteness of many communities (often only accessible 
by motorised canoe and/or lengthy and strenuous walking), the abundance of local 
languages, poor access to education and high illiteracy rates, particularly amongst 
women (Adams, 1997), meant that many rural people were effectively excluded from 
informed involvement in forest management decisions and the timber rights 
negotiations in particular.
In addition, the process did not adequately accommodate the complex property rights 
claims which local communities had with regard to the forest resource, in particular the 
different levels of claims. Different members of the community have different levels of 
claims to land and resources based on complex sets of social relations (Hviding, 1996; 
Burt, 1994; Renee, 1979). The literature describes the differentiated gender roles of 
Solomon Islands societies, with men traditionally being more associated with cash- 
generating production, such as decorative wood carving, canoe building and timber 
production and women with subsistence and domestic production, although men and 
women are traditionally involved in creation and maintenance of gardens for 
subsistence food production. The complexity of social institutions involve different use 
rights of different parts of a community’s land and resources (Adams, 1997; Bayliss-
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Smith, 1993). Whilst women inherit land rights, and bilateral descent is traditionally 
important, the matrilineal rights are being undermined by development pressures, in 
particular the timber industry (Adams, 1997; Hviding, 1996; Burt, 1994). This 
reinforces the fact that timber, and decisions about timber production, are considered to 
be man’s business.
It was clear that, despite the apparent inclusion of local communities as partners within 
the decision-making process, power imbalances between the stakeholders were inherent 
in the formal procedures. The complexity of the formal procedures effectively put them 
beyond the access of many rural people, disadvantaging them in a relationship with 
overseas timber companies. Conversely, the complexity of custom tenure and use rights 
to forest resources made identification of relevant landholders a task beyond most 
outsiders, leading to the distortion of power structures within communities.
Furthermore, the role of the state and its relationship to communities is ambiguous, as 
has been noted by Pathak (1994) in his study of the relationship between the state and 
peasant society in India, on the one hand facilitating and encouraging the allocation of 
timber cutting rights, whilst on the other hand being embedded within communities.
Notwithstanding the problems associated with the formal procedures outlined above, the 
system of negotiating and allocating timber cutting rights was open to abuse, with 
informal processes also having an influence on outcomes. In particular, companies were 
able to influence decision-making at key stages in order to obtain positive decisions. 
Informally, companies had usually approached either key landholders or key members 
of the Area Council or key members of the national government (or a combination of 
the three) to ease the path of the negotiations. These informal processes were often the
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cause of social disruption, creating new rural elites at the village level and allegations of 
corruption and illegality. However, from the company’s perspective, this unofficial 
process was usually the only way to be reasonably sure of a successful outcome to their 
application before becoming involved in the lengthy process itself.
A common complaint made by interviewees was that in many cases not all custom
landholders with a legitimate claim were involved in negotiations and signing of logging
agreements with logging companies. According to interviewees and anecdotal information
recounted by NGOs, there appeared to be a "divide and rule" tactic being carried out
whereby company representatives cultivated one or two community members who were
given sums of money or were flown to Honiara or even Kuala Lumpur and introduced to a
lifestyle at the opposite end of the spectrum to that which was experienced in the village.
As a result of these inducements, these landholders negotiated timber cutting rights with
companies supposedly on behalf of the community but in fact often without consultation or
authority to represent them25. It was explained by community members and NGO
representatives interviewed that it suited company negotiators, faced with the complex task
of identifying all the community members with custom tenure over a piece of forest and
gaining their approval to log, to approach certain members of the community with
financial rewards or foreign trips in return for their self-appointment to the role of
community representative. This was undertaken either in anticipation that the selected
person(s) would convince all other relevant landholders to agree to the deal or that these
signatures would suffice to permit logging to go ahead. Thus, the company could report to
government that negotiations with the proper community authorities had taken place and
approval for the logging scheme granted. This was similar to the process which took place
25 This was often cited as a tactic o f  company negotiations in interviews not only in the Solomon Islands but 
also Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.
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during the colonial period when it was expedient to identify key village figures to deal with 
for administrative purposes but served to undermine pre-existing decision-making 
processes (see section 5.2 above). Numerous anecdotes were recounted not only by 
Solomon Islanders but also by expatriate aid workers of loggers arriving by helicopter or 
boat with money for one or two token landholders in return for their signatures on logging 
agreements. These were powerful inducements to break down communal negotiating 
rights and resulted in new elites being formed whilst the majority of land holders were 
disempowered from the process. Interviewees described the divisions which were being 
created within communities over whether logging should be allowed and the power 
imbalance that often resulted when pro-logging voices won or, as described above, went 
ahead and made agreements unilaterally.
The tactic of singling out a representative was observed on two occasions during field 
work. In one instance, a Korean businessman targeted one particular man from Malaita 
and his family in order that this Malaitan would negotiate with members of his community 
to sign logging rights to the Korean businessman. Pressure was exerted daily on the man, 
with the Korean taking every opportunity to persuade and ingratiate himself with the 
Malaitan and his family. The man already had a small local logging company in his village 
on Malaita and a guest house in the capital. The businessman wanted to buy both and 
extensive logging rights in Malaita with the prize being a bible study course in New 
Zealand for the Malaitan. This deal subsequently went through. On another occasion, a 
man from Western Province was observed in Honiara meeting with a logging company 
representative to sign an agreement for logging rights. According to a wantok (someone 
from the same area), he doubted whether the rest of the community knew what the man 
was doing.
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On a field visit to Isabel island in 1996, several letters were studied which were kept on file
by the provincial government from landowner groups to Isabel Timber Company (ITC)
and its owner at the time, Axiom Forest Products, and to the provincial and central
governments, claiming that agreements were signed without understanding what was in
them, or by the wrong people, or they did not realise what they were doing. For example:
“It seems that LR703 and 704 [registered plots of land] are also included in the 
proposed areas for Axiom to log. Some of our registered and non-registered 
trustees were called from gardens or while performing other activities to sign 
against their names and you have claimed that they have now signed an agreement 
with the company. The signing of those papers were done in complete 
v ignorance ” (Extract from a letter to ITC on 26/3/92 by a trustee).
Another piece of correspondence, this time from the Bishop of Isabel stated that:
“If you were to investigate the signatures of the landowners, you will find that some of 
them do not have the power to sign. In some instances I am aware of, the family 
trustees of the land have refused to sign, but other members of the family, not being 
trustees, have signed.” (Letter from Bishop of Isabel dated 16/8/91 to Commissioner 
of Forests).
In addition, the point was made in correspondence that landholders had no access to legal 
advice or other technical advice when dealing with companies. The Isabel provincial legal 
advisor (a VSO, as was usually the case for these positions in the Solomon Islands at that 
time) stated in discussions in August 1996 that she had been intimidated into leaving 
timber rights hearings by members of the Area Council which she had attended in an 
official capacity and with the intention of representing the landholders’ interests.
The role of the Area Council in the determination and allocation of timber cutting rights 
often proved a controversial area, open to misinterpretation and abuse. Whilst the Area 
Council, as the lowest tier of government, should be closest to the people in terms of 
accessibility and accountability there were numerous reports of Area Councils in a number
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of provinces operating both beyond their legal scope and being influenced by outside 
interests, including logging companies. The Area Council was not empowered to 
determine timber rights nor to identify all relevant landholders. Its task was to arrange 
Timber Rights Hearings and advertise them in such a way that all relevant landholders 
knew about the scheduled meeting. They were then bound to report on the outcome of the 
hearing, with an application being rejected if either the community did not want to proceed 
or if there was a dispute as to who were the legitimate landholders.
In a high court case in 1992 (civil case no.52 of 1992), a logging licence issued to Hyundai 
Timber Company Limited and the Timber Rights Determination were revoked after the 
court found that the certificate of customary ownership in Vella La Vella, Western 
Province, was falsified. The court found that at the Vella La Vella Area Council meeting in 
October 1990 which lasted two days and over 100 people attended, an unsigned minute 
recorded the actual ruling - which was that land ownership was disputed and therefore 
timber rights could not be granted. This unsigned minute was subsequently altered by the 
President and Secretary to grant timber rights and issue the certificate of customary 
ownership.
One key informant from the Western Province said that the Area Councils were not 
representative of the local communities and he was working with others in the Marovo 
Lagoon area to try and revive the local customary tribal institutions {butubutus) so that 
they, rather than an externally created local body, formed the basis of local level 
representation. He described how the colonial administration introduced a lower tier
26 Hviding and Bayliss-Smith (2000) analyse in detail the evolution and role o f  butubutus in the Marovo 
Lagoon within the context o f  local social institutions and in relation to outside factors and development 
contexts.
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called Areas Committees to bring a local perspective to colonial rule, but that these were 
not representative. These became the Area Councils post-independence. The key informant 
also described the role of the chief traditionally as a trustee to the community, supposedly 
listening to the community and representing them rather than making decisions on their 
behalf. Other interviews with community members showed that the role of chief was 
crucial and contested, indicating the extent to which new rural elites were being created by 
timber revenues and influence, with individuals claiming to be chiefs or clan leaders when 
they were not. This can be viewed as a continuation of the process started by the 
imposition of colonial rule, which undermined traditional roles and relationships between 
chiefs and others, replacing it with forms of authority more conducive to dealing with a 
colonial administration. As a result, the Area Councils and chiefs (whether self-designated 
or not) often did not properly represent the community and had a credibility deficit 
amongst local communities.
The Area Council was not the only level of government that appeared to be involved in 
informal processes for granting logging licences. According to a confidential annex to a 
1996 document, in 1991-2, Isabel Timber Company’s parent company at the time, Axiom 
Forest Products, obtained concessions to log large parts of Isabel island, “even in some 
cases without the relevant Area Council having met. Hograno Area Council met, and even 
banned them from coming into the Area, but they were still granted the concession from 
central government” (anon, 1996:2).
To summarise, asymmetries in bargaining power between the negotiating parties appeared 
to influence the outcome of timber rights negotiations, with differences in access to 
information, the use of financial inducements and political connections all affecting both
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the formal procedures and informal processes surrounding the allocation of timber cutting 
rights. By singling out specific members of a community and offering them cash or other 
“sweeteners” to sign away timber cutting rights, private timber interests subverted 
communal negotiating rights and traditions, facilitating the creation of new local elites. 
This appeared to contribute to a disruption of pre-existing institutions based on traditional 
cultural practices, a process which was started during the colonial period. The involvement 
of political figures in the industry at national and local levels provided avenues for 
exploiting political connections in order to influence outcomes, sometimes in a fraudulent 
manner. Therefore, despite the apparent equitability of the system, whereby local 
communities had direct negotiating rights and power of veto, an analysis of the relative 
bargaining power of the parties shows how those with access to finance, information and 
political influence were able to achieve favourable institutional outcomes, notably access 
to timber resources. The ongoing relationships once timber cutting rights were assigned are 
described in the next section.
5.4.2 Conflicts over logging
The nature of the relationships between local communities and timber companies once 
timber cutting rights had been assigned was often characterised by continued power 
imbalances, due to a lack of understanding of their rights by local people and the virtual 
impunity with which forestry activities could operate due to weak enforcement. As 
described in section 5.3 above, even basic managerial and technical forestry tenets were 
often ignored by timber companies operating in the Solomon Islands, with companies 
routinely breaching Standard Logging Agreement regulations and the under-resourced 
Forestry Department unable to monitor logging operations and enforce regulations. On 
Isabel Island, during an interview in September 1996, the only Forestry Department
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Timber Control Unit officer stationed on the island described how he had no transport 
or other means to check log export volumes or logging operations, and was reliant on 
timber companies to offer him a ride in a motorised canoe to log ponds. Discussions 
with local people revealed that many of them assumed that this officer was accepting 
bribes from timber companies to turn a blind eye to illegal activities. Local communities 
were usually much better placed than the state to know what a company was doing, 
particularly on their land, but because of the unequal nature of the relationship they 
often felt disempowered. For example, as a result of concerns about the negative 
environmental consequences of logging operations on Isabel Island, several landholders 
requested that an independent environmental and social impact assessment (E&SIA) be 
undertaken on their land. One of the landholders was so intimidated by a logging 
company employee that he would only enter his land with the E&SIA team after 
returning to the provincial capital, Buala, and being assured by the Provincial Secretary 
himself that he was within his rights to do so (Forests Monitor, 1997).
Adding to a sense of powerlessness amongst people interviewed, including state officials, 
was the fact that they did not know who they were dealing with at the corporate level, 
either in terms of not knowing or understanding shareholdings or in terms of senior 
management being remote from site-level operations. Not only NGO and community 
interviewees but also forestry department officials were not always aware of the current 
state of ownership of a particular licence. Key informants from Dorio, Malaita Province, 
described how they were unaware that the company they had entered into timber cutting 
rights agreement with, “Waibona Logging and Sawmilling Company Ltd”, had sold the 
rights to a company controlled by overseas interests, “Golden Spring”. This caused 
problems for them when trying to hold the company accountable through the courts for
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damage caused, as they did not initially know who was responsible (group discussion 
October 1995 and letter from landholders’ lawyer to the company dated 19/6/95).
Distributional conflict as a result of the timber industry occurred within communities 
and between communities and the timber companies. Land disputes within and between 
communities became more common as a result of the commercial timber industry 
(Hviding, 1996; AIDAB/MNR, 1995; Burt, 1994; Post Courier, 1995). Logging was 
described as “splitting the family” with some wanting commercial logging and others 
wanting to undertake small-scale logging themselves. “For this, brothers publicly argue 
against brothers. Fathers are at odds with their sons and daughters as well as their 
sisters. Logging is splitting the family, church and tribe” (Solomon Star, 1995c). One 
family’s stand against Hyundai logging company was reported in a New Zealand 
newspaper: “When bulldozers razed their coconut plantation, the Hitukera family had 
no source of income. When the bulldozers headed up the hill and ploughed their 
vegetable gardens, they were left with no food. It was only by standing in front of the 
machines that they saved their houses. Describing that encounter, Teddy Hitukera says: 
‘we wept and wept, we shouted and shouted’” (Evening Post, 1995). The article 
describes how this family claimed the land whilst the company signed a lease with 
relatives of Hitukera’s who believed they owned the patch of land. According to the 
article, this family and another had become isolated from their neighbouring 
communities because they were making a stand.
Once logging had taken place, there seemed to be widespread disillusionment with the 
outcomes, even when interviewees may have been in favour of logging to begin with. 
Complaints centred around a failure to provide promised infrastructure and other material
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benefits and the severe degradation of local environments, especially water sources. In 
these instances, the prospective benefits which had been promised by logging companies 
failed to materialise. Logging appeared to take place with little regard to the carrying 
capacity of the resource nor to the role of the forests as providers of multiple uses rather 
than single commodity extraction. There was a general sense of powerlessness expressed 
by those interviewed, other than trying to claim compensation after the event.
A common complaint amongst NGO representatives and landowners interviewed 
throughout Melanesia was that logging companies rarely fulfilled promises made at the 
outset to communities to provide facilities and infrastructure in return for rights to log. In 
October 1995, 50 landowners and community members from Dorio, Malaita Province 
came to Honiara to seek compensation for environmental damage done to their land by the 
company Golden Springs/Waibona logging. They were interviewed in the presence of a 
senior representative from Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT). Originally the 
community thought the logging would be a good thing - their parliamentary representative 
(who they later found out was a director of the company) said it was good for 
development. The company promised a school, a clinic, permanent roads, bridges, none of 
which had happened. The company logged the land and disappeared but subsequently 
returned, wanting to start logging another area of the same landholders' land. The 
landholders wanted to get an injunction against this new development until compensation 
had been paid for damage on the other land. To make matters more complicated, the 
landholders made the agreement with local company Waibona logging, who then sold the 
licence to Golden Springs. The community expressed concern over a number of breaches 
of the agreement by the company and complained of the damage caused to their water 
supply, which they claimed was causing health problems amongst villagers.
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This complaint was substantiated by an inspection to three water sources in the area, Ward 
26, which was undertaken in April 1995 by the Environmental Health Division based at 
Auki, Malaita Province (Malaita Province, 1995). This inspection found that the Fulai 
river, which was used by approximately 800 people for bathing, cooking, washing, 
drinking and other domestic purposes, had suffered damage and pollution directly as a 
result of the logging operation, causing diahrroea and ’’red eye’’. The report outlined 
similar damage caused by logging operations at two other water sources in the area. In a 
letter from a lawyer representing 24 landholding groups to Waibona logging and 
sawmilling company this damage as well as other breaches of contract were cited. See 
figure 5.5 below for a summary of the breaches.
Figure 5.5 Breaches of the Standard Logging Agreement at Dorio, Malaita Province
Activity which Breaches the Standard Logging Agreement Clause No.
No sawmilling facility has been set up clause 2
Water sources have been damaged clause 4
Small trees on steep slopes (above 30 degrees) have been cut clause 8
Top soil was not safely removed and retained in a pile for re-covering 
the area cleared as a log pond
clause 14
Due royalties were not paid to the landholders as a result of 
malpractice in grading, measuring etc
clauses 16 and 
33
The company failed to remove waste from the bush within three 
months
clause 17
Surface damage through excessive blading and bulldozing of soil clause 20
Reafforestation has not been carried out clause 21
No agricultural scheme has been developed clause 22
Source: letter to Robert Wong, MD of Waibona Logging and Sawmilling from legal 
representative of Landowners Committee, Kwariekwa Village, West Kwaio, Malaita 
Province.
The letter stated that this landholding group were prepared to withdraw the case provided 
they received SI$6.8 million as compensation and that this figure was negotiable. It must 
be assumed that the company failed to offer acceptable levels of compensation because of
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community representatives' subsequent presence in Honiara in October 1995, attempting to 
get an injunction against the company.
That conflict existed amongst Solomon Islanders over the benefits of commercial logging 
was clear during interviews. Whilst certain communities, or community members, saw 
commercial logging as a way of accessing cash by letting someone else develop the 
resource, others were concerned about either the ecological consequences or they 
questioned the likely financial returns in the longer term. Claiming compensation for 
damage after logging had taken place was another way of accessing cash from commercial 
logging. According to the SIDT representative present at the discussion with landholders 
from Dorio, SIDT had sent field representatives to the area when they heard that 
communities were thinking of signing a logging agreement to warn them about the 
experiences of others and the problems they could expect. However, according to the 
interviewee, the community was not interested and did not make the SIDT field people 
welcome. The SIDT representative stated that now the money was finished, they had lost 
their trees and their environment was degraded, they realised they had made a mistake and 
wanted SIDT's help with getting a lawyer and an injunction against the company.
Interviewees on Isabel Island, including members of the provincial executive, spoke about 
broken promises made by logging companies operating there who had promised schools, 
clinics and permanent roads, none of which had materialised. During interviews in 
September 1996, one landholder who had entered into an agreement with Isabel Timber 
Company (ITC) expressed bitterness that all he had seen after two years' operations were 
an outboard motor and damaged land. His sons wanted to get rid of the company and get 
involved in eco-timber production, but the man wanted compensation. An Environmental
170
and Social Impact Assessment undertaken by a forest ecologist subsequent to the interview 
showed a number of serious breaches of the Standard Logging Agreement at several ITC 
sites, as well as broken promises regarding infrastructure provision (Forests Monitor,
1997).
Conflict within communities appeared to exist not only regarding the distribution of
benefits from commercial logging, but also in relation to those who suffered most from the
negative environmental consequences. Interviewees on Guadalcanal stated during group
discussions in October 1995 that the presence of logging operations on communities’ land
had led to villages’ gardens (vital for subsistence provisions) having to be located at
several kilometres from the villages, putting additional burdens on the women, children
and old people who collected food. This was also reported in Vangunu and Roviana,
Western Province (SIDT, 1993; CAA, 1990). Shellfish and other marine resources used for
subsistence were widely reported to be destroyed as a result of pollution by logging
operations (CAA, 1990; Baenesia, 1993). Data on health implications associated with the
impacts of logging have not been systematically collated but there were anecdotal
accounts, see the Dorio case above. Also, a GP working in Western Province reported:
“.. .the health of these islanders deteriorates dramatically in areas which have been 
logged. Their fishing and gardens are destroyed so we see malnourished children in 
the hospital. Their social structure is destroyed so we see crimes of violence and 
venereal disease. Their water supply is destroyed so we see skin infections and 
water-borne diseases” (Collee, 1994).
The evidence obtained in interviews of dissatisfaction with commercial forestry operations 
was supported by village surveys of 116 villages conducted as part of the National 
Forest Resources Inventory Project (NFRIP) in 1995. The majority of villagers 
surveyed did not consider overseas economic interests developing their resource as
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appropriate, and prefered to consider local exploitation of resources. See figure 5.6 
below.
Figure 5.6 Survey results of preferences for various forest development options
Development options % Yes % No % maybe or don’t 
know
Logging by timber company 6 68 26
Small scale logging or sawmilling by 
landowners
83 0 16
Plantation forestry by timber company 3 88 9
Plantation forestry in joint venture with 
company
14 55 31
Plantation forestry by landowners 60 8 32
Cash crop development by plantation 
company
3 92 5
Cash cropping by landowners 78 6 16
Tourism run by outside company 5 87 8
Village owned tourism project 45 14 41
Source: AIDAB/MNR 1995
The NFRIP survey also found villages reporting extensive evidence of environmental 
degradation. The surveyors undertook a questionnaire survey in 28 villages, to ascertain 
the incidence and type of environmental problems experienced by villagers, see figure 5.7 
for the responses.
Figure 5.7 Survey results of problems associated with commercial logging reported 
by communities
Problems % of logged villages which reported problems after 
commercial logging had taken place
Spoilt streams 100
Soil damage 92
Fewer building materials 80
Land disputes 80
Less wildlife 72
Damage to gardens 68
Tambu sites disturbed 60
Damage to mangroves 20
Other problems 64
Source: AIDAB/MNR, 1995
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Solomon Islanders did not remain passive bystanders to the changes brought about by 
the introduction of commercial logging, and there has been a history of resistance to 
changes they felt would not be in their best interests, see section 5.3.1 above. Since the 
early 1900s, local communities offered resistance to land alienation and projects that 
undermined their communal property rights and custom practices. During the Phillips 
Land Commission held between 1919 and 1923, 75 claims against land alienations 
carried out under the Waste Land Regulations were heard. The hearings resulted in large 
tracts of land reverting to customary ownership, with the evidence presented by 
Solomon Islanders being described as “sophisticated and well-presented”: The record of 
the hearings “show a surprising understanding of both the procedures and the facts of 
land alienation for such an early period and they knew how to argue their cases very 
competently” (Ruthven, 1979:245).
Section 5.3.1 described the successful resistance to land alienations sought by the newly 
established colonial Forestry Department in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to resistance 
to government policies, resistance was also mounted against particular companies: Levers 
Pacific Timbers was the main focus for opposition by Solomon Islanders initially (Fraser, 
1997). Levers had a long history of involvement with the Solomon Islands, nearly as long 
as the British Protectorate itself. They were the main copra plantation and production 
company in the country, becoming established in the Solomon Islands in the early 1900s 
and being intimately bound to colonial land alienation policies27. A Levers subsidiary, 
Levers Pacific Timbers Ltd, one of the first timber companies to establish operations in the 
Solomons, began logging on Gizo island, Western Province in 1963, and subsequently
27 See Judith Bennett’s (1987) detailed history o f  the plantation economy in the Solomon Islands for an 
account o f  Levers’ impacts on the country and its people.
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established operations on Kolombangara and New Georgia islands, provoking conflict 
with and between local communities (CAA, 1990; Renee, 1979).
Resentment at Levers’ operations in North New Georgia turned to violence in 1982 when a 
company camp was burnt by local people, with houses and equipment being destroyed. 
Later in the same year, villagers stopped the company landing bulldozers by burning the 
wharf. Then in 1984 and again in 1986 there were further attacks on company property. In 
October 1986, the company ceased its Solomon Islands operations altogether. Other 
instances of violent protests against foreign-controlled logging companies have been 
recorded, and Malaysian logging company managers being described as turning 
“prematurely grey” because of the level of hostilities (Mellor, 1995a). For instance, in 
1994, villagers in northern Marovo set fire to five bulldozers belonging to Golden Spring 
on New Georgia Island (Tickell, 1994). In 1995, Earthmovers Ltd had $400,000 worth of 
equipment set on fire (Mellor, 1995a).
The most publicised logging conflict in 1995 was the one regarding the island of 
Pavuvu, which, unlike previous protests, became a national issue. The land was 
alienated in 1905 under the “Waste and Vacant Land Ordinance” as uninhabited land. 
Lease rights were assigned to Levers Pacific Ltd in 1907 for 999 years. Since the 1960s 
the indigenous community laying claim to Pavuvu had been campaigning to have their 
lands returned to customary tenure. However, upon Levers’ withdrawal from the 
country in 1986, logging rights were given by the government to Mavingbros, a 
Malaysian company owned in turn by another Malaysian company, Nila Wood 
Industries Sdn Bhd. Protests erupted in 1995 as the logging company moved in and 
prepared to start logging. It appeared from newspaper articles that there were two
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separate issues surrounding Pavuvu that were amalgamated by government in order to 
justify its activities. The Russell Islanders had been promised their land back and a 
resettlement plan. This they apparently approved of, according to a government survey 
cited in the Solomon Star (1995d). However, the government used approval of the 
return of land and a resettlement plan to signify approval of logging the island prior to 
its return. According to NGOs, Russell Islander representatives and opposition 
politicians, the majority of Russell Islanders were against logging (Solomon Star, 
1995e).
The government took a heavy-handed approach in dealing with the unrest caused by 
logging on Pavuvu. Field Force personnel were sent to the island in April 1995 in 
response to civil unrest there, with NGOs claiming that the Field Force was sent to 
protect company equipment and personnel (SIDT, 1995). The response to NGO 
criticism was a threat to crack down on their activities (Roughan, 1997). In the most 
serious development, one of the community leaders protesting against logging, Martin 
Apa, was found dead in suspicious circumstances on October 30th and in January 1996 
friends and relatives vowed to undertake their own investigation because of police 
inaction (Solomon Star, 1996b).
The Pavuvu issue was one of the most serious national news stories of 1995, with most 
people interviewed knowing about the situation there. One NGO, Soltrust, which 
promoted small-scale, community eco-forestry initiatives, estimated that the forests on 
Pavuvu which were awarded to Mavingbros for logging were worth SI$400 million 
(Soltrust, 1995). This led to claims by NGOs that the government was facilitating 
foreign company profits at the expense of the needs of the local community. A survey
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carried out by another NGO, Solomon Islands Development Trust, found that just over 
half of the people questioned in the capital (Honiara) believed that the government had 
sent the Field Force to Pavuvu to protect the loggers. The vast majority of those polled 
believed that the Pavuvu Islanders themselves, and not the government, should decide 
on the form of development to take place on the island (SIDT, 1995).
In conclusion, community level opposition to large scale logging appeared to be 
widespread throughout the Solomon Islands during field visits in 1995 and 1996, even 
though it was clear that certain members of communities in particular were benefiting from 
the timber industry. This opposition was apparent when talking to local people even on a 
casual basis, logging being the pre-eminent topic of debate and discussion during the 
period of fieldwork. Opposition and conflict seemed to be largely based on several factors: 
the lack of benefits to communities in cash or infrastructure; seeing financial benefits 
accrue elsewhere, with particular resentment against those community members who did 
benefit; the environmental damage caused and the hardship that resulted in terms of loss of 
access to NTFPs; and the sense that communities were losing control of their forest 
resources, even in situations where customary tenure still existed.
5.4.3 The emergence o f new institutions
In response to the growing opposition to large scale logging in the Solomon Islands, 
new institutions emerged in the 1990s that attempted to blend customary traditions and 
approaches with contemporary concerns about rainforest protection and sustainable 
development. External actors such as national NGOs (especially Solomon Islands 
Development Trust and Soltrust), international NGOs (such as WWF and Greenpeace) and 
provincial governments all positively supported this. Two of the most active indigenous
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NGOs, Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT) and Soltrust, developed 
programmes designed both to educate rural Solomon Islanders about the negative 
impacts of commercial logging and to provide training and assistance for the 
establishment of community eco-forestry projects. The latter strategy, which evolved in 
the 1990s, was seen as an essential ingredient in developing more culturally appropriate 
development rather than just engaging in anti-logging campaigns. To that end, in 1991, 
SIDT created a Conservation in Development unit to encourage community 
development of non-timber forest products and was involved in the development of an 
eco-forestry training school at Komuniboli on Guadalcanal, setting up an eco-forestry 
unit within SIDT in 1994. Soltrust, together with its marketing arm Iumi Tugetha 
Holdings, had the specific aim of assisting local communities to establish 
environmentally sensitive small-scale timber production that met international eco- 
forestry standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).
During field work, key informants described three community-level initiatives that, 
although developed separately, in each case sought to promote community control of 
the process of resource development and use as an alternative to commercial logging. A 
key informant described how, on Vangunu island and other parts of the Marovo 
Lagoon, villagers were concerned about the impact of large-scale logging as well as 
local over-exploitation of natural resources, so they developed their own local resource 
management plans to both provide an alternative to commercial logging and a means to 
manage their resources more sustainably. The project sought to reassert control of 
resources at the local level, with the involvement of the whole community through
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28butubutus, the traditional local institution for managing resources at the clan level . To 
this end, two separate but complementary institutions were formed to co-ordinate this, 
the Marovo Butubutu Development Foundation and the Marovo Lagoon Women’s 
Council, the latter specifically to represent women’s needs and wishes within the 
project. The key informant described how the initiative was supported by the WWF for 
the last few years as the Community Resource Conservation and Development Project 
(CRCDP).
The key informant described the crucial turning point for his community being when the
chief of Michi village (the key informant’s uncle), without authorisation from the whole
community, came to Honiara to talk to company representatives and the government
about a commercial logging deal. The key informant acknowledged that, prior to this
event, increasing population and the growing demands of the cash economy had started
to lead to over-exploitation of resources by local people and that this was leading to
shortages. The impending threat of a commercial logging deal precipitated the whole
community to sit down and discuss options. They decided that resource planning was
the key and would lead to alternative development. At the time of the interview
(October 1995), the village had a resource management plan which had been in place
for the last two to three years. The first plan to be drawn up was a marine resource
management plan. They had also tackled the issue of pollution, with a waste
management plan being in place, including oil and petrol disposal. There were also
population repair areas in reef areas which were over-fished and an eco-tourism site had
been established on a nearby uninhabited small island. The cash from this went into
developing the community resource plan. According to the key informant, the reason
28 See Hviding (1996) for a detailed analysis o f  butubutus as clan-based social organisations and their 
inextricable links to the land, and the evolution o f  complex rules and rights regarding use o f  resources.
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for building the resort (all of local materials and in a traditional style) on a nearby island 
was so that there should not be too much contact between tourists and locals because 
they wanted to avoid some of the problems associated with wealthy foreigners coming 
into small communities and disrupting their normal lives. The resort was built to cause 
the minimum ecological damage. At the time of discussions with the key informant, 
three communities including Michi had already signed up to participate in the resource 
management plan and another seven wanted to. The next resource management plan to
29be developed was for the forest, which they were intending to start in January 1996.
According to the key informant, in addition to natural resource management, one of the
objectives was to revive their custom and culture, with the elders teaching old traditions
alongside modem education. These traditions had been lost because a lot of children
were sent away to school where they were taught the lingua franca and mainstream
education. According to this description of the project, there were both resource
management and local institutional objectives. The key informant’s opinion was that it
was a radical position to allow women to be involved in the decision-making and that in
order to encourage their meaningful participation this was done through holding
separate women's meetings to discuss resources management and their needs and wishes
which were then included in the development of the overall plans, with the Marovo
Lagoon Women’s Council (MLWC) mediating input. The acknowledgement of gender
inequalities within resource management planning at the local level was bome out by a
study into the CRCDP that analysed the gendered roles and relationships within
households in Michi and another project village, Nazareth (Adams, 1997). The study
concluded that, although traditional Melanesian societies are relatively egalitarian at the
29 Hviding and Bayliss-Smith (2000) provide a detailed analysis o f  the evolution o f  the Marovo local 
resource management scheme and the main protagonists and objectives.
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village level, roles and access to resources within households were strictly determined 
by gender. As a result, Adams also concluded that, as newly emerging community 
resource management institutions, both the MBDF and the MLWC played 
complementary roles that should be nurtured.
The Isabel Sustainable Forest Management Project (ISFMP) on Isabel Island was 
devised by the provincial government in response to communities applying to log their 
own forest resources rather than sign away rights to foreign logging companies. The 
initiative received funding from the EU to establish eco-timber production, being timber 
produced on a small-scale by the forest landholders with conservation areas specifically 
set aside as part of each local-level plan. Interviews with the project manager and 
counterpart manager30 in 1996 and again in 1998 with the project manager (who had 
since become the project advisor), described how the ISFMP came about. In 1991, the 
Isabel Provincial Secretary and planning officer toured the island to meet with senior 
village people in every Area Council district around the island - they called it a natural 
resource tour - and the villagers spoke about their worries about the environment and 
resource shortages. There was no commercial logging at that time, the main concerns 
being worsening water supplies, loss of forest land due to (failed) cash cropping, 
declining marine resources and commodity prices being too low, which resulted for 
example in the cocoa plantations involving a lot of hard work for little or no returns, 
resulting in a lack of cash income. The villagers wanted to harvest their timber 
themselves but so far had not been able to. The provincial government organised a 
follow-up meeting in Buala, the provincial capital. In 1992, the situation was reviewed -
30 As in many development projects involving outside agencies, the initial project manager was a 
European who was working with an Isabel island counterpart, with the intention o f  handing over 
management to the Isabel islander after a period o f  time. This handover occurred after the field work was 
conducted, in May 1997.
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the province had received a number of applications for sawmill licences for community 
projects, and these were all pending with the Provincial Development Unit (PDU). The 
PDU in Buala screened all the applications and then they went to the PDU in Honiara 
who held a pot of money from bilateral donations for provincial development projects.
The province identified issues of training in use of equipment and international market 
requirements as being crucial to the success of any local schemes and therefore put 
together a “project package” which included all the different individual schemes and 
covered aspects such as training and grading. The project was sent to potential bilateral 
and multilateral donors, with the EU expressing an interest in the second half of 1992. 
During 1992 a number of communities were talked to about the scheme, and 15 said 
they were definitely interested, 12 of which had already submitted projects, plus 3 
others. The province drew up provincial conservation legislation which addressed the 
problems raised during the initial tour, namely of water supply, tabu areas (protecting 
forest and marine sites) and land conservation areas. The project was approved by 
central government in mid 1993 and then the proposal went to Brussels, where it took 
about a year to approve the funding. The project was due to start in January71995 but 
the final agreement was not given until May 1995 and no money was received until 
November 1995. The first staff were therefore not employed until the end of 1995. The 
first four groups were identified and went for training at the eco-forestry training unit at 
Komunuboli, followed by retraining at the end of 1995 and beginning of 1996. 
According to the project manager, the decision was taken not to aim for independent 
certification, for example by the FSC, because the levels of timber production and likely 
selling price did not warrant the costs and bureaucracy associated with such schemes. 
The aim was therefore to source buyers more directly and the first timber was produced
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in February 1996, with a commercial buyer found in New Zealand with the assistance of 
Greenpeace New Zealand. Interviews with the project manager and counterpart 
manager in September 1996 indicated that there were a total of seven groups operating 
within the project. The long time frame for receipt of funding meant that by the time of 
its inception, the project had lost eight of the original communities who had in the 
meantime signed deals with commercial timber companies. Although commercial 
logging was not taking place on Isabel in the early stages of the project’s development, 
by the time it was operational at the end of 1995, large-scale logging was taking place 
over large parts of the island. The project workers saw the project as offering an 
alternative to large-scale logging and were keen to promote it on that basis. Although 
technically a provincial project, local institutional capacity building was an explicit 
objective. According to the project’s 1995-6 annual report, land use plans were devised 
based on village meetings and separate women’s and men’s meetings, followed by 
further village meetings. The involvement and approval of women to the local plans 
was an explicit requirement of the project (ISFMP, 1996).
The Solomons Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) project in Western and Choiseul 
Provinces was a fair trade eco-timber project devised by the United Church, the local 
methodist church, with considerable financial support from overseas development 
NGOs. The aim was for local producers to produce independently certified eco-timber 
that could be marketed overseas at a premium, ensuring a fair return to the communities. 
According to an interview with the project co-ordinator in September 1996, this project 
was developed explicitly to provide an alternative to local landholders who might 
otherwise have signed logging rights with large-scale logging interests. The 
environmental and social problems had been widely witnessed and documented in
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Western Province, including increased land disputes and disruption to communities. 
According to the key informant, the project’s secondary goal was to promote 
sustainable timber production. SWIFT provided a timber marketing and transport hub 
for local producers who produced timber according to internationally recognised “eco- 
timber” standards and had received Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification.
Of the three projects described above, the SWIFT project was the most high profile 
project in terms of international awareness, and was widely promoted as a model of 
community eco-timber development by environment and development NGOs. As all 
three projects had only just become operational at the time of field work, their success 
in economic terms could not be judged. However, there were institutional elements that 
were of interest in each of them. Whilst the three projects were all independently 
devised and operated, and each had a different motivating force for its establishment, 
underlying them all was the objective of ensuring landholders were at the centre of 
creating local development options to enhance control over their resources. In two cases 
(CRCD and SWIFT), these local development options were established explicitly to be 
an alternative to landholders signing timber cutting rights with commercial logging 
companies. In the third case (ISFMP), although not explicit when the project was first 
being devised, providing an alternative to commercial logging was seen as an objective 
once the project was operational. These were all new initiatives, which saw the creation 
of new local-level institutional arrangements to manage forest resources sustainably 
based on customary practices and norms, and they explicitly considered issues of social 
sustainability such as community benefits and gender roles, as well as being 
environmentally benign. All received outside support, both financially and in terms of 
capacity building. Figure 5.8 summarises their characteristics.
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Figure 5.8 Characteristics of three community level projects in the Solomon Islands
Project Initiator Activity Outside 
funding and 
support
Community 
input to plans
Explicit 
alternative 
to large 
scale 
logging
CRCDP Local
community/
NGO
initiated
Resource
management
WWF Yes, but with 
input from 
WWF
Yes
ISFMP Provincial
government
initiated
Community
eco-timber
production
EU tropical 
forest budget 
line
Yes, but 
within overall 
project 
objectives
Yes, once 
operational
SWIFT Church/IntT
NGO
initiated
Community
eco-timber
production
International
NGOs
Yes, but have
to operate
within
international
standards
(FSC)
Yes
To summarise, there appear to be two motivating factors behind the development of 
community forest management initiatives in the 1990s. The first was a reactive response 
to try to address some of the ecological and social problems created by commercial 
logging in the Solomon Islands; the second was a more proactive desire by 
communities, the state and international donors to encourage local communities to 
develop their resources for themselves. Even in the negative forms of resistance, the 
underlying goal was to protest against communities’ loss of de facto control over forest 
resources. The more pro-active initiatives described above had an explicit aim of 
strengthening communal organisation and control over forest resources. The new 
institutions had political objectives, seeking to assert control by building on social 
cohesion inherent in traditional institutions whilst also tackling inequalities such as 
gender relations regarding natural resource decision-making and use. They therefore 
aimed to blend traditional institutional norms with contemporary concerns about
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environmental protection and sustainable development. They also provided education 
and training and aimed to offer a fair economic return to landholders for developing 
their resource sustainably, thus seeking to avoid distributional conflict and to overcome 
knowledge deficits and associated power imbalances. However, the empirical work did 
not assess the economic feasibility of these projects and further research would be 
needed to determine whether these schemes proved viable in the longer term.
5.5 Conclusion
In the Solomon Islands, customary tenure has been the dominant property rights 
institution. However, the case study reveals how colonialism by the British led to 
attempts to introduce forest management practices and associated tenure policies 
adopted from the models imposed in Burma and India. Under these models, concepts of 
state control of the forest resource to promote private sector development were 
introduced. Explicit in this was the belief that Solomon Islanders were not able to 
develop commercial timber operations themselves. However, tasked with finding forests 
to establish a Permanent Forest Estate, with its implicit assumptions of empty and 
unproductive forests (“Waste Lands”) and exclusion of other users, the colonial 
administration largely failed due to the resistance of Solomon Islanders and some 
sympathetic members of the administration. During this period, there were tensions 
between land and forestry officials, with the former being more sensitive to the 
Solomon Islanders’ customary tenure, whereas the latter were more interested in 
establishing a framework for timber exploitation.
In the 1990s, although customary tenure remained the dominant form of tenure, 
management of the forest resource was increasingly ceded to the private sector by way
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of timber cutting rights for timber exploitation. This introduced an additional layer of 
rights to forest resources on top of customary tenure, in practice undermining the 
traditional customary approach and gave considerable power to the private sector, both 
in terms of negotiating with landholders and in terms of operational control of forest 
areas. As a result, formal and informal decision-making processes regarding the 
allocation of the resource were open to abuse by timber companies; they were also often 
subverted by individuals within communities as well as elected representatives at 
national and local levels for the promise of personal gain. This in turn undermined 
existing property rights structures and power relations, creating new rural elites. The 
changing shareholdings of companies increased the sense of distance between 
traditional landholders and the new managers of the forest resource, with landholders 
often not knowing who they were dealing with. Although still the legitimate 
landholders, community members did not feel in control of the forest resource once 
logging companies had logging rights to their forest. By analysing the inter­
relationships between these social actors, it becomes clear that they were based on 
unequal power relations, with corporate interests often being the strongest in terms of 
bargaining power, due to the financial resources at their disposal and the lack of 
information available to local forest communities. Also, communities often saw the 
benefits from the resource exploitation accrue either to private companies or to only 
certain members of the community, creating distributional conflict at a local level.
Notwithstanding these unequal power relations, and the tendency for interactions with 
the timber industry to have a negative impact on community cohesion and pre-existing 
institutions, Solomon Islanders continued to find ways to resist these influences, either 
through non-co-operation with formal procedures or through direct action, and this
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mirrors actions in Burma and Indonesia, where even those considered to be the weakest 
in terms of power still found ways to resist those in power (Bryant, 1997; Peluso, 1992). 
Attempts were also made to establish community forest management projects, often 
with the political aim of asserting communal rights through developing community eco- 
timber schemes and in order to achieve a more fair distribution of the benefits from 
logging. However, most of these projects required significant technical and financial 
assistance from external sources.
In conclusion, the establishment of property rights institutions to facilitate the 
development of the timber industry has followed a complex and contradictory path. 
Although the state failed to establish a Permanent Forest Estate under its control, 
leaving customary tenure as the formal property rights institution to land and forests, 
nevertheless it did mediate rules by which the private sector could enter into direct 
negotiations with landholders to gain timber cutting rights. Thus, unlike in many 
countries with a large scale timber sector, Solomon Islanders were able to enter into 
direct negotiations with timber companies over whether to allow timber cutting in their 
forests or not. So, local forest communities appeared to have reasonable levels of 
bargaining power in relation to other bargaining parties. However, a careful analysis of 
the procedures for negotiation show that asymmetries in power existed on a number of 
levels, both within communities and between communities and timber companies.
These asymmetries were based on lack of knowledge amongst certain members of the 
community, financial inducements offered by timber company representatives to 
individuals, or connections to politicians and officials who favour the private sector 
timber industry. However, Solomon Islanders found ways to assert bargaining power, 
through resistance and through using community forestry as a means of asserting
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control over forest resources. Property rights in the Solomon Islands can therefore be 
understood as complex political institutions used to negotiate access and control of 
forest resources over time, with past institutions and decisions resonating on the present. 
The implications of the findings of the case study in relation to the analytical framework 
elaborated in Chapter Two are discussed more fully in Chapter Seven, and comparisons 
are drawn with the British Columbia case study, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Six 
British Columbia Case Study
6.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the evolution of the forest management regime in the Canadian 
province of British Columbia (BC) and the pressures for changes in property rights 
institutions in the 1990s. Within the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the 
same questions explored in the Solomon Islands case study are investigated in BC: how 
has the dominant forest management regime evolved? What are the property rights 
implications of the dominant forest management regime for local forest communities? 
How do local forest communities and the dominant forest management regime interact? 
This chapter analyses a number of primary and secondary data sources. Interviews were 
conducted with key informants in government, NGOs and civil society representatives 
in January and February 1999, with follow-up emails after that date. Administrative 
records were also important sources of primary data for the BC case and included 
archival materials, legal judgements, official and unofficial documents and websites, in 
particular those of First Nations, industry and environmental groups. Secondary data 
consulted included published reports, literature and newspaper articles.
After briefly describing forest resources in BC, section 6.2 provides a short introduction 
to BC society, including relations between First Nations and the provincial government, 
in order to provide a context for understanding the evolution of forest management in 
the province. The dominant forest management regime described in Chapters One and 
Three is epitomised in BC, with the province holding public forests under state control 
and delegating management of the resource for timber production to the private sector. 
The evolution of property rights institutions to facilitate this process is described in
189
section 6.3, including a history of resource development and the structure of the timber 
regime in the 1990s. Section 6.4 discusses the interactions between local communities 
and the timber regime, based around the themes of forests as contested domains and 
negotiating access and control. In section 6.4.3, primary data from one particular region, 
the Nelson Forest Region, is analysed to investigate in more detail these inter­
relationships. The analytical factors identified in Chapter Two that can help explain 
institutional choice and change, namely distributional conflict, the relative power of 
bargaining parties, ideology and historical path dependence, guided the analysis and are 
discussed in more detail in relation to both case studies’ findings in Chapter Seven.
6.2 Case study context
British Columbia (BC) is a Province of Canada, situated on the west coast and bordering 
the United States to the south (see map 6.1). It stretches 1,300 km from south to north and 
800 km west to east, covering 930,000 square kilometres. Forests cover 600,000 square 
kilometres, mainly of coniferous species. BC is world-renowned for its natural beauty, 
with mountains, forests, lakes and a long coastline combining to spectacular effect. The 
ecological significance of BC’s forests have been well-documented and publicised by 
ecologists and environmental NGOs. BC contains the world’s largest remaining intact 
tracts of temperate rainforest, which has been identified as one of the most threatened 
forest types in the world (Bryant et al, 1997). Temperate rainforests are rare ecosystems, 
covering only about 0.2% of the Earth’s land area, one half of which being on the west 
coast of North America, from Oregon to Alaska.
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Temperate rainforests are biologically rich ecosystems. The main species of conifer in 
the temperate rainforest are Western Hemlock, Western Red Cedar, Amabilis Fir, Douglas 
Fir and Sitka Spruce. They can live up to 800 years and grow to heights of 95 metres. This 
makes the trees of particular interest to the timber industry and BC is the largest softwood 
producer in Canada. Forests of old-growth trees (trees over 200 years old) provide habitat 
essential to a rich community of species, many of which are dependent on the natural
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ecosystem of an old growth forest for their habitat (Hammond, 1991). The importance of 
old growth forests compared to secondary or plantation forests are stressed by ecologists 
and conservationists because of their productivity and performance of vital ecological 
functions, such as providing nutrients and shelter, regulating water flows and providing 
rich, deep soils.
In Canada, provincial governments have jurisdiction over the country’s forest resources, 
apart from those forests under federal control for example as National Parks or Indian 
Reserves. The Government of British Columbia therefore holds 97% the province’s forests 
(also known as Crown forests) under its jurisdiction on behalf of the people of the province 
and is directly responsible for the management of the resource. BC’s parliamentary 
government has the Premier at the centre of the executive, who appoints members of the 
cabinet and thus controls provincial policy (Salazar and Alper, 2000). The BC Minister 
of Forests is the key regulator of forests, appointed by the Premier. Provincial control of 
the forest resource and the predominance of the production regime have meant that links 
between the government and the private sector have traditionally been close, with policy 
formulated through bargaining between these two groups and management of the 
resource delegated to the private sector (Cashore et al, 2001; Wilson, 1998).
Formerly a British colony, BC retains British-style parliamentary democracy, the 
provincial government being located in the provincial capital of Victoria, situated in the 
south of Vancouver Island. The commercial centre and largest city, is Vancouver, situated 
on the coast of the mainland, very close to the US border. The population of BC is around 
4 million in total, of which around 170,000 are aboriginal people. Most of the population is
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located in the south west of the province, in Vancouver city and on Vancouver Island. 
These were also the first areas to be colonised by settlers.
Because of the high value stands of timber on the one hand and the wilderness value on the 
other, BC’s forest resources have been categorised by a “war in the woods” between those 
who want to develop the timber resources and those who want to protect the natural 
forests. This proved an increasingly divisive and public issue in the 1980s and 1990s (see 
section 6.4 below). However, amidst the wrangling between logging and protection, the 
claims of First Nations were largely ignored by all parties (Braun, 2002). The vastness of 
BC, most of which is forested and remote, has meant that the province has widely been 
conceived as an empty, pristine wilderness to be exploited or protected. This has 
contributed to the negation of First Nations land claims31 and the dominant forest 
management regime developed with little reference to aboriginal rights or title until 
litigation and treaty negotiations forced the issue onto the agenda (see section 6.4 below).
The first outsiders to contact the aboriginal peoples of the region were traders and
explorers, contact being limited to transient visits. The first commodity to be sought by
traders for international markets were the pelts of the sea otter. The traders were reliant on
the native peoples to provide them with supplies. The skins fetched high prices,
particularly in China. Barman (1991) calculates that during the peak years of 1785 and
1825 over 170 separate ships from several nations traded in the Pacific Northwest. During
this period sea otter populations declined rapidly to the point of extinction, as demands of
the trade exceeded supplies. Russia, Spain, Britain and later the United States of America
all had economic and political interests in the area. It was the British who would
31 See Braun (2002) for an analysis o f  nature/culture ideologies and how scientific forestry and wilderness 
protection discourses have constituted First Nations as either being absent from forests or as being 
collapsed into them in idealised and romanticised views.
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consolidate their trade and political interests in the region by claiming it as their territory. 
By the mid 19th century, the Hudson's Bay Company had established settlements for fur 
trading in the west, the British government granting this privately owned, London- 
headquartered trading company "the sole and exclusive privilege of trading with the 
Indians" over all of British North America "not being part of any of our provinces" (cited 
in Barman 1991: 39). British Columbia was not at this point claimed by any nation as a 
sovereign territory.
In 1846, the international boundary with the United States was negotiated, the northern 
part formally becoming British territory but left more or less to the control of the Hudson's 
Bay Company (HBC). As animals became trapped out, the HBC diversified. It was not 
until the gold rush, starting in 1858, that the non-native population really began to grow. 
By the end of 1858, the British government was forced to establish an independent 
administration in the area, rather than relying on management by the HBC, in order to 
defend its newly acquired territory from US encroachment. Around the same time, timber 
was being recognised as a valuable asset and the beginnings of a timber industry began. 
BC joined the Canadian federation in 1871 and the construction of the railway increased 
demand for timber (Gillis and Roach, 1986).
The First Nations of British Columbia never ceded or signed treaties giving up rights to 
their land and resources, apart from 14 treaties that were signed in the 1850s relating to a 
small portion (about 3%) of Vancouver Island. One of these was later extended to a small 
area in North Eastern BC (Boyd and Williams-Davidson, 2000). Nevertheless, the state 
appropriated their land for development. In the 1860s the Lands commissioner prohibited 
the pre-emption of Crown land by aboriginal people and denied the existence of aboriginal
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rights or the need for treaties (BC Treaty Commission, 2002). Aboriginal rights were 
further eroded with the creation of Indian reserves and the adoption of assimilationist 
policies such as the removal of children from their families to be placed in residential 
schools and the outlawing of the potlatch, “the primary social, economic and political 
expression of some aboriginal cultures” and the prevention of land claims from going to 
court (BC Treaty Commission, 2003). It was not until 1951 that these laws were repealed 
and in 1960 aboriginal people gained the right to vote in federal elections (the provincial 
right to vote was given to aboriginal males in 1949) and the phasing out of residential - 
schools began. In 1991, the BC government recognised the existence of aboriginal rights 
and in 1992 an independent BC Treaty Commission was established to begin a treaty 
negotiation process between the federal and provincial governments and First Nations (see 
section 6.4 below).
6.3 The evolution of forest management in BC
The history of BC’s development since colonisation revolved around resource extraction, 
in particular forestry, fisheries and mining. Forest management policy was dominated by 
single resource extraction, namely timber production. How to manage the forest to provide 
a sustained yield of timber and generate revenues for the province preoccupied the policy 
makers since the 1900s. BC’s forests are a rich source of quality softwood timber species, 
described as “green gold” (Marchak, 1983). Timber is the dominant industry in the 
province, and BC is the largest producer in Canada. Most BC timber is exported, with the 
main market being the USA, followed by Japan and Europe, earning the province over 1.6 
billion Canadian dollars in revenues in 1999. It is the largest industrial employer, providing 
90,600 direct jobs and 181,200 indirect jobs in 1999 (COFI, 2000). Despite the 
increasing awareness of the multiple roles and values of forests, timber production is
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still the dominant forest management regime and the following sections describe the 
history and development of forest management in the province and its structure in the 
1990s, in particular in relation to the property rights assumptions of the dominant forest 
management regime.
6.3.1 Developments up to 1991
A review of the history of forest management in the province is important for 
understanding how the tenure system in BC’s forests evolved and the conflicts that have 
arisen as a result of forest allocations that favour the commercial timber industry. Up to 
1991, four broad phases in policy development can be identified since colonisation in 
the mid- 19th century. Each new phase was signalled by the report of a Royal 
Commission ordered to study and make recommendations on forestry policy for the 
province.
The first phase up to 1912 has been characterised as the pioneer days. At the time of the 
first settlers, the timber of BC was not viewed as a valuable resource (Barman 1991, 
Gillis and Roach 1986). At that time, because the land was unsurveyed and no money 
was forthcoming from Britain to carry out such work, land was sold by the Crown to 
individuals, initially for agricultural purposes. The terms of the sale, apart from other 
conditions, made the purchaser responsible for the survey of his holding before title was 
fully transferred (Gillis and Roach 1986). The earliest alienation of land specifically for 
timber production occurred in 1862, and the first instances were for the provision of 
timber to highly localised markets (Gillis and Roach 1986). In thel860s, large, 
mechanised mills were built around Burrard Inlet, and other locations suitable for
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shipping. The timber was given virtually for nothing in large concessions to encourage 
these developments, regardless of First Nation claims to these lands (Harris, 1997).
However, this system did not last long as it proved unpopular with all parties. Government 
was losing the right to revenue and industry, which was operating in a transitory way, did 
not want to be saddled with land once it had been logged out. In 1865 annually renewable 
leases were introduced, with clauses guaranteeing settlers' pre-emption rights, reflecting 
the government's preoccupation with agricultural settlement (Gillis and Roach, 1986).
After BC joined the Canadian confederation in 1871, the construction of the trans­
continental railway provided increased demand for timber and a shift in location to inland 
mill sites. The completion of the railway provided access to Canadian markets, particularly 
the prairies.
During the pioneer period, Crown land was granted outright to railroad and timber 
companies in order to generate development in the sparsely populated and untouched 
forests of the province. It was during this period that most of the existing private land was 
granted, mostly on Vancouver Island. In 1909, a Royal Commission was established under 
the chief commissioner of lands, Frederick John Fulton, to review the development of the 
timber industry and to make recommendations on managing and developing the forest 
resource, and his report laid the groundwork for the second period in forest policy 
development. The Final Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Timber and 
Forestry was published in 1910. Amongst its recommendations, the commission stated that 
no further alienations of timber lands should take place, and unalienated timber lands 
should remain as Crown Forest Reserves to be developed by the Province. It also 
established clear support for the generation of provincial revenues from timber and
197
provincial regulations to ensure “orderly extraction” (Government of the Province of 
British Columbia, 1910).
The next phase, between 1912 and 1947, was a period when resource development was 
consolidated along the lines of the colonial forestry model used around the world. 1912 
saw the introduction of the first Forest Act, including some of the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission of 1909-10. The Act established for the first time a system of forest 
reserves specifically for timber harvesting, being the foundation for the provincial forests, 
and introduced the timber sales licence, which granted a one-off right to harvest a 
particular stand of timber. The Act also established a Forest Service to administer the 
forest reserves.
The government relied on the private sector to develop the resource in exchange for fees, 
retaining Crown ownership of the resource. Thus, the industry had access to abundant high 
value timber at relatively little capital cost and the government maintained control and 
received revenues from the sector. As the industry grew in the 1920s and 1930s, forest 
policy was primarily concerned with fire suppression, undertaking inventories of the 
timber resource and collecting revenue, and did not impose any regulations on the rate or 
methods of harvest, which were left to the discretion of the private companies, and 
reforestation was not a requirement (Ministry of Forests, 1996). This established the 
pattern of partnership between government and the private sector regarding the 
development of the timber resource, with government maintaining control of public forests 
but delegating operational management to the private sector. By the late 1930s, the 
provincial chief forester was raising concerns about the booming unregulated industry and 
the need to manage BC’s forests to ensure future timber supplies. At the same time,
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industry was demanding the allocation of more forest land in order to further expand and 
meet the growing demand for timber (Ministry of Forests, 1996). In response to these two 
conflicting demands, a second Royal Commission under Gordon Sloan, the chief justice of 
BC, was convened in 1943 and reported in 1945. Having identified key problems in the 
way the forest resource was being developed, he urged the introduction of sustained yield 
management:
“.. .we must change over from the present system of unmanaged and unregulated 
liquidation of our forested areas to a planned and regulated policy of forest 
management, leading eventually to a programme ensuring a sustained yield from 
all our productive land area” (Government of the Province of British Columbia, 
1945:127).
Amongst his recommendations, Sloan advocated new systems of tenure that would permit 
the operator “to retain possession in perpetuity” of land currently held under temporary 
licence, in return for operating on a sustained-yield basis. In order to promote sustained- 
yield practices by the private sector, he recommended the large-scale allocation of Crown 
timber to private operators.
Following the recommendations of the 1945 Royal Commission, the Forest Act was 
substantially amended in 1947 in order to introduce a sustained yield policy to the 
province. There were two key tenets of the new policy. Firstly, the harvest rate was to be 
regulated for the first time through the introduction of the Allowable Annual Cut (AAC), 
which was set by the chief forester as the upper limit of wood that could be harvested in 
any one year. The AAC was based on a formula to calculate the volume of timber that 
could be harvested without theoretically depleting future timber stocks. Public Sustained 
Yield Units (PS YUs) were identified, within which the harvest of a specified volume of 
timber was allowed by a number of operators, through the issuance of the timber sale 
licence and, introduced in 1967, the timber sale harvesting licence. These licences were
199
volume-based licences and did not designate the specific area from which the harvest 
should take place within the PSYU.
Secondly, additional Crown timber was made available to the private sector through the 
issuance of long-term, exclusive forest management licences (FML) to specific areas of 
forest in exchange for private sector investment in processing facilities and a commitment 
to introduce forest management plans. This further reinforced the trend towards the 
government-private sector partnership in managing the province’s resources. The FML 
system was designed to allocate large areas of forest in perpetuity to large companies in an 
attempt to encourage sustained yield forest management. The system intrinsically 
recognised the Crown's inability to manage the resource and therefore sought to establish 
the conditions to encourage sustainable management by large companies. The allocation 
process was based on the approval of the minister responsible for forests, with no 
transparent criteria for acceptance or rejection. This allowed the system to be open to 
bribery and manipulation by forestry companies wanting access to forests. Indeed, the first 
Minister of Forests under the Social Credit (SOCRED) government, newly elected in 
1952, was imprisoned in 1958 for four years having been found guilty of taking bribes 
from British Columbia Forest Products (O'Keefe and Macdonald, 1999).
Thus there were now two systems in place, one being the area-based forest management 
licence and the other being the volume-based timber sales harvesting licence. As a result 
of the introduction of FMLs, the forest industry in BC became concentrated in the hands of 
a few large companies, dominated by the BC company MacMillan Bloedel. The sector 
boomed in this period. The 1950s and 1960s saw further expansion of the industry, 
particularly into the interior, and improved harvesting and processing methods and new
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technologies encouraged the AAC to be continuously increased throughout the period. By 
the 1970s, as the industry expanded, operations started to take place in environmentally 
sensitive sites. Control of the sector was concentrated in the hands of relatively few 
players. The top 10 companies controlled nearly 59% of the province’s AAC in 1975, with 
corporate concentration being even more marked in the coastal areas (Government of the 
Province of British Columbia, 1976). Two companies, MacMillan Bloedel and BC Forest 
Products, between them controlled more than 43% of the coastal AAC and 21% of the 
province wide AAC (Wilson, 1998).
However, in 1972, a significant political shift occurred, with the election of the left-leaning 
New Democratic Party (NDP) government ending over 20 years of pro-industry SOCRED 
government. Although not specifically a “green” party, it did have an inherent mistrust of 
the control of the sector by large corporate interests and its natural constituency was 
amongst forest workers rather than corporate executives. Although only in power for a 
little over 3 years, its office marked the start of a long period of gradual change, with the 
awareness of broad forest management objectives beyond just timber production playing a 
more central role in debates about forest management. In 1975, a Royal Commission on 
Forests was established under Peter H Pearse to examine timber rights and forest policy. Its 
1976 report explicitly highlighted the historical role of the private sector in the 
management of the forest resource and stressed the need to look beyond timber production 
to address broader environmental and social objectives. Pearse noted the importance of 
tenure arrangements and allocations in determining management outcomes, with tenures 
aimed at the private sector inevitably reinforcing the single use management of forests for 
timber production. He also recognised the significance of tenure arrangements not just in
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assigning rights but also in providing the instrument for controlling forestry activities and
achieving a wide range of other public objectives:
“The forest tenure system is therefore the vital link between the users of the 
province’s forests and the public landlord which owns them. It determines the 
pattern of rights and responsibilities and shapes the form and pace of resource 
development” (Government of the Province of British Columbia, 1976:1).
The Pearse Commission identified a fundamental change in thinking that would be needed 
to accommodate broad environmental objectives and greater public participation within 
existing forest management policies. In 1979, the Ministry of Forests Act, Forest Act and 
Range Act were legislated, incorporating many of the Pearse recommendations. Key 
features of the new legislation included a change to Ministry of Forests objectives to 
explicitly consider other resource values as well as timber; the consolidation of PSYUs 
into 33 Timber Supply Areas (TSAs), each TSA with its own AAC; the streamlining of the 
tenure system; increased public review; multiple-use planning processes and a new process 
for determining the AAC (Ministry of Forests, 1996).
Whilst the period between 1976 and 1991 has been categorised as one where broader 
forest management goals beyond timber production were increasingly recognised through 
the adoption of Integrated Forest Management discourses (Ministry of Forests, 1996), the 
reality remained business, namely the timber business, as usual. The 1979 Act overhauled 
the licensing system, with Timber Supply Areas replacing the smaller PSYUs, and 
Allowable Annual Cuts (AACs) being introduced for each TSA, allocated via a number of 
new licence agreements, including forest licences and timber sale licences. Tree Farm 
Licences replaced Forest Management Licences. Area-based Tree Farm Licences and 
volume-based Forest Licences remained long-term agreements, but were replacable at 
shorter periods to allow for updating of contract agreements.
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The return to SOCRED governments from 1976 to 1991 ensured a sympathetic 
administration for timber interests. However, the NDP period in office and the Pearse 
Commission left their mark in terms of increased awareness amongst the public about 
forest policy and demands for increased public involvement in decision-making. The 
growing environmental movement became a force to be taken seriously by industry and 
government alike, and pressure for wilderness protection from interest groups and the 
public increased, with a series of flash points arising when logging was scheduled for 
sensitive areas (Wilson, 1998; Mason, 1992). Government plans to extend the private 
property-type arrangements of the TFL system in the late 1980s met almost universal 
public opposition (Cashore et al, 2001) and led to the establishment of a Royal 
Commission under Sandy Peel in 1989 to examine the forest land base and how it was 
managed (Government of the Province of British Columbia, 1991). The Commission’s 
report was published in April 1991, just as a newly elected NDP government took office, 
having received large popular support for its environmental platform. The Commission 
recommended far-reaching changes to forest management at all levels, to reflect the 
changing values of society:
. .the status quo is not good enough. The way the forests and their many values 
are currently being managed by government and industry is out of step with what 
the public expects. It must change.” (Government of the Province of British 
Columbia, 1991:6).
6.3.2 Forest Management in the 1990s
At the beginning of the 1990s, forest property rights and tenure arrangements were 
virtually unchanged since the 1979 Forest Act. The 1994 Forest, Range & Recreation 
Resource Analysis (Ministry of Forests, 1996) presented data on all aspects of forestry 
management, including data on property rights. The 1994 data indicated the two
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significant forces in BC’s forest management and allocation of forest resources: the 
provincial government and the private sector (see figure 6.1 below). BC has a total land 
area of 95,158,000 hectares. Of this, 58,938,000 hectares are classified as forest lands. In 
1994, just over 96% of all forest lands in the province (56,921,000 hectares) were 
controlled by the provincial government, 3% were owned by private interests and less than 
1% was under federal government control as National Parks and Indian Reserves (Ministry 
of Forests, 1996). Of the 56,921,000 hectares of provincial forests, 53,737,000 hectares 
(94%) were allocated to timber production under tenure arrangements that had changed 
little since the 1979 Forest Act, see figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 Provincial forest land allocation, 1994
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□  Timber Supply A reas 
86%
source: Ministry of Forests (1996)
The forest management priorities at the beginning of the 1990s were clear: timber 
production remained the primary objective of forest management, with conservation 
being a secondary objective. Thus, BC provided a good example of the dominant forest
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management regime described in Chapter Three, with government and the private sector 
effectively controlling the forest resource and decision-making regarding forest 
management objectives and policies.
In the 1990s, the Ministry of Forests continued to have primary responsibility for the 
province’s forests and was therefore one of the most powerful within government. Its 
management responsibilities were designated as being for timber, recreation, forage and 
wilderness, with the primary function being managing the forest for timber production 
(Ministry of Forests, 1999a; Ministry of Forests, 1998). The ministry employed around 
4,550 people, with the headquarters being in the provincial capital of Victoria plus a 
network of six regions and 40 districts. The six regional offices provided direction and 
expertise and monitored district activities. District offices were the operational arm of 
the forest service, “providing service to the public and responding to local needs” 
(Ministry of Forests, 1999b). The ministry described this as providing a decentralised 
structure for operational management and local-level decision-making. However, the 
engine of policy development remained at the headquarters level, where there were four 
divisions (Forestry, Operations, Forest Industry Projects and Revenue and Corporate 
Services) plus a Policy and Economics Group. These five areas were divided into 18 
branches. The regional and district levels fitted within the Operations Division.
The government’s traditional partner in managing the forest resource, the private sector 
was often able to use its bargaining power to gain outcomes favourable to itself.
Forestry companies controlled most of the forest resource through industrial timber 
tenures. At the beginning of the 1990s, integrated wood products companies controlled 
85% of the AAC in crown forests (Government of the Province of British Columbia,
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1991). The concentration of corporate power into the hands of a few big players in the 
forestry sector was a marked feature of the development of BC forestry since the second 
world war. For much of this period, the ties between government and industry were close. 
Leading the private sector stakeholders was MacMillan Bloedel, the longest established, 
largest and one of the most vociferous corporations in the Province throughout the post­
war period32. For much of MacMillan Bloedel’s history, the company took a 
confrontational approach to environmental critics (Braun, 2002; Cashore et al, 2000). The 
company was instrumental in establishing and financing the Council of Forest Industries 
(COFI), an influential mouthpiece for the forestry sector in BC (Williston and Keller, 
1997). COFI was an industry trade association representing over 100 forestry companies 
throughout the province, including all of the largest companies such as Canadian Forest 
Products, MacMillan Bloedel, BC Forest Products and the Slocan Group. It aimed “to 
create a climate for consistent, healthy economic performance of the BC forest 
industry”, envisioning global competitiveness for the sector (COFI, 2000). The 
organisation played a significant strategic role in promoting the industry position on 
high profile issues such as First Nations treaty negotiations, timber supply, forestry 
regulations and tenure. They mounted a vigorous challenge to the environmental lobby 
and calls for incremental reductions in the Allowable Annual Cut, the president of COFI 
claiming that “narrowly focused special interest groups” were calling for changes that 
would “shrink forestry, kill jobs and destabilize communities” (COFI, 2000: 3). 
Regarding tenure, COFI consistently advocated private property rights as the most 
advantageous for producing a globally competitive forestry industry: “This ownership 
provides forest companies with a stable access to the forest resource and greater 
autonomy in forest management” (COFI, 1998:43). They stated that private ownership
32 MacMillan Bloedel was taken over by the US timber giant Weyerhauser in 1998.
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of forests in BC at only 3% was however very low compared to other leading world 
forest products exporters such as the USA (72%), Sweden (70%), Finland (72%) and 
New Zealand (21%), and this was seen as a disadvantage to global competitiveness 
(COFI, 1998).
The main tools for allocating forest access and use in the 1990s reflected the 
predominance of timber production and were a continuation of forest policies that 
evolved since the post-war period. These continued to be the Allowable Annual Cut and 
the timber tenure system. The primary objective remained the promotion of timber 
production in order to generate revenues for the province. The Allowable Annual Cut 
(AAC) underpinned the forest management regime in BC. It was the annual rate of 
timber harvesting specified for an area of land by the chief forester, and was determined 
at least once every five years. The chief forester set AACs for timber supply areas 
(TSAs) and tree farm licences (TFLs) in accordance with the Forest Act, and these were 
described as being based on calculations to determine the rate of timber production that 
may be sustained on the area, taking account of such things as the composition of the 
forest and expected growth rate; expected time for a forest to become established 
following clearfelling; expected wastage rates; silvicultural treatments; reasonable 
constraints on timber production for use of the forest area by other purposes (for 
example range and recreation); broad provincial economic and social objectives (see the 
Forest Act Part 2 section 8).
Whereas the AAC was often presented as being based on a neutral calculation of 
sustained yields of timber, the calculation of the AAC was actually influenced by a 
number of factors and was in fact a policy tool reflecting broad management objectives,
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increasing or decreasing according to political constraints or priorities (Cashore et al, 
2001). The AAC was one of the most contested issues within forest management in BC, 
ranging pro-development forces on the one hand against conservationists on the other: 
generally, COFI argued for an increased AAC and environmental groups argued for a 
reduced AAC. Underlying the allocation of the AAC were inherent property rights 
decisions regarding the distribution of rights to the timber harvest. The allocation was 
controlled by the state, but the state was subject to advocacy by the various interest 
groups regarding the level of AAC. If the overall AAC was reduced, the state had to 
correspondingly reduce the level of harvest that had already been allocated to licensees. 
If the overall AAC was increased, then more timber cutting rights were available to be 
assigned. Companies could be penalised not only for exceeding their AAC but also for not 
harvesting their full allotment of AAC (Ministry of Forests, 1996).
In the 1990s there were various different types of tenure rights to timber in the province, 
with forests available for timber harvesting covering 94% of the province’s forests in 
Timber Supply Areas (TSAs) and Tree Farm Licences (TFLs). The 33 TSAs were 
administrative units under the jurisdiction of the BC forest service and each TSA was 
allocated an AAC. The AAC was then distributed by way of licences to a number of 
operators, who were licensed to fell a specific volume of timber each year within the 
TSA. In most TSAs virtually all of the AAC was already apportioned to operators via 
long-term replaceable licences (Hoberg, 2000).
Volume-based licences, such as the Forest Licence, were non-exclusive rights to AAC 
within a TSA. In order that licensees did not cut the same area, each licensee submitted 
annual permits to cut in a specific area for the approval of the district or regional manager
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of the Ministry of Forests. Licence holders paid stumpage fees and annual rent to the 
province and had standard responsibilities elaborated under the Forest Practices Code. 
Unlike TFL holders, they were not obliged to prepare management plans or inventories 
(Cortex, 2001).
Tree Farm Licences (TFLs) were the most productive form of tenure in terms of timber 
extraction, with 24% of AAC coming from 8% of the land base of the province in the year 
to March 1998 (Ministry of Forests, 1999c). There were in 1999 34 TFLs, held by 19 
private companies and 2 district-run institutions. The Tree Farm Licence (TFL) was the 
tenure agreement with the most private-property right type characteristics. It was an 
exclusive right to a specific area of land, and although issued for 25 years, was renewable 
every 5 years, giving security of tenure to the licence holder into the foreseeable future.
The TFL could be transferred by the holder, with the provision that they obtain ministerial 
consent and relinquish 5% of the AAC. TFL holders had rights to exclude the public 
from forest areas if they might interfere with logging interests. With these rights, the 
TFL holder had responsibilities to pay stumpage fees and annual rent to the province and 
had to submit 5 year management plans and prepare an inventory, as well as standard 
requirements for road-building, operational planning and protection and reforestation as 
regulated by the Forest Practices Code. If the government decided to set aside some of 
the land within the TFL, it had to compensate the TFL holder accordingly (Cashore et 
al, 2001). The TFL system has been blamed for facilitating the concentration of corporate 
power that was witnessed from the 1950s onwards, with the industry being concentrated 
into the hands of fewer and larger corporations (Wilson, 1998; Government of the 
Province of British Columbia, 1976). In 1987 it was proposed to double the amount of land 
under TFLs in order to stimulate private sector investment. However, due to strong public
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opposition, the scheme was eventually dropped (Ministry of Forests, 1996). Figure 6.2 
lists the main industrial scale licences33 in operation in the 1990s and their property 
rights characteristics.
Figure 6.2 Main types of industrial-scale licences in 1994 and property rights 
characteristics
Type of 
Licence
Allocated
by
Duration Area or 
volume- 
based
Property rights 
characteristics
Tree Farm 
Licence
Minister 25 years, 
replaceable 
every 5 years
Area-based • Exclusive 
rights to 
harvest timber 
in a specified 
area
• Transferable 
(Ministerial 
consent -  5% 
of AAC reverts 
to province)
Forest
Licence
Minister Up to 20 
years, 
replaceable 
every 5 years
Volume- 
based 
AAC in 
TSA
• Transferable 
(Ministerial 
consent -  5% 
of AAC reverts 
to province)
Timber Sale 
Licence
Minister Up to 10 
years, 
replaceable 
every 10 years
Volume- 
based 
AAC in 
TSA
• Transferable
• (Ministerial 
consent -  5% 
of AAC reverts 
to province)
Pulpwood
Agreement
Minister 25 years Volume-
based
• Transferable
Source: Forest Act; Cortex 2001
The private property-type nature of timber tenures operating in BC in the 1990s was borne 
out by the compensation culture that was accepted by government and industry alike. As
33 Industrial-scale licences are those that assign rights to large volumes or areas o f  timber. In addition to 
these licences, since the 1980s there have been specific programmes designed to be available to small 
operators, for example as drawn up under the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program, for volumes up 
to 10,000 cubic metres and the Woodlot Licence, for areas up to 600 hectares. They account for 14% o f  
the AAC (Hoberg, 2000).
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discussed in Chapter Two, Bromley (1991) describes the prevalence of compensation 
culture in the contravention of private property rights, where the latter are seen as a 
“timeless and immutable entitlement”. This approach underpinned tenure in BC. If the 
government withdrew any Crown forest land from the timber exploitation stock, 
government and industry both expected compensation to be paid to the private sector. For 
example, when in 1987 an agreement was reached between the Canadian and BC 
governments and the Haida Nation for the creation of the South Moresby protected area, 
the BC government was only prepared to sign this agreement if C$37 million were paid by 
the federal government to two forestry companies, Western Forest Products and 
MacMillan Bloedel, for the loss of future logging rights to the area’s Crown forests 
(Parfitt, 1998). Other options would have been to let the licence lapse or take back a 
portion of the AAC, both of which the Minister of Forests was entitled to do. Critics see 
examples such as this as government intent to privatise public resources: “That these 
options weren’t pursued....tends to reinforce the notion.. .that public resources are being 
privatised in all but name” (Parfitt, 1998:20). However, others see the flaws in BC forest 
policy as being not enough privatisation (Drushka, 1993). For Drushka, increased 
privatisation would increase security of timber access for the forestry industry, thus 
promoting longer term investment and management of the resource, and could be 
structured to allow small businesses to enter the sector. Nevertheless, the system in place in 
the 1990s favoured large businesses, and timber tenures were concentrated in the hands of 
relatively few, large corporate interests, who controlled 86% of the AAC (Cashore et al, 
2001). In summary, the evolution of forest management policies in BC clearly favoured 
timber production, and property rights institutions were introduced to facilitate corporate 
control of the forest resource as the most efficient way of developing the timber industry. 
This meant that the state and the private sector between them held the most power
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regarding forest management and control, with little apparent scope for local forest 
community involvement as bargaining parties able to influence property rights outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the following section analyses the ways in which local forest communities 
did try to influence forest policy and management, and attempts to create new property 
rights institutions.
6.4 Interactions between local forest communities and the timber regime
The predominance of the timber regime, with power over forest control and decision­
making resting with the provincial government and private sector, meant that local forest 
communities had little capacity to influence how forests were managed and allocated. The 
participation of local forest communities in decision-making and management of the forest 
resource was rarely encouraged by successive provincial governments, other than through 
the small business enterprise program and the woodlot licence system, both of which 
accounted for a small percentage (14%) of overall tenures. However, the 1990s saw the 
emergence of a new forest politics that promised much in terms of participation. After the 
relative stability of forest policy in the post war period, with timber production 
remaining the primary objective of forest management and the private sector controlling 
and managing most of the province’s forests, the 1990s were a period of change in 
forest management culture, with a new forest politics emerging within a broad shift 
towards sustainable development objectives and a framework of comprehensive land 
use planning. The election of the NDP government in 1991 and their subsequent 
holding of power throughout the 1990s produced an active period in forest policy 
dialogue, although by the end of the decade little had actually changed regarding forest 
tenure (Cashore et al, 2001). The NDP government was elected largely on its platform 
of environmental and forest reformist promises. These appealed to a populace whose
212
awareness of environmental issues, and issues surrounding the protection of old-growth
forests in particular, had been heightened by the increasingly sophisticated and media-
sawy environmental movement in the province (Wilson, 1998; Mason, 1992). In its
manifesto, the NDP promised to double the amount of provincial land under protected
area status, to 12%. It also promised to reform existing forest policy to specifically
protect old-growth forest:
"What we need to see is a logical, technical approach to identifying and preserving 
old growth stands for future generations instead of just waiting around for the axe 
to fall on them" (NDP, 1989).
Thus, shifting ideology regarding forests and growing acceptance of conservation at the 
political level meant that a broader range of interest groups were starting to have some 
influence on the direction of forest policy, rather than the dominance of industry and 
government that had characterised previous decades. The following paragraphs discuss 
the interactions between local forest communities and the dominant forest management 
regime, in particular attempts by local forest communities to challenge the status quo 
forest management and tenure assumptions of the dominant forest management regime, 
in which the state and private sector were the most powerful actors.
This section examines the pressure for change to the forest management regime in the 
1990s by focusing on two processes that, although in evidence prior to the 1990s, 
played a more high profile role in that decade. First, there was popular resistance to 
commercial logging, frequently called the “war in the woods”, between logging and 
wilderness protection forces that reached its most extreme confrontation in Clayoquot 
Sound on Vancouver Island in the early 1990s. Second, there were the calls for 
increased community involvement in forest policy decision-making and control of the 
forest resource itself, which by the end of the decade manifested itself in treaty and
213
rights negotiations between First Nations and provincial and federal governments on the 
one hand and the limited introduction of community forest tenures on the other.
6.4.1 Resistance to commercial logging
With the increasing public awareness of environmental issues since the 1970s and the 
growing strength of the BC environmental movement, attention broadened in the province 
to focus on multiple values of forests, in particular biodiversity and scenic values. The key 
environmental debate revolved around the protection of old-growth forests, the conflict 
being characterised as between logging versus wilderness protection (Wilson, 1998). 
Tourism became an important industry in the province, with hiking, canoeing and ski-ing 
being particularly popular activities. Apart from aesthetic and recreation values becoming 
increasingly important, the protection of forests was also promoted in terms of their 
hydrological regulation functions, with many rural communities depending directly on 
watersheds for their domestic water supply, and wild salmon-spawning streams and rivers 
being vital to the fishing industry. The scale of forest lands in BC masked the fact that old 
growth forest areas were increasingly logged out over the decades, in particular accessible 
coastal old growth such as is found on Vancouver Island.34 This led to the emergence of a 
strong and highly vocal environmental movement which grew in strength from the 1970s 
to demand the cessation of logging in old growth forests and to advocate an increase in the 
amount of wilderness areas, particularly forests, that were protected. Given the dominance 
of the timber industry in BC’s political and economic realms and the high profile 
wilderness protection supporters, the relationships between those advocating
34 The liquidation o f  natural forests, particularly in the coastal areas, has been o f  concern to experts for 
decades, and is raised in the Sloan, Pearse and Peel Royal Commissions (Government o f  the province o f  
British Columbia, 1947, 1976 and 1991). However, the fundamental trend, known as “falldown”, was 
masked by the opening up o f  new forest areas to exploitation, particularly in the interior o f  the province.
214
environmental protection on the one hand, and those representing economic interests on 
the other, were characterised by their adversarial nature (Wilson, 1998; Mason, 1992). 
Popular protest against the dominant paradigm of industrial forestry began in the 1970s 
and a series of flash points occurred as protests erupted in one valley or watershed after 
another as the industry moved into previously unlogged areas35. The conflicts have 
commonly been labelled “the war in the woods”, a phrase that became short-hand for the 
often acrimonious disputes and front-line nature of battles that took the form of blockades 
and other mass direct action focused against industrial forestry, and clearcut logging in 
particular36.
By the 1990s, calls for increased wilderness protection were becoming louder, largely as 
a result of the increasingly sophisticated environmental movement that had been 
developing its skills over the previous decade or so. Popular support for protecting the 
environment was also high, and the NDP were elected on an explicitly pro-environment 
agenda of protecting old-growth forests and developing new harvest methods. However, 
despite the promising words of the NDP government, within two years of coming to office 
they were to be faced with one of the world’s largest environmental protests, at Clayoquot 
Sound on Vancouver Island. Clayoquot Sound, on the West coast of Vancouver Island, 
became the largest and most famous case of mass civil disobedience in Canada’s history, 
bringing the campaign to protect BC’s old-growth forests to an international audience. 
Clayoquot Sound can be seen as the high water mark in grass roots activism in the
35 For example, Meares Island, Stein Valley, Carmanagh Valley and South Moresby were all scenes o f  
environmental protest.
36 Clearcut logging has been the primary harvesting method in the province. It involves the removal o f  all 
vegetation over large areas and has a very high negative visual impact.
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province, galvanising thousands of protestors to blockade roads and undertake acts of civil 
disobedience to prevent logging in the area.
Despite widespread calls for the whole area to be protected, a management plan for
Clayoquot Sound was published in April 1993 that scheduled logging in all but 26% of the
Sound's old-growth forests, even though around 24% had already been logged. This caused
consternation, not just amongst environmentalists but also amongst academics and others
critical of status quo forest management:
"The New Democrat Party decision to log Clayoquot Sound appears to be a short­
sighted decision...examined in the context of the whole Island the plan is a mistake 
because the rest of the land has already been logged or altered by logging" 
(Dearden, 1993).
After the announcement of the plan in April 1993, more than 12,000 people took part in
protests in Clayoquot Sound itself, blockading roads to prevent logging operations and 932
people were arrested for civil disobedience (Maclsaac and Champagne, 1994). The focus
of their protest was to prevent MacMillan Bloedel, the company with timber cutting rights
to the majority of the available forests in the Sound, from continued logging of the area.
Protests also took place across Canada, the USA, Europe and Australia. Information,
publicity and awareness-raising activities became a major advocacy tool for the
protagonists. The protests generated massive publicity, not just within the province but
nationally and internationally, gaining widespread support amongst the public. The
government tried to argue that its plans were different to previous ones, producing a leaflet
that was delivered to every BC home:
"There is no doubt that large-scale clearcutting and poor road construction have 
extensively damaged streams, soil conditions and wildlife habitat. Previous 
governments cut back forest monitoring, allowing logging companies to police 
themselves with only occasional visits and audits by Ministry of Forests staff. That 
era of "sympathetic administration" is over. This government is introducing new 
standards that will stop such logging practices from ever occurring again in 
Clayoquot Sound" (leaflet published by Ministry of Forests, 1993).
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Environmental activists, whose experience, networking and strategic acumen had
evolved over the past few years to become a formidable force (Mason, 1992), produced
evidence of significant environmental degradation caused by clearcut logging in the
Sound. Following a freedom of information inquiry by environmental groups, it was
uncovered that a recent government audit of MacMillan Bloedel's logging practices
found that more than 75% of the sites examined were in violation of government
fisheries and forestry guidelines. On August 6th 1993, the Ministry of Forests wrote to
MacMillan Bloedel, cataloguing specific incidents of non-compliance with the Coastal
Fish Forestry Guidelines (CFFG) in Clayoquot Sound. The August 6th letter from the
resource officer responsible for the area made the following points:
"..in some cases the severity of events of non-compliance with the CFFG is not 
clearly expressed in the AAP [Annual Assessment Plan]...Generally, Section 2.6 
(post operational) of the 1988 CFFG has had a low level of compliance... Road 
construction has been identified as an area of non-compliance...Road maintenance 
is an area of non-compliance...The stream management of Class HI and IV creeks 
is a major area of non-compliance..." (Fisherman, 1993).
Overall, 21 of the 27 cut blocks audited failed to meet with Federal fish-forestry guidelines 
and Ministry approval. MacMillan Bloedel was found to not be maintaining forest site 
productivity after logging by stabilising slopes or minimising stream impacts. The Annual 
Assessment Plans and the audit revealed extensive landslides and soil erosion in the 
majority of cut blocks. The company was also found to have deliberately misrepresented 
classifications of salmon streams, falsely claiming they were devoid of fish in order to 
avoid additional costs of safeguarding habitat.
Environmental groups used the international attention focused on Clayoquot Sound to 
lobby for boycotts of BC timber by international markets, with some success in Europe. 
The pressure on government to satisfactorily settle the Clayoquot Sound issue was
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immense and in 1993 established the independent Clayoquot Sound scientific panel which 
was charged with making recommendations on how logging should occur in the area. The 
panel finally reported in 1995 and the government accepted all of its 128 
recommendations, including the cessation of clearcut logging in the area. Whilst First
"xn *Nations were marginalized during initial protests at Clayoquot Sound , the formation of 
strategic alliances with local protestors and environmental groups proved to be of mutual 
benefit in increasing the bargaining power of all the protesting parties. As a result, the 
Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nations became increasingly prominent in the course of resolving 
conflict and were instrumental in implementing the subsequent settlement. An Interim 
Measures Agreement (IMA) was signed between the government and Nuu-Chah-Nulth in 
1994, giving greater control over land use decisions and a power of veto to the First 
Nations in the area. The IMA led to the establishment of the Clayoquot Sound Central 
Regional Board, the first significant joint management structure between First Nations and 
the provincial government. In addition, in 1997 a joint venture company was established 
between representatives of the Nuuh-Chah-Nulth and MacMillan Bloedel to co-manage 
the forest resources falling within traditional territories and the company’s TFL 44 
(SILVA, 1998).
In summary, the pressure on the provincial government to engage with concerns regarding 
protection of old growth forests was enormous during the 1990s. The Clayoquot Sound 
issue brought international attention to the “war in the woods” that was being waged across 
the province. Battle lines moved from one hot spot to the next as logging plans were 
announced in politically sensitive areas. The level of expertise amongst activists had been 
increasing since the 1980s and strategic alliances were formed between environmental
37 See Braun (2002) for a detailed account o f  Clayoquot Sound’s First Nations and their relations with 
government, industry and protest groups.
activists, First Nations groups, unions and conservation-minded scientists that strengthened 
the calls for change in the status quo.
6.4.2 Communities: negotiating access and control
As seen in Clayoquot Sound, protests against the prevailing forest management regime did 
not just focus on increased protected areas and wilderness preservation. There were also 
increasing calls for the involvement of local forest communities in forest management, the 
underlying message being that such involvement would result in more environmentally 
sustainable forest management. The role of the Silva Forest Foundation, an independent 
forest management organisation, in articulating ecosystem-based forest management 
planning was influential in providing a scientific framework for these goals and, most 
importantly, for providing a link between protecting old growth forests and sustainable 
community development in a “win-win” scenario. At the heart of the ecosystem-based 
management model espoused by the Silva Forest Foundation (SFF) was protection, with 
the first step being to identify what should be set aside in a landscape unit in order to 
protect the full range of environmental goods and services. From this foundation, an 
assessment was then made of the feasibility of developing diverse, ecologically 
sustainable, community-based economies, one component of which was to assess how 
much timber could be harvested on an ecologically sustainable basis. Whilst the SFF 
model was widely championed by community activists, the approach itself was not 
necessarily tied to community control and could be adopted by government and the private 
sector as well.38
38 Interview with SFF director, February 1999. The interviewee also made the point that communities 
were capable oFmismanaging resources.
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In order to defuse the war in the woods, the NDP government embraced the language of 
consensus, with concepts of democratic legitimacy and participatory decision-making 
being applied on a systematic basis to land-use decision-making for the first time in the 
province (Burrows, 2000; Mason, 1996). These concepts were mediated through several 
processes, including their most comprehensive manifestations through the Commission 
on Resources and Environment (CORE) and Treaty Negotiation processes (see below). 
These represented steps towards an inclusive approach to land use planning, mirrored 
by a shifting emphasis within the forest policy arena to include civil society in dialogue. 
This inevitably led to high expectations that fundamental change in forest management 
could take place, expectations that by the end of the decade were by and large dashed 
(Cashore et al, 2001).
How did all of this pressure manifest itself in specific calls to action? The discourse moved 
increasingly beyond wilderness protection as the over-arching message and became one of 
demands for community involvement, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, in decision­
making and community control over forests. Whilst this may have been an expedient way 
to bring the disparate forces against the status quo together behind a unified message in 
some instances, it also offered a genuine path of compromise and fertile ground for 
negotiation with the advocates of the status quo. The argument evolved beyond the simple 
“jobs” versus “environment” dichotomy that the industry representatives liked to portray 
and introduced far more complex and genuinely challenging concepts based on 
fundamentally rethinking status quo property rights institutions in the province.
By the mid-1990s, a number of communities were actively developing initiatives to have a 
greater say in how the forests in which they lived were managed. Figure 6.3 identifies
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those communities who were engaged in such developments by 1998. The communities 
were in various stages of development, from initial planning to operation.
Figure 6.3 Community forest management initiatives in planning or operation in 1998
Community association Stage of development in 1998
Central Coast Economic Development 
Commission (CCEDC)
Planning
Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board Joint management agreement between 
provincial government and First Nation
Cortes Island Community Forest 
Committee
Planning
Cowichan Lake Community Forest 
Cooperative
Forest Licence
Creston Community Forest Forest Licence
Denman Island Community Forest Planning
Forests for the World Planning
Galiano Conservancy Association Planning
Gitxsan Nation Planning/Treaty/rights negotiations
Haida Nation Planning/Treaty/rights negotiations
Harrop-Procter Watershed Protection 
Society
Planning
Islands Community Stability Initiative Planning/Treaty/rights negotiations
Kaslo Community Forest Forest Licence
Klahoose First Nation Treaty/rights negotiations; Woodlot 
Licence
Malcolm Island Community Forest Planning
Mission Municipal Forest TFL
Nootka Economic Development 
Corporation
Forest Licence
North Cowichan Municipal Forest Municipal Forest
North Island Woodlot Association, Comox 
Valley
Planning
Omineca Community Forest Ltd. Planning
Revelstoke Community Forest Corporation TFL
Robson Valley Planning
Slocan Valley Watershed Alliance Planning
Sto:lo Nation Planning
Tanizul Timber Ltd. TFL
West Chilcotin Community Resource 
Association
Planning
Office of the Wet'suwef en Hereditary 
Chiefs
Planning/Treaty/rights negotiations
Municipality of Whistler Planning
Xaxli'p First Nation Private land
Yalakom Community Council Planning
Source: Denman Community Forest Co-op, 998; Silva Forest Foundation, 1998
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Although the community associations listed in figure 6.3 were all actively calling for 
greater control and were drawing up community management plans, in fact 
opportunities for them to implement these plans or gain control of local forest resources 
were limited due to the legal framework of the dominant forest management regime. 
Those who were operating were doing so under existing tenure arrangements, either on 
private land or as a standard forest licence or, in the case of Clayoquot Sound, as a formal 
joint management agreement. The groups at the planning stage were either exploring 
options to establish community forest tenures or were actively calling for such 
opportunities, including under treaty negotiations and aboriginal rights and title claims. 
They were engaged in planning round tables taking place throughout the province or were 
developing plans based on traditional land claims and local economic factors. Two new 
initiatives in the 1990s did provide a means to achieve greater community control, the 
Treaty Negotiation Process for resolving First Nations land claims and the introduction 
of a new form of forest tenure, the community forest pilot agreement. These are 
described below.
As treaties had largely not been negotiated with First Nations at the time of colonisation, 
ownership of most of the province in effect remained unsettled, with aboriginal title and 
rights being claimed by First Nations, although the provincial government had long 
maintained that such rights and title were extinguished (Ministry of Forests, 1996). In 
1993, the provincial and federal governments of BC and Canada and the First Nations 
established a treaty negotiation process. Up to this point, the provincial government had 
insisted that it was the federal government that held the responsibility to deal with First 
Nations’ claims and that at most all the BC government had been prepared to do was 
provide “assistance” (Smith, 1996).
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Aboriginal rights to forests are distinct from Aboriginal title to land, and both were being 
pursued by First Nations, either through negotiation or litigation (Boyd and Williams- 
Davidson, 2000). Aboriginal rights claims encompass two distinct rights: traditional 
usufructuary rights and commercial rights. Aboriginal title was elaborated in the 
Delgamuukw decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in December 1997, whereby 
Aboriginal title was a legal interest in the land, including minerals and forests. According 
to this decision, Aboriginal title contained key concepts that made it distinct from private 
property rights: the land is communally owned; the land can only be sold to the Federal 
government; the land must be managed and used sustainably so that the rights of future 
generations to the land and resources are not impaired (Boyd and Williams-Davidson, 
2000). It distinguished between aboriginal title and aboriginal rights by stating:
. aboriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a piece of land 
can be put. The aboriginal right to fish for food, by contrast, does not contain within it 
the same discretionary component.” Aboriginal rights to certain resources, such as 
fish or trees for cultural purposes, could exist on land that was not subject to aboriginal 
title. The challenge to First Nations after the Delgamuukw decision was to prove title to 
land, which the Delgamuukw case itself failed to do (Lordon, 1998).
Negotiated outside the treaty negotation process, the Nisga'a Final Agreement was 
reached in 1998, which transferred ownership of 200,000 hectares of land from the 
provincial government to the Nisga'a, a relatively small proportion of the traditional 
Nisga'a territory originally claimed by the Nisga’a of 2.4 million hectares. The treaty 
allowed the Nisga’a people to “govern themselves in a way comparable to a municipal 
government”; they owned the forest and mineral resources on their land; they were 
subject to the federal and provincial laws relating to all British Columbians
39 Supreme Court o f  Canada, 1997, Delgamuukw decision para 168
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(Government of the province of British Columbia, 1998). However, this agreement did 
have significant limitations on the way the Nisga'a could manage and use the forest 
resource. The Nisga'a were given logging rights to the area, but had to extract not less 
than the volumes set down under the terms of the BC Forest Practices Code for Crown 
land for the first five years (165,000 cubic metres annually), followed be a gradual 
annual reduction down to 130,000 cubic metres. This was despite the fact that the 
Annual Allowable Cut for the Nass Timber Supply Area (in which the Nisga'a territory 
lies) was roughly three times the government's own estimates of the long-term 
sustainable harvest level (Boyd and Williams- Davidson, 2000). Thus, regardless of 
how the Nisga'a may have wanted to manage the forest resource, they were obliged to 
extract timber at a rate set by the provincial government for the first nine years.
The Treaty Negotiation process itself had not been successful in concluding any treaties by 
the end of the 1990s, although over 50 negotiating tables were in existence. Neither had 
litigation proved any more conclusive, failing to rule in favour of specific claims to 
aboriginal title, for example in the Delgamuukw case. There appeared to be a lack of 
consensus about the aims of the treaty negotiation process between the government and 
industry on the one hand and the First Nations on the other. The government approach to 
treaty negotiations was that they were designed to achieve certainty in land tenure by 
moving from undefined aboriginal rights to defined treaty rights in order to have certainty 
over who owned what in the Province. According to the provincial government, “all treaty 
settlements in total will not exceed a land base of five per cent of the province -  which is 
roughly proportional to BC’s aboriginal population”(Govemment of the Province of 
British Columbia, 1998). However, for First Nations the purpose of treaty negotiations was 
to share power with the Crown as equal, co-existing partners on a government to 
government basis rather than through one-off final settlements: “For them, certainty will be
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achieved through renewable, ongoing agreements between mutually recognised partners, 
not through a final and definitive settlement” (BC Treaty Commission, 2000). This co­
management approach, where there is shared jurisdiction of Crown land, was considered 
impractical and unworkable not only by the government but also by the forest industry 
association COFI, with their members believing that such joint tenure would increase 
confusion and conflict: “COFI considers that effective and efficient administration of 
Crown lands can only be achieved where the Crown holds unequivocal authority and 
singular jurisdiction over public lands” (COFI, 2001:6). For COFI, the uncertainty 
surrounding First Nation land claims undermined the investment climate and hindered 
resource development in the province. According to Smith (1996), the First Nations who 
had filed their intent to negotiate treaties claimed in total 111% of the province (due to 
overlapping claims), including Vancouver itself. Thus, there was a very large gulf between 
First Nation claims and provincial government intentions regarding actual land available 
for settlements. In terms of tenure, on the one hand, the province maintained its 
sovereignty over Crown lands whilst on the other First Nations asserted aboriginal title to 
their traditional lands.
Outside the Treaty Negotiation process, the ongoing management and allocation of Crown 
forests produced conflict at a local level between First Nations on the one hand and 
government and industry on the other. There remained disagreement over what constituted 
consultation. The Haida nation of Haida Gwai for example claimed that the Ministry of 
Forests and MacMillan Bloedel had not engaged in good faith consultation regarding the 
approval of cutting permits: “They ask for input and they do whatever they want. 
Meaningful consultation would be where our interests are taken into consideration” 40. By 
contrast, critics claimed that consultation did not equate to joint decision-making and that
40 Kim Davidson, chief councillor o f  Old Masset, cited in Lordon, 1998:21.
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by entering into such relationships governments “have abdicated their obligation to 
govern” (Smith, 1996:101). In a subsequent ruling by the BC Court of Appeal in a case 
brought by the Haida nation against the Ministry of Forests and MacMillan Bloedel (later 
acquired by Weyerhauser corporation), the judge asserted that the state and the company 
had a legal duty to consult and try to reach agreement with First Nations over timber 
cutting, even though aboriginal title and rights had not been established:
“I would grant a declaration to the petitioners that the Crown Provincial and 
Weyerhaeuser have now, and had in 1999 and 2000, and earlier, a legally 
enforceable duty to the Haida people to consult with them in good faith and to 
endeavour to seek workable accommodations between the aboriginal interests 
of the Haida people, on the one hand, and the short term and long term 
objectives of the Crown and Weyerhaeuser to manage T.F.L. 39 and Block 6 in 
accordance with the public interest, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, on the 
other hand”41 (emphasis added).
This case is interesting in the light of the earlier Clayoquot Sound resolution, because it 
involved the same company (MacMillan Bloedel, later Weyerhauser), First Nations and 
the provincial government as bargaining parties. As described above, the Clayoquot Sound 
outcome centred around a unique joint management agreement between First Nations and 
the provincial government which resulted in the Nuu-Chah-Nulth having the power of veto 
over developments and involving First Nations in commercial forestry activities through 
the joint venture company with MacMillan Bloedel (later Weyerhauser). MacMillan 
Bloedel accepted this model, even though it restricted their operations, both in terms of 
location and methods. However, it seems clear from the later Haida case that the 
Clayoquot outcome had not changed the prevailing ideology of the state or private sector 
regarding their powers to decide forest policy and manage forestry operations to the 
exclusion of First Nations. The case also highlights the unique legal position of First
41 BC Court o f  Appeal, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister o f Forests), para 60, February 27, 
2002
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Nations, in that the ruling established that consultation should include efforts to reach 
workable accommodations with them. This contrasts with legal rulings regarding the 
Slocan Valley, described in section 6.4.3, where consultation was legally deemed to not 
include participation in decision-making or any obligation on the part of the state to 
negotiate outcomes. These empirical data support North’s (1990) theoretical point that 
institutional constraints, such as status quo power relations, make large-scale institutional 
change unlikely, with change more likely in an incremental and marginal way. There was 
one more development that, together with the Nisga’a Treaty and Clayoquot Sound joint 
management agreement, represented the only tenure changes in BC to favour community 
control in the 1990s.
As indicated in figure 6.3 above, First Nations were not the only communities wanting 
to gain control over forest resources. Calls for community-based tenures achieved 
enough momentum that the provincial government eventually paved the way for their 
limited development. In 1997, the then Forests Minister David Zimhelt announced that 
the provincial government was going to provide new opportunities for communities and 
First Nations to participate directly in forest management through the establishment of 
new community forest tenures that would be piloted on a limited scale after an 
independent advisory committee had made recommendations for the terms of reference 
for the programme (Ministry of Forests, 1997). The Forest Act was amended in 1998 to 
include provision for a new form of tenure known as a Community Forest Agreement. 
Prior to this date, there was no legal basis for a community tenure, although a few 
communities had been involved in managing forest resources through the standard 
forest licences: for example, the municipalities of Mission and Revelstoke held Tree 
Farm Licences. The aim of the pilot project was to test the new tenure and “to provide
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opportunities at the community level to test some new and innovative forest 
management models...”(Ministry of Forests, 1999d). A sub-committee of the 
Community Forest Advisory Committee evaluated the proposals and ranked them, 
providing the ministry with a short-list of the best candidates. The ministry then made the 
final selection. It was initially anticipated by the ministry that three pilots would be 
selected. However, of the original 27 applicants, 10 were invited to participate in the 
scheme (Ministry of Forests, 2001), although only six signed final agreements. In 2002, 
Cheslatta First Nation were also issued a CFPA, bringing the total to seven. See figure 6.4 
for details of the seven community forest pilot agreements issued.
Figure 6.4: Community Forest Pilot Agreements Issued as at 31 January 2003
CFPA holder Area (hectares) AAC (m3)
Bamfield Huu-ay-aht Community Forest Society 418 1,000
Bums Lake Community Forest Corporation 23,325 53,677
Cheslatta First Nation 39,129 210,000
District of Fort St James 3,582 8,290
Esketemc First Nation 25,000 17,000
Harrop-Procter Watershed Protection Co-op 10,860 2,603
Village of McBride 60,860 50,000
Total 163,174 342,570
Source: Ministry of Forests, 2003
Whilst the Community Forest Pilot Program represented an innovative step towards 
establishing both the concept and practice of community tenure in BC, nonetheless the 
operations were regulated by the standard forestry regulations and laws of the Province 
and therefore had to include timber production as at least part of their business objectives. 
The tenures were initially short-term, the pilot tenure being for 5 years, during which it 
would be evaluated and if deemed successful, long-term community forest agreements 
could be offered by the ministry of between 25 and 99 years, although the specifics for the
228
longer tenures were not formalised. No crown land was taken out of existing licence 
agreements to be made available for these new tenures, and so applicants had to identify 
unallocated Crown forest land and spare AAC as part of their application. According to a 
ministry source interviewed in 1999, the Community Forest Pilot Program was seen by 
some in government as an opportunity to access timber production in previously politically 
difficult areas where opposition from local communities had been strong enough to 
prevent industrial logging (for example, see the Harrop-Procter case in 6.4.3 below).
In conclusion, the discourse of who should manage the forest resources of BC was 
heightened in the 1990s. There were ideological shifts that led to the acceptance in 
principle of community inclusion, although in practice the status quo proved resistant to 
large-scale changes. Nevertheless, there were increased opportunities for communities to 
negotiate access to and control of forest resources, both through First Nations litigation and 
treaty negotiation processes and through the emergence of new tenure arrangements 
available to all communities. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade only 393,000 hectares 
of the Province’s 59 million hectares of forests (0.61%) had changed tenure to be brought 
under community control and even this was subject to Ministry of Forests objectives and 
regulations. In the next section, the processes and constraints are examined in more detail 
in one particular forest region in order to analyse how property rights issues were central to 
forest management debates in the province.
6.4.3 Nelson forest region
In this section, issues raised by a comprehensive property rights analysis are studied in 
the context of one forest region visited in 1999, in order to look in depth at themes of
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distributive conflict, the relative power of bargaining parties and different ideologies 
regarding forest management and control. The Nelson Forest Region was subdivided 
into 6 Forest Districts. As with the pattern throughout the province, timber cutting rights 
over most of the Region were concentrated in the hands of relatively few corporations. 
Nelson Forest Region had 7 Timber Supply Areas and 6 TFLs, with 24 Forest Licences 
and the 6 TFLs together accounting for over 80% of the volume of committed rights to 
cut timber in the region (Ministry of Forests, 1999c). The Nelson Forest Region offers 
two examples of local community tenacity in trying to gain control over the 
management of local forest resources. Both cases demonstrate the frustrations and 
conflicts faced by communities and how the analytical factors described in Chapter Two 
influenced the different institutional outcomes in each of the areas. The two locations 
chosen were the Slocan Valley and Harrop-Procter (see map 6.2).
Map 6.2 Slocan Valley and Harrop Procter
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Water protection was a significant issue in the region, with many residents relying 
directly on watersheds for domestic water sources. The potential threats posed to water
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quality and quantity by industrial logging activities led to community activism in both 
locations. Neither the Slocan Valley nor the Harrop-Procter areas had a strong First 
Nations presence, and the Sinixt Nation of the Arrow Lakes area had been declared 
extinct by the BC government and therefore were not recognised as a Nation. 
Nevertheless, representatives of the Sinixt Nation were actively reclaiming their 
traditions and worked with community groups who included them in issues of 
relevance.
An area of high scenic value, the Slocan Valley is situated in a remote area in the Nelson 
Forest Region in South East BC. The valley had around 2,000 residents spread over a 
number of small communities. Industrial forestry licences applied to most of the Crown 
forest land in the area. Local opposition to industrial forestry had been evident in the area 
for decades. Members of the local communities opposed to large-scale clearcutting 
commissioned the Slocan Valley Community Forest Management Project in 1974, which 
was a feasibility study to examine how greater autonomy to the local community regarding 
decision-making and control of local forest resources based on integrated forest 
management policies would result in more sustainable local economies and preservation of 
environmental goods and services, including explicitly recognising the aesthetic, 
recreational and other non-timber values associated with the area, as well as the 
development of less wasteful, value-added timber businesses. One of its principal 
recommendations was that local people should be involved in resource policy decision­
making processes for the valley, something that they claimed rarely happened. Their 
rationale for this was that: “We feel that the people who live in the area most directly 
affected by resource management and utilization policies need to share in their 
determination and implementation” (Slocan Valley Community Forest Management
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Project, 1976:5-1). This project articulated local involvement in integrated forest 
management policies as a “win-win” scenario for the environment and the local economy: 
“good ecology is good economics” (Slocan Valley Community Forest Management 
Project, 1976:xi). Although the document found little acceptance at official levels, this 
marked the start of activists’ calls for local involvement in decision-making regarding 
forest resources and the document helped to mobilise community members who were 
concerned about water quality and environmental protection issues in the Valley.
In 1981, the Slocan Valley Watershed Alliance (SVWA) was formed. This was a coalition 
of community activists trying to build consensus within communities around watershed 
protection, the risks posed by industrial logging to water quality and soil stability, and 
the concept of ecosystem based management planning for the Valley. The Slocan Valley 
Watershed Alliance represented 10 watershed groups42 in the Slocan Valley and its main 
goal was: “the protection of water quantity, quality and timing of flow in the watersheds of 
the Slocan Valley”; other goals were ecosystem-based planning for the valley; promoting 
value-added timber and diversifying the local economy (Slocan Valley Watershed 
Alliance, 1999). Alliance activities included organising workshops, establishing a 
community water monitoring programme, lobbying government, commissioning 
independent experts’ reports of the hydrology of the area and participation in planning 
processes. Whilst the alliance participated in major stakeholder forums that took place in 
the 1980s and 1990s, frustration grew in the 1990s as participants felt that the 
communities’ needs and aspirations were being ignored by government and industry and 
that whilst they were taking part in good faith in public consultation processes their views
42 Hills Water Users Association; Goat Mountain Water Users Association; Harris Creek Water Users; 
Village o f  Silverton; Red Mountain Residents Association; Slocan Ridge Watershed Committee; Elliott- 
Anderson-Christian-Trozzo Watershed Committee; Perry Ridge Water Users Association; Passmore 
Water Users; South Slocan Commission o f  Management.
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were not being listened to43. Lobbying by environmental groups for increased 
environmental protection in the area contributed to the creation of the Valhalla Provincial 
Park and other protected areas. However, in the 1990s, opposition to industrial forestry 
continued apace. In 1991, there were 83 arrests during a blockade to prevent logging in 
Hasty Creek, at the time the largest civil disobedience action in the province.
The SVWA worked with the Silva Forest Foundation to develop an ecosystem-based plan 
for the Valley (Silva Forest Foundation, 1996). SVWA and its constituent groups used the 
ecosystem-based plan to build support in the communities as a “win-win” option to bring 
together pro- and anti- logging residents. According to interviewees, there were some splits 
in the community between those who supported logging and those who supported full 
protection for the valley. This was bome out by a telephone poll conducted by the Angus 
Reid Group of Vancouver amongst 400 (out of a total of around 2000) randomly selected 
permanent residents in August 1996 (Angus Reid Group, 1996). The poll found that 48% 
of respondents either moderately or strongly opposed government/industry forestry plans 
in the Valley whereas 36% moderately or strongly supported them. The poll found that 
moderate or strong support for an ecosystem-based plan increased to about 75%, showing 
this to be a potentially consensus-building tool within communities. The interviewers 
sought the interviewees’ attitudes towards various key concepts of the Silva Forest 
Foundation Plan, with the majority of residents considering water protection to be the 
number one priority, with 97% of respondents citing this as important, see figure 6.5.
43 Interview with Perry Ridge Water Users member, February 1999
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Figure 6.5 Slocan Valley residents’ support for statements based on the Silva Forest 
Foundation Plan
All logging plans should be sensitive to maintaining high quality of water and 
protecting watersheds
97%
Responsible forest use means that all human uses must first respect ecological 
limits
93%
Forest restoration needs to be done to correct damage caused by logging 
practices
92%
A strong economy and a stable community depends on a healthy ecosystem 90%
A diverse local economy is desirable 90%
Adding value to wood products before they leave the valley means that we 
can cut less timber and employ the same number of people
81%
The forest of the Slocan Valley should be planned and managed by the local 
community
79%
The Slocan Valley economy is diversifying and many new businesses rely on 
maintaining the high quality of the environment
78%
Current rates of logging cannot be sustained and, if continued, will soon 
result in wood shortages and few people employed in the timber industry
12%
Source: Angus Reid Group (1996)
SVWA lobbied the Minister of Forests for the implementation of the ecosystem-based plan 
for the Valley and for negotiations to end conflict in the Valley, with little success. From 
October 1996 to May 1997 a series of correspondence between SVWA, the Silva Forest 
Foundation and the Minister indicated the gulf between the parties over the feasibility and 
application of the Silva plan, in particular regarding its impacts on tenure and property 
rights institutions in the area. In March 1997, the Minister wrote that the Silva plan would 
involve “sweeping changes to legislation, the timber tenure system, the roles of provincial 
and local governments in social, economic and environmental decision-making and the 
flow of revenue to the province.”44 He therefore proposed a working group to develop 
procedures for testing aspects of the Silva plan on a smaller scale. He proposed the 18,000 
hectare Perry Ridge area as a suitable landscape unit. The Silva Forest Foundation rejected 
the Minister’s offer to deal initially with the Perry Ridge area: “Given the geographic
44 Letter from David Zimhelt, Minister o f  Forests, to Silva Forest Foundation, March 14, 1997
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integrity of the Slocan Valley, Perry Ridge is not an appropriate model”.45 Regarding the 
SVWA proposals to negotiate resolution to land use conflicts in the area,46 the Minister of 
Forests replied in May 1997 that: “Based on the expected impacts of your conditions, I 
cannot support implementation of your proposal” 47 This set the stage for further conflict 
as the logging season opened in 1997.
In the summer of 1997, further civil disobedience took place in various hotspots in the 
Valley. This followed attempts by activists to legally challenge the issuance of cutting 
permit 130 to Slocan Forest Products in New Denver Flats. This case provides an example 
of the juridical process being limited to supporting the status quo of timber extraction and 
the dominance of the Ministry of Forests as lead agency regarding Crown forest lands. In 
July 1997, the Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled in a case brought by the 
Valhalla Wilderness Society against the Province of British Columbia and Slocan Forest 
Products. Valhalla Wilderness Society (VWS), an environmental NGO based in the 
Slocan Valley, petitioned the court to declare invalid a forest licence, cutting permit and 
road permit issued to the respondent Slocan Forest Products Ltd by the Ministry of 
Forests in the New Denver Flats area of the Slocan Valley. VWS argued that the licence 
and permits were invalid on two counts: firstly, that certain areas to which the licence 
and cutting permit applied were watersheds which had been established as community 
water "reserves" in 1973 under section 16 (at the time section 12) of the Land Act, and 
therefore “may not be ‘disposed o f  in any way including the granting of licences and
45 Letter from Susan Hammond, Director, Silva Forest Foundation, to David Zimhelt, Minister o f  Forests, 
April 14, 1997.
46 Proposal for Negotiated Settlement o f  Slocan Valley Forest Use Conflicts, SVW A, October 11, 1996.
47 Letter from David Zimhelt, Minister o f  Forests, to SVWA, May 1, 1997.
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permits to harvest timber thereon”48; and secondly that VWS, other interested groups 
and members of the public had a legitimate expectation to public input in decision­
making regarding the issuance of cutting permits as a result of previous government 
actions, notably the commitment to establish a community resource board under the 
CORE process49.
With regard to the first point, and the status of community water reserves, Justice Ray 
Paris referred to official correspondence of the Ministry of Lands and the Ministry of 
Forests when elaborating his ruling. VWS had submitted evidence in the form of 
correspondence and memoranda, starting with a letter in June 1973 from the office of 
the Chief Engineer of the Water Investigations Branch of the Department of Lands, 
Forests and Water Resources to the Minister of Lands, requesting a number of 
community watersheds on Crown Land in the area should be withdrawn from 
disposition to other uses. Subsequent memoranda submitted as evidence referred to 
“reserves” having been placed on “community watersheds”. VWS argued that this 
demonstrated that “reserves for water supply purposes were created and that it was not 
within the power of the Ministry of Forests to issue forest licences or cutting and road 
permits with respect to those areas”50. Justice Paris disagreed with this interpretation, 
and presented an analysis of the interplay between the Land Act and the Forest Act and 
other correspondence between ministries over the period, concluding that the Land Act 
did not supersede the Forest Act in such a case and that the Minister of Lands did not 
have jurisdiction over the community watersheds in question:
48 Supreme Court o f  British Columbia ruling s97-1030 paragraph [3]
49 See below for a discussion on the CORE process
50 Supreme Court o f  British Columbia ruling s97-1030 paragraph [7]
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“Section 16, therefore, clearly does not supersede the provisions of the Forest 
Act and the Ministry of Forests Act nor permit the Minister under the Land Act 
to withdraw Crown lands from disposition under the Forest Act, dispositions 
such as forest licences and cutting and road permits.”51
The second point upon which VWS sought the invalidation of cutting permits in the 
New Denver Flats area was on the grounds that it had a legitimate expectation of input 
into decision-making regarding the issuance of cutting permits and that this was denied. 
The 1992 Commissioner on Resources and Environment (CORE) Act, which created 
the CORE process, was established as a result of the government’s commitment to 
increase public input into land use plans. The CORE process specifically sought the 
establishment of regional land use planning boards, community-based participatory 
processes and a dispute resolution system (Mason, 1996)52. In the region in question, 
the West Kootenay Boundary Land Use Plan was published in March 1995 as a result of 
the CORE process, stating that future community involvement would provide a local 
say in the implementation of the land use plan; it further stated that Community 
Resource Boards would be established to ensure local input and advice on the 
implementation of the plan and that the boards would provide advice on government 
development of resource management objectives and guidelines. VWS argued that this 
created a legitimate expectation that they, other public interest groups and the public 
should have the opportunity to input and participation in any decision to permit timber 
harvesting. However, they claimed that the decision by the Ministry of Forests to grant 
a cutting permit to Slocan Forest Products in the New Denver Flats area (cutting permit 
130) without having established and consulted a Community Resource Board meant that 
their legitimate expectation to input and participation in the decision to grant the cutting 
permit had been denied.
51 Supreme Court o f British Columbia ruling s97-1030 paragraph [19].
52 For more details see the Commissioner on Resources and Environment Act, s 4.2a, b and c.
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In his ruling on this point, Justice Paris considered the “legitimate expectation”
doctrine, stating that, whilst it could create procedural rights for a party whose
substantive rights could be affected by the decision of an administrative body, it did not
in itself create such substantive rights. Paris stated that in this case there was no clear
right, for example a property right, of the petitioner that was affected by the decision.
Whilst the judge acknowledged that the members of the petitioner (VWS) were interested
parties in that their concerns were the common good, he did not find on the evidence any
substantive right of the petitioner. He further cited a Supreme Court of Canada ruling
that, where applicable, legitimate expectation can “create a right to make
representations or to be consulted. It does not fetter the decision following the
representations or consultations.”53 In applying this doctrine, he stated that there was no
legitimate expectation in this case that the petitioner had any right to input in the actual
decision-making process:
“Nothing in the legislative framework of the CORE process, the terms of the 
West Kootenay Boundary Land Use Plan or the Slocan Valley Pilot Project 
deliberations could reasonably lead to an expectation of a right to share in the 
actual decision-making process.”54
Justice Paris further stated that there was no legal requirement to establish community 
resource boards and that, even if established, such boards would have advisory and not 
mandatory functions. He also stated that the petitioner had had ample opportunity for 
the kind of input and participation foreseen by the CORE process. VWS’ petition to 
have the New Denver Flats permit invalidated was therefore rejected on both points by 
the judge.
53 Supreme Court o f  British Columbia ruling s97-1030 paragraph [31], citing Reference re Canada 
Assistance Plan (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2) 1 at p.24, in the Supreme Court o f  Canada
54 Supreme Court o f  British Columbia ruling s97-1030 paragraph [32]
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This case has relevance to a number of issues raised by the analytical framework. In the 
context of public input to forestry policy and management plans in BC, it upheld the 
predominance of the existing rights of the Ministry of Forests to allocate forests for 
timber harvesting and indicated the nature of the juridical process in upholding the 
status quo. Also, the right to input and participation by the public did not extend to the 
right to be involved in actual decision-making: the public had the right to express their 
concerns or objections, but the government had no obligation to take such concerns or 
objections into account. This is a clear example of the distinction between participation 
and empowerment discussed in Chapter Two, and contrasts with the ruling in the Haida 
case cited above. The lack of meaningful participation in decision-making was a source 
of ongoing dispute with the government for civil society groups in the Slocan Valley 
over the years. Interviewees consistently stated that the fact that the government refused 
to listen to them, despite the many years of input that had been made in good faith, was 
a source of extreme frustration in the communities and appears to have been a 
significant factor in the blockades and civil disobedience that took place in the summer 
of 1997. After the Supreme Court of BC decision outlined above, 175 people protested 
against road building at New Denver Flats, with an injunction being served against them 
three days later, with seven people being arrested. In neighbouring Perry Ridge, 150 
people protested against the start of construction of a 7.7 km logging road. An 
injunction issued at the end of July and enforced in August saw 16 people arrested. In 
September 1997, 80 people protested in Bonanza Creek, with 12 people arrested.
The main arguments put forward by community associations against logging in the 
Slocan Valley were based on the fact that the area has inherently unstable terrain and 
logging would exacerbate this, resulting in potential damage to life, limb and property,
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and that logging activities threatened the consumptive use watersheds that are the main 
source of potable and agricultural water in the valley55. These arguments were 
supported by independent and Ministry-commissioned studies of the area, although the 
reports were suppressed by the BC government when the Ministry of Forests applied to 
the BC Supreme Court for, and was granted, an injunction against road blockades on 
Crown Land in Perry Ridge in the summer of 1997. Justice Parrett, overturning his 
Supreme Court injunction in November 1997, referred to the misrepresentation and 
suppression of reports and the suppression of information about actual landslides that 
had occurred in the area, when the BC government made its application for an 
injunction:
“There is found within these expert reports a disturbing consistency. Each raises 
significant concerns and each directly or by implication calls for or recommends 
more detailed study... .in my view these reports, coupled with the incidents of 
landslides.. ..represent a significant area of concern which was almost entirely 
absent from the court application in July”.56
Subsequent to the overturning of the injunction, it further came to light that the BC 
government had also misled the court regarding the land tenure of the area in question, 
claiming it all to be Crown land when in fact some of it was private land that the 
government was in negotiation to acquire at the same time as it applied for the 
injunction against blockades on Crown land. It transpired that some of those arrested 
were actually on private property and not Crown land and that this was known by 
Ministry representatives present during the arrests.57
55 See, for example, the web sites o f  various water users associations in the valley, including the umbrella 
Slocan Valley Watershed Alliance at www.watertalk.org/svwa; the Perry Ridge Water Users Association  
at www.watertalk.org/svwa/perryridge and the Elliot Anderson Christian Trozzo Watershed Alliance at 
www.watertalk.org/svwa/eact.
56 BC Supreme Court. Justice Parrett overturning the Perry Ridge injunction, November 15, 1997, cited in 
Perry Ridge -  Slocan Valley Press Release, April 23, 1998.
57 Perry Ridge -  Slocan Valley Press Release, April 23, 1998.
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To summarise, inter-relationships between local communities and the timber regime in the 
Slocan Valley were based on distributional conflict and the unequal power of the 
bargaining parties. Although many people in the Valley’s local communities opposed 
large-scale industrial forestry, favouring either no logging or ecosystem-based 
management, the status quo timber allocations meant that calls for tenure changes were 
rejected by government. Efforts to gain adoption for the Silva plan failed because the 
government believed that the concepts would fundamentally challenge the status quo 
timber regime, decision-making and forest management, not just in the Valley but also by 
extension throughout the Province. However, in a neighbouring area with a similar history 
of community/timber regime conflicts, the outcome was different.
The communities of Harrop and Procter are situated on the south shore of the west arm of 
Kootenay Lake, which stretches from Nelson in the west (see map 6.2). Commonly 
referred to as a single settlement, Harrop-Procter consists of a strip of dwellings along the 
lake and road, and has an adult population of 460.58 At the time of the field visit, this rural 
community was not dependent on forestry industry jobs, as the forests in the vicinity 
remained unallocated in the 1990s. However, from as early as 1976, as part of a 
consultation process by the Ministry of Forests, residents were expressing concern about 
the potential problems that would be caused to their community watersheds and 
environment if proposed industrial logging were approved. In particular, there were 
concerns expressed at a proposed logging road in a sensitive area that posed at threat to 
domestic water supplies and soil stability. In 1984 there were renewed rumours about 
proposed logging activity in the Lasca Creek area and at a public meeting in Harrop the
58 According to 1996 census statistics cited in HPWPS (1999)
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community was presented with a “minimally changeable end result”.59 Over the next eight 
years, community representatives took part in meetings and made input into forest 
management strategy. In 1992, the community’s application for a Model Forest was 
rejected. By 1995, participation in the local CORE Table caused divisions within the 
community between those who adopted a “wait and see” attitude and those who were 
lobbying for a West Arm Wilderness protected area that would include both the Harrop- 
Procter area and Lasca Creek. In the end, the Kootenay Boundary Land Use Plan and 
Implementation Strategy released in 1995 as a result of the CORE process excluded key 
areas from the West Arm Wilderness Area, making them available for timber extraction.60 
The community activists were deeply frustrated that promised language on community 
forests was omitted and Community Resource Boards did not materialise. In 1995 the 
Harrop Procter Watershed Protection Society (HPWPS) was formed to “protect the quality 
of our water sources which we see as being potentially threatened by the Ministry of 
Forests announced intentions to commence commercial logging in the Harrop-Procter 
area” (HPWPS, 1996a). Committee members were split between those who favoured 
community ecosystem-based planning as espoused by the Silva Forest Foundation and 
those who favoured total protection.
A questionnaire conducted by HPWPS in 1996 amongst local residents showed a slight 
majority support (51.3%) for land use “managed by the community, using ecosystem- 
based planning with the possibility of sensitive logging”, with the remaining respondents 
split fairly evenly between current forestry practices (23.5%) and no logging or resource 
extraction at all (25.2%) (HPWPS, 1996b). From a list of 11 issues respondents had been
59 HPWPS, 1999:28 and interviews with HPWPS members
60 HPWPS, 1999:31 and interviews with HPWPS members
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asked to rate in importance,61 the number one concern was domestic water quality, 
followed by wildlife habitat protection and wilderness preservation. Very similar ratings 
were received for no industrial development in watersheds, logging according to an 
ecosystem-based plan and non-logging jobs dependent on forests. Forestry industry jobs 
were considered rather less important (see figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6 Results of rating exercise in Harrop-Procter community questionnaire, 
ranking issues by importance
Issue %
Domestic water quality 96
Wildlife habitat protection 88
Wilderness preservation 79
Scenery 75
Closure of watersheds to industrial development 71
Logging according to an ecosystem based plan 71
Non-logging jobs dependent on forests 70
Non-motorised recreation 67
Forest industry jobs 63
Hunting and trapping 40
Motorised recreation 26
Source: HPWPS (1996b)
The community activists in Harrop-Procter took painstaking steps over the next couple of 
years to identify resident concerns, raise awareness and build consensus in the community 
around community involvement in forest management and decision-making, culminating 
in the development of an ecosystem-based plan. This was put forward as an alternative to 
the industrial logging proposed by the Ministry of Forests for the Harrop-Procter area that 
had widely been deemed unacceptable within the community. In 1997, HPWPS continued 
to try to engage in dialogue with the Ministry of Forests to gain approval for the 
ecosystem-based plan and to find out about proposed work scheduled for the area before it
61 Respondents were asked to rate each issue on a scale o f  0 to 5, but not to rank them in order o f  
preference. Thus, each respondent could give each issue a 5 or a 0
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happened. Despite this, an initial stage in identifying areas for logging (terrain mapping) 
was commissioned by the Ministry of Forests for the Harrop-Procter area without 
consultation or notification, to the chagrin of HPWPS members who threatened civil 
disobedience, referring to the example of the nearby Slocan Valley: “Similar clandestine 
planning and lack of honest communication have resulted in the present volatile situation 
in the Slocan Valley watersheds. It now appears to us that the Kootenay Lake Forest
• • • • 69District is inviting this civil disobedience to spread eastward”.
At the end of 1997, the Minister of Forests announced the introduction of the Community 
Forest Pilot Program and HPWPS immediately entered into dialogue with the ministry as 
they saw this as an opportunity to gain control of their local forest resources and 
implement the ecosystem-based plan. In February 1998, HPWPS met with ministry staff 
about the pilot project but were not given an encouraging response. HPWPS were advised 
that their chances of being awarded a community pilot project were “mediocre at best” 
(HPWPS, 1997). Nevertheless, HPWPS prepared and submitted a proposal for a 
community forest pilot project based on the Silva ecosystem-based plan and incorporating 
a business plan based on producing and marketing a mix of timber and non-timber forest 
products. The timber part of the business plan was based on projected sales of eco-certified 
timber and logs, for which there was identified an international market; the creation of a 
value-added manufacturing plant producing locally designed products; the development of 
an agro-forestry business combining the harvest of wild herbs and plants from the forest 
with the growing of organic herbs; production of medicinal tinctures and balms from the 
locally harvested herbs and plants and, eventually, low-impact tourism (HPWPS, 1999). 
The business was to be run as a community co-operative.
62 correspondence from HPWPS to Ministry o f  Forests, cited in HPWPS (1997)
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Whilst the minister had explicitly stated in a press release that one of the objectives of the 
new community tenures was to allow communities to test innovative management regimes, 
there is some evidence that ministry officials were worried about aspects of this. The 
HPWPS was the only successful applicant to have submitted an eco-system-based 
management plan devised by the Silva Forest Foundation. The Silva Forest Foundation 
had for many years prior to this advocated holistic ecosystem-based planning as the 
foundation for any forest development plans but had not been given the opportunity to put 
this into practice on Crown land63. Silva plans were seen as radical and contentious by 
ministry and industry alike, given their basis of ecosystem protection first and timber 
harvesting as the lowest priority for economic development, and then only within strict 
environmental limits.64 As a result, there was strong resistance to allowing the 
implementation of this approach on Crown land as it challenged the very basis of forest 
policy that prioritised timber harvesting. In the case of HPWPS, although the group were 
informally told that they had been rated very highly by the pilot project application 
evaluating committee, being ranked first or second by all members, when the first round of 
successful applicants were announced in June 1999 HPWPS were not on the list, nor were 
they one of the two further successful applicants announced in early July 1999. During 
negotiations between HPWPS and the ministry in Victoria in June 1999, it transpired that 
the main stumbling block for the ministry was the Silva plan, and that the AAC in the Silva 
plan was about half of that proposed by the ministry itself.65 In other words, according to 
the Ministry of Forests district office, the HPWPS were not going to cut enough timber. 
Silva and the District Office agreed to differ on the AAC and, apparently after concerted
63 Interview with Silva Forest Foundation director, February, 1999.
64 Personal communication with HPWPS member, June 1999; correspondence between ministry o f  forests 
and Silva Forest Foundation and Slocan Valley Watershed Alliance, 1996.
65 Personal communication with HPWPS member, July 1999.
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behind the scenes lobbying by the evaluating committee, HPWPS was eventually offered a 
CFPA in July 1999.66
To summarise, in both the Slocan Valley and Harrop-Procter areas there had been a 
strong history of community demands to be involved in decision-making regarding 
forest management and allocation decisions. This was articulated as a desire to protect 
domestic and agricultural water supplies, to promote local economies and for aesthetic, 
recreational and environmental protection. In both areas, these objectives were 
promoted by community activists as complementary and not competing goals. This 
manifested itself in the development of community and eco-system-based management 
plans; input into public consultation processes; civil disobedience; public awareness 
raising and mobilisation; community questionnaires demonstrating majority support for 
greater community control and protection of watersheds; and the lobbying of district 
and provincial governments. Whilst there were a number of similarities between these 
two areas, the outcomes were rather different in the 1990s. In the Slocan Valley, by the 
end of the 1990s communities had made no progress in gaining greater control over 
local forest resource management and decision-making, with civil disobedience and 
litigation still featuring as tools to try to achieve these objectives. By contrast, in 
Harrop-Procter by the end of the 1990s there had been the award of a community forest 
tenure and a community co-operative was established to implement its eco-system 
based community management plan. There are a number of possible reasons for this 
disparity in outcomes. Although it is not possible to assert which were the most 
influential given the data collated, many of these reasons have strong property rights 
connotations. Firstly, even though both areas lay within the Nelson Forest Region and
66 Personal communication with HPWPS member, July 1999
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were both considered to be holistic eco-system units, the Harrop-Procter area was 
smaller, at 10,860 hectares, compared with the much larger area of the Slocan Valley, at 
342,000 hectares. The issue of scale is in itself significant for a number of reasons. A 
number of separate communities were dispersed through the Slocan Valley, containing 
around 2,000 residents, so presenting a united voice to the authorities was more 
challenging, whereas the community of Harrop-Procter, numbering around 650 
residents, was spread along one particular strip of the West Arm of the Kootenay Lake, 
and therefore was more socially cohesive. Whereas both Harrop-Procter and the Slocan 
Valley could be persuasively argued to be a single landscape unit from an ecological 
perspective (Silva Forest Foundation, 1996 and 1999), it proved difficult in practice to 
get the government to accept this in the case of the Slocan Valley, as demonstrated by 
the Ministry of Forest’s unsuccessful attempts to persuade Slocan Valley Watershed 
Alliance, Perry Ridge Water Users Association and Silva Forest Foundation to treat the 
Perry Ridge area as a discrete Landscape Unit for trialing the alternative management 
model. Linked to this, any changes in management approach in the Slocan Valley as a 
whole would affect a relatively large portion of Crown land allocated to timber 
harvesting compared to Harrop-Procter, and therefore could be expected to meet with 
greater resistance from the status quo.
Also of significance was the difference in tenure between the two areas. In the Slocan 
Valley, most of the Crown forest land had already been allocated as Tree Farm Licences 
or volume-based licences to industrial interests, in particular Slocan Forest Products. In 
Harrop-Procter, such allocations had not yet taken place, although they were slated to. 
This meant that Slocan Valley community members were fighting tenures that had 
already been awarded to third parties, whereas in Harrop-Procter people were protesting
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against the award of such licences. Thus, status quo vested interests were not as strong 
in the latter area, particularly in terms of corporate interests. In the Slocan Valley on the 
other hand, protestors were up against both the government and corporate interests, and 
thus their relative bargaining power was weaker than in Harrop-Procter. In terms of 
bargaining power, there was another factor that influenced the Harrop-Procter outcome. 
The community forest legislation specified that no Crown forest lands or available 
annual cut would be reallocated to the new tenures: applicants had to identify 
unallocated forest areas and available annual cut in order to be successful. Given the 
high degree to which Crown forest land and available annual cut were already allocated 
in forest licences, finding spare land and volume was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. The Harrop-Procter community were able to identify unallocated Crown 
forest land and available annual volumes to successfully fulfil the criteria for a 
community forest tenure.
Ideology seems to have played a role in both locations regarding the effectiveness of 
advocacy of different institutional models. Resident surveys in both locations 
consistently showed overwhelmingly that the issue of greatest concern to residents was 
the protection of their domestic use watersheds. However, there had traditionally been 
less agreement around whether the solution lay in banning logging altogether or 
whether environmentally sensitive logging should be permitted. This indicates the 
existence of differing ideologies at the local level about the most appropriate 
institutions. Interviews with key community activists in the Slocan Valley suggested 
that they favoured the no logging solution, with the development of alternative non­
timber industries being proposed by them as an alternative economic development 
model. In Harrop-Procter, HPWPS community activists successfully persuaded
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residents that an ecosystem-based plan that included timber harvesting was the best 
option for the community, even though at the time of the questionnaire more local 
people appeared to favour environmental and wildlife preservation to logging according 
to an ecosystem-based plan (see figure 6.6). In the end, the Harrop-Procter scheme 
appears to have been successful because the government had no reasonable cause to 
reject it, whereas, for a number of reasons outlined above, Slocan Valley community 
proposals were more challenging to the status quo and therefore more likely to be 
resisted.
6.5 Conclusion
British Columbia presents a classic example of the dominant global forest management 
regime, namely a mix of production and protection forests, with timber production 
being the main objective, and with the state and corporate interests controlling and 
managing the forest resource. Tenure also fell within the dominant model, with the state 
maintaining control of public forests, devolving management of timber production to 
private corporate interests through varying tenure arrangements. Protection forests were 
either under provincial or federal jurisdiction. Although they laid claim to most of the 
province as traditional territories, First Nations had been assigned lands, including 
reserves, accounting for less than 1% of the province. Local forest communities had no 
input into decision-making regarding the forest resource and traditionally had only 
limited opportunity to manage forest resources within existing tenure structures.
The 1990s saw the emergence of a new forest politics, with the language of public 
participation being adopted by government through processes such as CORE and the 
establishment of a Treaty Negotiation process with First Nations. Nevertheless, by the
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end of the decade very little had actually changed in terms of forest tenure. Increasing 
public pressure had been brought to bear on provincial governments over many years 
before limited tenure changes were introduced in 1998. The Community Forest Pilot 
Agreements and the Nisga’a Agreement, both finalised in 1998, represented the only 
ceding of control and management by the province to community groups, and in 
Clayoquot Sound a joint management agreement was reached between the province and 
First Nations. Critics of the dominant forest management regime argued that the 
government ceded control and management of the forest resource to private corporate 
interests as a matter of course. The property rights institutions in BC reflected the 
heterogeneity of bargaining parties, establishing distributional norms that proved 
resistant to change. By the end of the decade, of the nearly 59 million hectares of forest 
lands in the province, only 200,000 hectares had passed to First Nations ownership and 
just over 163,000 hectares were given community forest tenure status, totalling only 
0.61% of forest lands. Meanwhile, 94% of provincial forest lands were held under 
timber licences, primarily by large corporate interests.
The status quo power relations proved resistant to change, even once precedents had 
been set. For example, the joint management agreement in Clayoquot Sound that 
brought First Nations in as equal decision-makers, redressing the power inbalances that 
had existed between First Nations, the government (Ministry of Forests) and private 
sector (MacMillan Bloedel, later Weyerhauser), was not used as a model for other areas. 
Indeed any kind of sharing of decision-making was still resisted. For example, in the 
legal case brought by the Haida Nation discussed above, the Ministry of Forests and the 
very same company were found guilty by the court of not undertaking good faith 
consultations with the Haida, a duty they were legally bound to undertake. The
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increased calls for community involvement in forest management in the 1990s marked 
an ideological shift away from wilderness protection towards community development 
of forest resources for ecological and local economic objectives. However, opportunities 
to implement community control over forest resources were extremely limited and were 
resisted by the Ministry of Forests, for example in the Slocan Valley. Even in Harrop- 
Procter, there was initially some resistance by the ministry to accepting their ecosystem- 
based plan as a Community Forest Pilot Agreement, on the grounds that the plan 
foresaw a greatly reduced annual cut compared to that recommended for the area by the 
Ministry.
Nevertheless, despite the immense resistance to change by the dominant timber regime, by 
the end of the 1990s key events such as the election of a government with more 
sympathetic leanings towards inclusive forest policy decision-making, the strategic 
alliances between First Nations and environmental groups, and the increasing 
acceptance of alternative ideologies to the dominant production/protection paradigm 
helped to engage government and the private sector in a more inclusive forest 
management culture during the decade. Whilst the Qlayoquot Sound joint management 
agreement, the Nisga’a Treaty, the community forest pilot agreements, and First 
Nations treaty negotiations had by the end of the decade effected only minimal property 
rights changes, they helped to transform the forest policy debate, and point to societal 
value shifts that occurred during the period and the receptivity of government and 
private sector to engage in dialogue with other actors. However, at the same time the 
status quo and vested interests represented massive impediments to fundamental change 
in forest management control and decision-making. First Nations had been largely 
excluded from land use decision making and forest policy for the past century and more
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(Braun, 2002) and other forest communities had even fewer opportunities to change the 
dominant timber regime and the system of property rights that excluded them from forest 
management control and decision-making. Any further settlement of First Nations claims 
were likely to challenge existing property rights arrangements in fundamental ways. 
Although the provincial government controlled most of the province in the public interest, 
this would be subject to change as treaty negotiations unfolded in the future. The legality 
of exclusive logging rights such as Tree Farm Licences held by private corporate interests 
were likely to be subject to challenge on lands where Aboriginal title could be established.
This chapter has sought to analyse how the forest management regime in British Columbia 
has evolved, the nature of interactions between local forest communities and the dominant 
forest management regime and the property rights implications of the dominant forest 
management regime for local forest communities. The analytical factors identified as 
influencing institutional choice and change in Chapter Two appeared to be influential in 
BC and can help explain the complex processes surrounding property rights institutions for 
forest management in the province. Thus, underlying the dominant forest management 
regime, distributional conflict was evident. The relative bargaining power and ideological 
beliefs of the social actors appeared to be fluid and dynamic, and the changing nature of 
power relations and value systems appeared to influence institutional outcomes, although 
the pre-existing distributional norms and divisions of power proved resistant to radical 
change. The next chapter presents a synthesis of the findings of the two case studies in 
relation to the theoretical framework established in Chapter Two, presenting a cross-case 
analysis of the political dimensions of property rights institutions.
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Chapter Seven 
Cross case analysis
7.1 Introduction
Having presented the data for each case study in Chapters Five and Six, this chapter 
synthesises the findings from the empirical work conducted in the Solomon Islands and 
British Columbia (BC) in the context of a political conceptualisation of property rights 
developed in Chapter Two. The chapter draws on the findings of the individual cases, 
analysing them in relation to the cross-cutting themes identified in the analytical 
framework in order to present a cross-case analysis. The empirical work was conducted 
in two different locations in order to provide a comparative analysis of the political 
dimensions of property rights and forest management in two different locations. The 
individual cases presented in Chapters Five and Six addressed three related research 
questions: how has the dominant forest management regime evolved? What are the 
property rights implications of the forest management regime for communities? How do 
local forest communities and the dominant forest management regime interact?
The political dimensions of property rights incorporate considerations of power 
relations, exclusion, control and competing rights claims as discussed in section 2.4 
above (pages 48 to 57). An analysis of the political dimensions of property rights 
considers them as institutions mediating relationships between social actors regarding a 
resource, with rights holders being in a reciprocal relationship with non-rights holders, 
having power over and the ability to exclude the latter. This is in contrast to neo­
classical economic approaches to property rights that view them as neutral tools for the 
efficient allocation of resources and juridical approaches to property rights based on the
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upholding of formal laws constituted by the state. It offers a broad conceptual 
framework that sees property rights institutions not just as functional management 
options but also as incorporating complex and dynamic processes and relationships 
between social actors. In order to analyse the political dimensions of property rights and 
forest management, an analytical framework was proposed in section 2.5 above (pages 
58 to 67) based on the institutional theory literature. This literature identifies four 
factors that explain institutional choice and change, namely distributional conflict, 
bargaining power, ideology and historical path dependence. This analysis of 
institutional choice and change can explain property rights institutions as being 
contingent on dynamic processes between social actors that influence outcomes and 
acknowledges property rights institutions as fluid and subject to evolution, rather than 
simply being fixed rules. This chapter synthesises the findings from the case studies in 
relation to the four analytical factors, as a way of comparing unique empirical cases and 
to provide an explanatory framework for the political dimensions of property rights. 
Thus, the analysis is guided by the theory and reflects back on the theory. The following 
sections discuss each of these factors in relation to the empirical data from the two case 
studies.
7.2 Distributional conflict
As described in Chapter tw o, property rights institutions distribute rewards in society, 
both in terms of wealth and decision-making authority, and as such they create winners 
and losers. The establishment or modification of property rights are therefore inherently 
political processes. Distributional conflict is generated when some people perceive 
themselves to be made worse off whilst others become better off as a result of property 
rights allocations. There is only conflict when there is disagreement over the allocation
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or modification of property rights -  if all are in agreement with the outcome, conflict 
does not arise. Distributional conflict can constrain property rights choice and change 
because those who will be made worse off by the new arrangement have a vested 
interest in opposing that change. Conversely, those who would benefit from change 
have an incentive to support it (Wang, 2001; Knight, 1992), although North (1990) and 
Libecap (1989) argue that it is often much more difficult to change the status quo than 
to leave arrangements as they are. Libecap (1989) points out that politicians and 
regulatory agencies may also favour status quo institutions if, in the case of the former, 
there are political risks associated with the change or, in the case of the latter, change 
could undermine their regulatory authority over the resource.
Distributional conflict was in evidence in both the Solomon Islands and British 
Columbia case studies at a number of different levels, not only over the assignation of 
the rights to a benefit stream but also over the distribution of decision-making authority. 
In the Solomon Islands in the 1990s it was clear that, notwithstanding the continued 
importance of customary land tenure as the legally recognised property right institution 
to 87% of land in the Solomon Islands, the development of the timber industry had 
distributional consequences, with decision-making and control over certain aspects of 
forest management being allocated to state and private corporate interests, assigning 
both de jure and de facto rights and benefits. The state’s policy-making powers guided 
the overall development of the timber industry and it established the parameters within 
which timber cutting rights were negotiated. National government also established the 
regulatory framework, with the Standard Logging Agreement elaborating the minimum 
legal operational requirements of the timber industry in the forest, and raised revenues 
through fiscal measures that assigned most of the surplus income to the central treasury.
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In addition, both national and regional tiers of government had the power of veto during 
the formal procedure to assign timber cutting rights. Thus, within the legal framework, 
notwithstanding the continued existence of customary tenure, decision-making and 
management of the forest resource became dissipated, as did the rights to the benefit 
stream from forests. As a result of this dispersed distribution of decision-making, 
management and control, there was widespread feeling amongst local community 
members and some state representatives interviewed that commercial forestry 
operations were undermining customary tenure, leading to a de facto loss of control by 
local communities over forest resources, even when customary tenure still existed.
Notwithstanding the regulatory framework, informal (often illegal) processes 
exacerbated distributional inequalities, leading to conflict at various levels. Within the 
state, conflict was evident between those politicians and officials who wanted to rein in 
the worst excesses of the industry, tackle corruption and halt the flight of capital to 
overseas parent companies, and those who allegedly benefited personally by alliances 
with industry. Within communities there was conflict between those who benefited 
personally from logging deals and those who saw little or no benefit from these deals 
but bore the brunt of the environmental costs. There was also conflict between 
communities and the timber industry in those instances where payments failed to 
materialise and promises made by companies to provide infrastructure in order to obtain 
community consent for logging were not honoured. It was felt by those interviewed that 
companies harvested the valuable timber and then disappeared, often leaving 
environmental degradation and diminished resources in their wake. As a result of this 
distributional conflict, there were a number of court cases by landholders to claim 
compensation for damages by the companies.
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In British Columbia in the 1990s, there was conflict over forest resource allocation 
decisions. Commercial timber exploitation was the predominant use, with 94% of 
provincial forests being allocated to large-scale timber harvesting through a system of 
licences and concession agreements that were held by corporate interests. Local forest 
communities rarely saw a specific monetary return locally from timber extraction, other 
than through the provision of employment. Local forest communities were excluded 
from decision-making regarding local resources. Frustrations ran high in the 1990s 
because the elaborate consultation processes set in train throughout the province did not 
grant the power of veto for development schemes nor allowed local communities a say 
in timber allocation decisions. The juridical system upheld this exclusion from decision­
making, ruling that the right to participation did not equate to the right to take part in 
decisions. This example of participation without empowerment, as described in Chapter 
Two, added to the frustration felt by local communities in the locations visited and 
resulted in increased incidents of civil disobedience in the Slocan Valley.
The 1990s also saw increasing conflict over the allocation of forest resources to timber 
production rather than wilderness protection. Widespread opposition to commercial 
logging was epitomised in Clayoquot Sound, which became a province-wide symbol of 
forests as contested domains. However, although the largest, the Clayoquot protest was 
not the only one to take place in the province. Since the 1970s there had been protests in 
many areas as logging moved to previously unlogged areas of forest. The 1990s saw 
increased discourses around community control of forest resources and local 
community development plans and this also proved to be a direct challenge to state 
control and decision-making regarding the mix of development and protection that was 
appropriate at a local level. The case studies from the Nelson forest region described in
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Chapter Six are examples of the consistent level of opposition at a local level to many 
logging plans, and of how local community management plans were used as a way to 
challenge distributional norms.
Potentially the most significant distributional conflict in BC was that between First 
Nations and provincial government control of land and resources. Traditional First 
Nations territories used to cover all of the Province of British Columbia, including those 
areas under industrial timber licences. Because treaties were not signed between the 
British colonial powers and First Nations, apart from in a tiny portion of the province, 
First Nations lay claim to these territories. The provincial government had for decades 
claimed that these rights were extinguished. First Nations successfully argued the 
theoretical existence of aboriginal title (the Supreme Court decision on Delgamuukw in 
1997) but by the end of the 1990s had not yet gained legal support for aboriginal title to 
specific areas of land. Thus, although the principle of aboriginal title had been 
established, this was seen as only the first step in attempts to establish aboriginal title in 
practice. First Nations continued with legal and negotiated routes towards redressing the 
historic injustices in land policy they claimed denied them their legitimate land rights. 
Given the implications of any treaty settlements for future decision-making and 
resource use, and given that most of the province’s forests were allocated to long term 
forest tenures held by private corporate interests, the treaty negotiation processes set in 
train during the 1990s reflected fundamental distributional conflict within the province. 
The process became mired in problems by the end of the decade, as a result of 
significant differences between the negotiating parties over issues such as the amount of 
land that was available for settlement and the nature of the process itself. Thus, the 
treaty negotiation process proved to be highly politicised within the province due to its
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long term implications for many of the existing resource use allocation and management 
decisions, and rights to the benefit stream.
In conclusion, by considering distributional conflict in the empirical cases it was 
possible to analyse forests as contested domains and to see beyond the existing tenure 
arrangements to consider who perceived themselves to be the winners or losers in both 
existing property rights allocations and to understand calls for property rights change. 
Despite the different underlying tenure arrangements in each of the case studies, with 
forests in the Solomon Islands being held mainly under customary tenure and forests in 
British Columbia being held mainly under provincial control, distributional conflict was 
nevertheless evident in both locations. In particular, conflict manifested itself around the 
allocation of forests to commercial timber exploitation and the implications in terms of 
winners and losers of the distribution of rights to the benefit stream and decision­
making. The ability of individuals and groups to influence property rights changes are 
discussed in the following sections.
7.3 Bargaining power
As discussed in Chapter Two, the relative power of bargaining groups is of critical 
importance in determining which property rights institutions are established and 
whether and how they change. The fact that asymmetries in power exist between 
heterogeneous bargaining parties means that some are more able to influence outcomes 
than others. As discussed in the previous section, some of the interested groups perceive 
they will be made worse off by changes in property rights and this gives them an 
incentive to oppose those changes, whilst others support them because they perceive 
they will be made better off by the changes. As noted by North (1990) and Ensminger
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(1996), the outcomes from such bargaining rarely have anything to do with efficiency, 
being much more about the location within society of political power and the subjective 
worldviews of the bargaining parties regarding where their interests lie. Sources of 
power include financial resources, access to technology, access to and connections with 
decision-makers, including politicians and bureaucrats, access to information and 
strategic alliances with interest groups. Bargaining parties can be private claimants 
(individuals or corporations), bureaucrats and politicians, all of whose positions will be 
shaped by their expected private gains and by the actions of the others (Libecap, 1989). 
These gains include the distribution of decision-making, control and authority as well as 
economic returns. Thus, politicians may assess the political risks of institutional change 
in terms of popularity with voters whilst regulatory agencies will consider the 
implications of change for the maintenance or expansion of their regulatory authority.
In the Solomon Islands case study, an analysis of the asymmetries in power between the 
bargaining groups, and their knowledge, experience and access to financial, technical 
and information resources, helped to explain how certain actors were able to influence 
property rights outcomes. Whilst customary tenure and the formal procedures for 
allocating timber cutting rights suggested that customary landholders were equal 
partners in the timber regime and that power and control of decision-making rested with 
them as they could approve or reject timber cutting rights on their land, the reality often 
proved to be rather different. The private sector was expected to negotiate directly with 
customary landholders in order to gain access to forests and to be allocated timber 
cutting rights to customary land. The state established formal procedures to govern this 
interaction and had a role to play in mediating various stages of the formal negotiations, 
as described in Chapter Five. Landholders had the power of veto, in that all legitimate
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landholders were supposed to agree to timber production before it could go ahead. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the power of veto is often considered to be a key element in 
community control (Mitchell and Carson, 2001). However, evidence presented in 
Chapter Five suggested that in reality customary landholders did not find themselves in 
a position of equal bargaining power, either with the timber industry or amongst each 
other. In practice, interactions with the timber regime often undermined customary 
landholding and the communal nature of social relations, with coercion or fraud 
frequently being used as a means of gaining consent.
The complexity of formal procedures, lack of infrastructure and high illiteracy rates, 
meant that many people did not in fact have effective access to the decision-making 
process, and they were often disadvantaged in relationships with the state, the private 
sector and members of their own community. On the other hand, the complexity of 
customary tenure and use rights to forests often made them impenetrable to outsiders, 
resulting in the self-appointment of community leaders who undertook negotiations 
with companies, thus undermining existing decision-making structures within 
communities and leading to abuses of power. Interviewees consistently described how 
legitimate landholders were deliberately excluded from decision-making by both 
company representatives and local individuals in order to expedite the (fraudulent) 
approval of timber cutting rights, often for personal gain.
It is clear from the empirical data that financial inducements were commonly used to 
influence the decision-making process regarding the allocation of timber cutting rights. 
Local Area Councils on occasion assumed decision-making powers beyond their 
statutory obligations in order to fraudulently award timber cutting rights. Within local
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forest communities, divisions were created or deepened as a result of interactions with 
outsiders who wanted to control the forest resource. The power imbalances within 
communities were exploited, both by timber companies and by individuals within 
communities in order to expedite agreement for timber cutting rights. Because the 
formal procedure was dependent on unanimous agreement by the whole landholding 
community in order for timber cutting rights to be assigned, and given the complexity of 
customary land tenure, this could in itself be a lengthy and difficult process to negotiate. 
A new elite therefore emerged who either brokered deals on behalf of the community or 
fraudulently signed documentation in the knowledge that not all landholders agreed 
with or even knew about the development plans. In return, this new elite benefited 
financially as a result of payments from timber companies and in terms of power and 
authority within their landholding communities. High illiteracy rates, particularly 
amongst women and the elderly, lack of infrastructure and the remoteness of many rural 
communities meant that information, or the lack of it, became a potent tool used by 
those who stood to gain from the assignation of timber cutting rights.
Asymmetries in power were also evident between the state and timber companies. The 
weak nature of the state meant that it had extremely limited enforcement capacity to 
ensure that the legal framework was adhered to. Therefore, its control of forest 
management practices was minimal, as evidenced by the widespread environmental 
damage caused by logging on both state-controlled and customary land. The state also 
showed itself to be incapable of capturing full economic rents from the industry due to 
the prevalence of illegal transfer pricing activities, such as mis-declaring species and 
under-reporting export volumes. As a result, although the state-civil society links within 
Solomon Islands society were traditionally very strong, with politicians and bureaucrats
262
maintaining close ties to their homes through language, kin and tenure ties, the 
perception grew in the 1990s that the state supported the timber industry rather than 
rural communities. In addition, reports of corruption of politicians and officials by 
timber interests further undermined legitimate state authority.
Empirical evidence suggested that local forest communities were also finding ways to 
assert power, and building alliances to support them, for example by using sympathetic 
officials such as the Public Solicitor and seeking alliances with development and 
environment NGOs and other external support in order to strengthen their bargaining 
power. For example, communities were asserting their interests through instigating 
court cases in order to claim compensation or sanctions against timber companies. They 
were also developing community eco-timber, eco-tourism and other local resource 
management plans in order to reassert control over local resources. These institutions 
were based on customary land tenure and social norms, but were adapted to take 
account of new discourses such as the explicit inclusion of women in decision-making 
and environmentally sustainable activities.
It is clear in the Solomon Islands that there existed a range of heterogeneous interest 
groups, with different levels of bargaining power that affected property rights 
institutions. The fact that customary land tenure still existed and had not been replaced 
by state and/or private sector control suggests that customary land tenure in the 
Solomon Islands had inherently robust institutional characteristics and delivered 
benefits that were valued by many in society. It also suggests that an understanding of 
complex processes and relationships is required to investigate how these institutions
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were adapting and evolving within a context of rapid commercialisation of forest 
resources.
Asymmetries in power were also evident in the British Columbia case study. Here, there 
was no history of local forest community involvement in forest management or 
decision-making, other than indirectly through the legislative process. As a result, 
politicians and the Ministry of Forests were constitutionally responsible for the 
management of the forest resource in the public interest. The distributional norms for 
the past century involved tenure arrangements to facilitate the development of private 
sector timber interests. State-industry alliances were therefore traditionally strong, and 
the Ministry of Forests’ principle statutory responsibility was to manage the forest 
resource for sustained yield timber extraction. Within this framework, local forest 
communities had little power to influence property rights institutions.
However, empirical data presented in Chapter Six indicate that local forest 
communities, as in the Solomon Islands, were using property rights institutions as a way 
of asserting control over local forest resources, although with mixed results. In the 
Slocan Valley and Harrop-Procter, community activists worked over a number of years 
to build high information levels on the local forest resource, in ecological and 
community development terms. They prepared local level management plans, with the 
assistance of technical experts, to argue for community control of local resources. They 
also worked to build alliances within the communities they sought to represent, in order 
to forge greater consensus around the concept of local management. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, the two locations had different outcomes, and this in itself can be partially 
explained by the different levels of bargaining power. In the Slocan Valley, most of the 
forest had already been allocated to timber harvesting, with one company in particular
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controlling most of the licences in the area. Thus the timber industry had a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo property rights institutions in the area, making 
change more difficult. In Harrop-Procter, the community was able to take advantage of 
the fact that timber licences had not yet been awarded to companies in order to apply for 
the newly legislated community forest tenure pilot project. They successfully built 
strategic alliances with technical experts and local resource users to promote their 
interests. Although evidence suggested that forestry agencies may have found this 
application challenging to the status quo forestry policies, in particular the proposed low 
harvest rate, the high quality of the application itself, in terms of business and 
management planning, and behind the scenes lobbying by the evaluating committee 
members meant that the proposal was accepted. Thus, whilst in the Slocan Valley and 
Harrop Procter community activists had similar aims, asymmetries in their bargaining 
power in relation to other actors appeared to affect their ability to influence changes in 
property rights institutions.
BC’s First Nations had been excluded from forest policy decision-making, despite their 
longstanding claims to aboriginal rights and title. However, they too built alliances with 
each other and with sympathetic legislators, administrators and other interest groups to 
enhance their bargaining power and lobby for changing relations with provincial 
government. They used litigation and negotiation as tools to influence the process of 
institutional change that would be necessary to accommodate their claims. The 
difficulty in establishing a legal case pointed to the juridical system giving weight to the 
status quo property rights and indicated the difficulty in changing these. This was a 
highly political process within the province, given the existing distributional norms and 
the redistributive aims of First Nations. Changes would result in vested interests, both
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private sector and regulatory authority, being made worse off, both in terms of access to 
wealth and decision-making authority, so it was a highly contested process.
In BC, the heterogeneity and relative bargaining power of various actors in terms of 
their ability to influence and modify property rights institutions is clear from the 
empirical evidence. However, change was evident, despite the relative strength of the 
status quo arrangements. The introduction by the BC government in 1998 of community 
forest pilot tenures and the finalising of the Nisga’a treaty in the same year represented 
the first changes in tenure arrangements to facilitate community control of forest 
resources in the province. Nevertheless, it remained unclear whether these new 
property rights institutions would be extended in the province and by the end of the 
1990s only had limited application, being less than one percent of the province’s forest 
lands. They did set a precedent for modification and signalled shifting power relations 
between actors, although it is not clear whether such changes would continue in the 
future. Ultimately, change may depend on the levels of compensation or side payments 
that could be agreed upon with potential “losers” in order to gain support for change. 
Libecap (1989) refers to this process as the level of side payments that are required to 
achieve support for change, noting that such side payments can in themselves 
compromise and thus alter the original institutional objective.
As discussed in Chapter Two, when analysing property rights, it is important to look at 
control, management and decision-making regarding the resource and not just 
ownership; these can all be assigned to different stakeholders, bringing a level of 
complexity to understanding the dynamics of forest management, control and decision­
making, which in turn confer power on the rights holders (Christman, 1994; Bromley,
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1991). The owners are not necessarily those with the decision-making power regarding 
resource management and the rights to the benefit stream can be allocated to different 
parties -  and all of these dimensions should be part of a property rights analysis. By 
focusing on the relative bargaining power of the actors, and their ability to influence 
existing property rights institutions and institutional change, such issues can be 
addressed. The empirical work highlights the complex and dynamic interrelationships 
between heterogeneous actors and the ways in which they use financial, technical and 
information resources to influence outcomes, as well as the way in which building 
strategic alliances can strengthen their bargaining power.
In both the Solomon Islands and British Columbia, the state facilitated the involvement 
of the private sector in timber extraction, and this process in turn strengthened the 
bargaining power of corporate interests. Management of the forest for timber production 
in both locations was devolved to private corporate interests through licensing 
agreements, with the onus on the company to devise and implement forest management 
plans for the area of forest licensed to them, operating within regulations or guidelines 
established by the state. Although in the Solomon Islands communities played a 
significant role in granting timber cutting rights, in neither location did communities 
have input into decision-making regarding forest policies. Nevertheless, evidence from 
the case studies suggested that power relations were not static and that complex 
processes and inter-relationships between bargaining parties were shaping institutional 
modifications in both locations. Community-based management initiatives were being 
used as a way of resisting the dominant timber regime in both places, echoing the work 
of Reddy (2002) in Guatemala, where she found common property institutions being 
used as a political tool to assert authority over forest resources.
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7.4 Ideology
Ideology is the subjective beliefs and value systems of the actors, whether individuals or 
organisations. The explicit assumption is that ideology influences institutional choice 
and change by shaping how people view the world and how they think the world should 
be (North, 1990). Recognition of the importance of ideology can explain seemingly 
non-rational behaviour, and why wealth maximisation is not the strategy pursued by 
everyone in the real world (Ensminger, 1996). The empirical evidence from the two 
case studies indicates that ideology can be a significant factor in explaining approaches 
to forest management and associated property rights institutions.
Ideology has shaped prevailing forest management policies and associated property 
rights assumptions, as described in Chapters One and Three. The belief that large-scale 
commercial exploitation of timber, together with protected areas, is the best way to 
manage a permanent forest resource through managerial and technical skills held by 
experts has had widespread application in highly forested countries. In both the 
Solomon Islands and British Columbia, the belief that the private sector was the best 
agent to develop the timber resource has underpinned forest policy since its inception. 
Thus, although the underlying forest tenure systems in each location were very 
different, with 87% of the Solomon Islands under customary tenure and 97% of the of 
forest lands in British Columbia under provincial state control, policies had evolved in 
both locations to facilitate access to timber resources by corporate interests. However, 
despite the predominance of the ideological model of forest management for timber 
production, there was evidence that other ideological worldviews existed in both 
locations, and that these influenced the modification of property rights institutions.
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In the Solomon Islands, custom and customary land tenure continued to form the basis 
of all social institutions, despite the pressure of the timber model. The strong adherence 
by the vast majority of the population to the underlying principles of these belief 
systems can help to explain how state alienation of forest resources was resisted. It also 
helps to explain how the timber industry had to develop within an institutional 
framework of customary tenure and norms, resulting in overlapping rights where timber 
cutting rights were granted on customary land. Notwithstanding the asymmetries in 
power described in section 7.2 above, custom and customary tenure were adapting to 
new influences and this flexibility could be seen to be part of their strength (see also 
Hviding and Bayliss-Smith, 2000). Empirical evidence suggested that new ideologies 
were blending with existing ones, with eco-timber and other small-scale resource 
management projects being adopted within existing institutional frameworks, in turn 
modifying them with new concepts such as the inclusion of women in planning and 
decision-making and concepts of sustainable development. Alliances with outside 
interest groups such as environment and development NGOs and bilateral and 
multilateral donors provided financial resources and the provision of information to 
facilitate these developments..
In BC, the dominant ideology behind the allocation of forest resources for timber 
production was that the corporate sector had the necessary technical and managerial 
experience and capital to develop the province’s forest resources. As a result, most of 
the province’s forests were allocated to timber harvesting by corporate interests. Such 
allocation of timber production rights was predicated on the view that the forests were 
vast empty wildernesses to be developed by the state. This compounded the negation of
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First Nations land claims, resulting in their exclusion from forest policy development. 
There was no process by which local forest communities could influence forest policy 
or allocation decisions. Conflicting ideologies became increasingly apparent, escalating 
to a “war in the woods” between timber interest groups and wilderness protection 
groups which reached a peak in Clayoquot Sound in 1993. The widespread use of 
clearcut logging and its consequences to the visual landscape, plus the “falldown” effect 
as old-growth forests became increasingly logged out, provided opponents of the timber 
industry with plenty of ammunition to use in lobbying and advocacy efforts to stop 
clearcut logging as a harvesting method, and to protect remaining areas of old-growth 
forest. However, there was evidence that ideologies were not fixed in BC and different 
views evolved amongst social actors about how the forest should be managed. This was 
reflected in political outcomes such as the election of the NDP government in 1990 on 
an explicitly pro-environment platform, and their stated intent to transform the industry 
after many years of “pro-industry” administrations. On the part of activists, wilderness 
protection goals were modified, with community-based ecosystem management and 
planning being seen as a “win-win” opportunity to bring together development and 
protection objectives and forge consensus at a local level for institutional change.
In conclusion, there is empirical evidence to suggest that ideology can play a role in 
shaping institutional choice and calls for modification of property rights institutions, 
although further ethnographic research would reveal more detailed insights into the 
ideologies of the social actors and how they change over time and influence institutional 
outcomes. It seems apparent that an understanding of the subjective worldviews of the 
actors can help explain why forests are contested domains, with conflicting ideologies 
about how and why forests should be managed being one of the factors leading to
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disputes over forest management, access and control in both case studies. According to 
interviewees in both locations, commercial timber was valued more by government than 
ecological goods and services, such as potable water, or other potentially more locally 
lucrative income streams from forests, such as tourism and non-timber forest products. 
An analysis of the data from the empirical studies suggests that ideology does appear to 
be a factor in influencing why property rights are chosen and why changes come about, 
creating a climate conducive to change in congruence with other factors such as 
alliances with sympathetic political allies. This finding supports those of Wang (2001), 
who found changing ideologies were influential in how property rights institutions 
evolve, although neither his case nor the data collated for this thesis indicate whether 
ideology in itself would be enough to alter the prevailing distributional norms. The 
empirical data from the two case studies suggests that different social actors have 
different and evolving worldviews about how forests should be managed and that these 
different worldviews can, in conjunction with other factors, influence property rights 
institutions.
7.5 Path dependence
Historical path dependence is defined as the role that existing institutional and 
ideological structures in a society play in constraining future behaviour (Ensminger, 
1996). Thus, past legislation and prevailing distributional norms all influence and 
constrain the range of institutional options that are possible within a current political 
system (Libecap, 1989). Historical path dependence can help explain why radical 
change in property rights institutions is difficult or unlikely, although Heltberg (2002) 
argues against over-emphasising inertia as a factor in property rights institutions. North 
(1990) stresses that path dependence does not mean that the future is pre-determined by
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the past, although it can explain why small incremental changes over time are more 
likely than radical change.
In the context of analysing the empirical evidence, an historical perspective is helpful 
because it can shed light on the political significance of forests over time and how and 
why property rights institutions were adopted in the context of past forest management 
objectives and ideologies. In the Solomon Islands in the 1950s, the British 
administration attempted to introduce a forest management model that had been 
established in other tropical colonies. The model was predicated on the establishment of 
a Permanent Forest Estate that was to be managed in the long term for timber 
production and protection of environmental goods and services. As in other colonies, 
the establishment of a Permanent Forest Estate meant that large-scale alienation of 
forest resources would be required by the state in order to allocate concessions to 
private interests. There was the explicit assumption that Solomon Islanders were not 
capable of developing a timber industry and that foreign investment would be required 
to exploit the timber resource. Thus the colonial administration was operating within the 
liberal paradigm of wealth maximisation through private investments, and associated 
with that was the belief that Solomon Islanders were unable to develop and manage 
forest resources themselves. As discussed in Chapter Three, this was a common 
approach by colonial powers in the tropics (Hisham et al, 1991), and introduced the 
western liberal concept of ownership of land and natural resources as a source of wealth 
(Hurst, 1990).
Chapter Five analyses the debates around forest policy in the 1950s and 1960s and the 
ways by which the Solomon Islanders were able to resist the implementation of policies
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that would have meant they lost access to their land. As a result of their resistance, 
customary tenure remained over 87% of the land. Nevertheless, despite the failure to 
establish broad public interest in land under the control of the state, the underlying 
forest management policy of promoting the exploitation of timber by foreign private 
capital was successful, with legislation for timber licensing on customary lands being 
enacted in 1977. This established the framework for forest management practice and 
policies in the 1990s, a period that saw the rapid development of the timber resource by 
foreign-controlled private interests on customary land, and the creation of overlapping 
property rights institutions.
Path dependence is one factor that can help explain how, despite the powerful 
ideological model of forest management based on production/protection of the forest 
resource described in Chapter Three, the prevailing distributional norms in the Solomon 
Islands proved a constraint to changes in property institutions that would have seen the 
state acquire control of the forest resource. After the initial wave of land alienations that 
took place in the early 20th century and which saw around 12% of the Solomon Islands 
come under the direct jurisdiction of the colonial administration, Solomon Islanders 
were able to resist all further attempts by the colonial administrators to gain direct 
control of land and resources.
In British Columbia, the historical roots of forest policy are similar to those in the 
Solomon Islands. Under British colonial rule, the province’s forests were seen as a vast 
stock of timber to be exploited by private interests in order to maximise wealth 
generation. However, whereas in the Solomon Islands attempts to establish a Permanent 
Forest Estate failed, in British Columbia the state was successful, with most forest lands
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in the province being designated as Crown forest lands under the jurisdiction of the 
provincial government. It is clear that in British Columbia native rights were easier to 
extinguish than in the Solomon Islands, although the reasons for this were not explored 
in the empirical work. However, possible reasons related to the property rights 
framework can be posited. Attempts to establish a Permanent Forest Estate occurred 
much later in the Solomon Islands and the British approach to its colonies and colonial 
subjects had changed greatly over the previous 75 years, allowing far more local 
involvement in management, thus explaining different levels of bargaining power of the 
indigenous populations in each location. Also, there was only very limited settlement by 
non-native people in the Solomon Islands, whereas in British Columbia the settler 
population grew rapidly after the Gold Rush in 1858, helping to establish the colonial 
property rights paradigms as the norm and making it easier for the administration to 
deal with only certain sectors of the public and not others, and thus making levels of 
distributional conflict possibly easier to disregard in BC.
British Columbia thus presents a classic case of the dominant forest management 
paradigm, with the state controlling the forest resource and delegating management for 
timber harvesting rights to private corporate interests. A timber licensing system was 
established in the post-war period to facilitate private sector development of the 
resource and, despite growing awareness of the multiple values of forests since the 
1980s, the predominant goal was still the industrial production of timber. As a result, 
most of the province’s forests were slated for timber production and had been allocated 
to the private sector. This distributional norm and legislative framework established 
over decades provided one explanatory factor in why property rights changes in BC 
were so politically charged and difficult to negotiate in the 1990s.
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The empirical evidence from the two case studies indicates that path dependence can be 
an explanatory factor in why the status quo property rights institutions are difficult to 
change. Taking a historical perspective shows that within an overall context of 
institutional stability there is scope for dynamism and change at the margins (North, 
1990). Whilst the data suggest that a deterministic analysis of forest management would 
ignore factors promoting change and would fail to explain modifications that occur, 
there was evidence to suggest that the status quo was resistant to change. Each case 
study had very different tenure structures, but in both locations the underlying property
th • •rights allocations had remained largely the same since the 19 century. Historical path 
dependence can explain why changes in the Solomon Islands were resisted even when 
those changes were promoted by the prevailing forest management ideology and the 
predicted power structures favouring the timber regime. Incremental modifications did 
occur in both locations however, in some instances undermining traditional institutions 
and in others providing opportunities for evolution of alternative institutional 
arrangements.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has synthesised the findings of the two case studies by using an analytical 
framework that identifies four key factors in institutional choice and change: 
distributional conflict; bargaining power; ideology and historical path dependence. The 
strength of the analytical framework is that it offers a way of comparing data and 
providing an analysis of common themes, but without over-generalising or masking the 
individuality of each unique case (Libecap, 1989). By analysing institutional choice and 
change using these four factors, insights can be explored into the political dimensions of
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property rights, such as how and why actors are excluded from the resource, the nature 
of competing rights claims and the way power relations influence which property rights 
are chosen and whether they are modified. Thus, the framework presents a way of 
analysing complex and shifting process of institutional adjustments reflecting 
competing interests, with factors such as bargaining power, different ideological 
worldviews, and conflict over the distribution of wealth and decision-making power 
between various actors over time all influencing the evolution of property rights 
institutions.
The framework is useful because, despite the differences in tenure structures and scale 
of the case studies, the themes are still relevant. In both cases, the status quo property 
institutions have proven resistant to significant change. The pre-existing divisions of 
power and distributional norms within society in each case can explain why different 
underlying tenure structures exist. In the Solomon Islands, the state-civil society 
alliances have traditionally been strong, whilst in British Columbia state-industry 
alliances have been at the core of forest management for decades. This supports the role 
of path dependence as a factor constraining institutional change. However, the 
dominance of the forest management ideology that favours timber production by 
commercial interests has clearly influenced institutional choice and change in both 
locations, and this in turn has affected the division of power and the ways 
heterogeneous actors have gained or lost as a result. In the Solomon Islands, this 
ideology, together with the asymmetries in bargaining power between actors, has 
resulted in timber cutting rights held by corporate interests overlaying traditional 
customary rights and often undermining communal norms. In British Columbia, the 
1990s saw some shifting ideological positions and bargaining power as a new 
administration more sympathetic to reform, together with key strategic alliances within
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and between civil society groups and First Nations, resulted in the first small changes in 
tenure towards community control in the province.
It would appear from the empirical evidence that it is the combination of factors that 
creates the unique circumstances for each particular case and can explain differences in 
outcomes. The empirical cases suggest that the factors are linked and influence each 
other. Who gains access to the benefit stream and/or decision-making authority to 
forests and who is excluded affects what positions the bargaining parties adopt. 
Outcomes are determined by the relative strength of the bargaining parties to produce 
the institutions favourable to themselves. These outcomes can in turn be influenced by 
ideology and different actors’ subjective worldviews regarding what is the best 
outcome. All of these factors over time are influenced by distributional norms and the 
pre-existing divisions of power within society, and this tends to make changes to the 
status quo difficult. However, any or all of these factors over time can change and create 
an environment that favours institutional change. The focus on these key factors within 
the empirical cases highlights the dynamic and complex processes surrounding property 
rights institutions and the usefulness of the analytical framework in considering political 
dimensions of property rights within forest management. Thus, this chapter has used the 
analytical framework to explain processes and assist comparative analysis; it has also 
used the empirical evidence to investigate the usefulness of the theory to explain the 
political dimensions of property rights. The final chapter considers the overall aims of 
the thesis in the light of the theoretical and empirical work undertaken, discussing the 
contribution of the thesis, its limitations and possible future research.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion
8.1 Summary of the argument
This chapter critically reviews the thesis. It starts by summarising the key points of the 
argument and then considers the extent to which the original aims of the thesis have 
been addressed. Next, the contribution of the thesis is discussed in terms of literature 
and theoretical development. The chapter then discusses the limitations of the thesis and 
possibilities for further research.
The thesis argues that a comprehensive property rights framework that elaborates the 
political dimensions of property rights institutions can illuminate the political nature of 
distributive decisions regarding the forest resource and can be useful in identifying and 
analysing the contested nature of forest resources. The framework contributes to an 
analysis of competing rights claims and the value judgements being made about whose 
rights take precedence. In the realm of forest management, this often means that private 
sector interests take precedence over local forest community rights, facilitated by state 
policies that have historical roots in expropriation of forest resources. A broad 
conceptualisation of property rights is used, incorporating notions of power, exclusion 
and competing rights claims, that highlight the inherently political nature of property 
rights. Within this political conceptualisation of property rights, the managerial and 
technical approaches to forest management can be understood to mask the fact that 
forests are often contested domains, with forest-dependent communities’ rights and 
aspirations often at odds with the dominant production/protection regime, despite the 
growing interest in community forest management both as a concept and as a policy
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option. By recognising the dynamic processes and shifting power relations reflected in 
evolving property rights institutions and the multiple layers of rights claims to the forest 
resource, the relationships between social actors regarding forests can be explored in 
relation to the establishment and modification of property rights institutions.
Chapter Two developed the theoretical framework for the thesis. It identified a growing 
(body of literature on property rights and natural resources that addresses the theoretical 
and empirical case for different property rights regimes, presenting a range of 
institutional options for successfully managing scarce resources so that they are not 
overexploited. Traditionally, the debate has focused on the relative merits of private 
property regimes compared to state property regimes or state regulation. Much of this 
work is underpinned by concepts of collective action problems, such as presented in the 
influential Tragedy of the Commons model which states that resource users will 
inevitably overexploit resources in the absence of externally imposed regulations or 
private property regimes. A growing body of literature on common property regimes 
has clarified misconceptions about common property, contributing to an understanding 
of the circumstances in which communities can self-organise to manage common pool 
resources successfully. Much of the literature on property rights and natural resources 
has thus examined the functional nature of property rights institutions, describing an 
array of institutional options for managing resources. However, less attention has been 
paid in this literature to critical analyses of the political and dynamic characteristics of 
property rights institutions. In order to contribute to this analysis, the chapter firstly 
explored prevailing approaches to property within the western liberal paradigm. It 
discussed the congruence of economic, juridical and political systems that have led to 
the predominance of private property as a pragmatic and normative model for delivering 
wealth maximisation and individual freedom, protected by law. The chapter then
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examined the political nature of property rights institutions in terms of complex 
processes of power, exclusion, distributional conflict and competing rights claims. This 
approach challenges the assumed neutrality of neo-classical economic approaches to 
property rights in regard to efficient resource allocation and highlights the power 
relations inherent in the juridical status quo. The chapter then proposed an analytical 
framework based on institutional theory as a method of exploring the complex political 
processes that shape evolving property rights institutions. Institutional theory identifies 
key factors that act as constraints or incentives to institutional choice and change: 
distributional conflict, asymmetries in power between bargaining parties; the role of 
value systems and beliefs; and the significance of historical path dependence. By 
focusing on these factors, the framework aims to offer insights into how and why 
property rights institutions are chosen and how property rights institutions evolve over 
time, considering complex and evolving processes and relations between social actors.
Chapter Three discussed the evolution of forest management policies within the 
political conceptualisation of property rights developed in Chapter Two. The tragedy of 
the commons paradigm that presents local people as unable to sustainably manage 
common pool resources and the western liberal paradigm that property ownership and 
wealth creation go hand in hand underlie the dominant forest management approach of 
sustainable production of timber and conservation of ecological services. This in turn 
has justified the appropriation of forest resources from forest communities by the state 
and the state’s facilitation of private corporate interests in developing the timber regime. 
As a result, the majority of natural forests are controlled by the state, and private 
property rights to forests are predominant in the form of timber concessions and other 
contractual arrangements. Although there is a growing interest in community forest
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management both as a concept and as a policy option, this is usually in relation to 
forests that are outside the main production/protection sphere. However, local forest 
communities may have claim rights to production/protection forests and may have 
informal use rights that have evolved over long periods. In such cases, resources are 
contested and different rights claims can conflict with each other. If, as is mostly the 
case, local forest communities have no legally recognised, formal property rights to the 
forest resource or its benefit stream then the juridical status quo categorises them as 
being excluded from the resource and obliged to respect the rights of the rights holder. 
The chapter thus highlighted the usefulness of analysing the political dimensions of 
property rights assumptions underlying management, decision-making and control of 
the forest resource for timber extraction. By defining property rights as political 
institutions establishing reciprocal relationships between social actors in relation to 
forests, issues of power, exclusion and differing, sometimes conflicting, property rights 
claims can become the central focus of analysis, with forests being understood as 
contested domains.
In order to investigate these themes in an empirical setting, two case studies were 
selected: the Solomon Islands and British Columbia. The methodology was discussed in 
Chapter Four and the findings of the case studies were presented in Chapters Five and 
Six. The dominant forest management regime in both locations was based on timber 
extraction by the corporate sector, explicitly because of the belief that the corporate 
sector was best able to develop the forest resource. As a result, policies had been 
introduced to facilitate timber harvesting rights by the corporate sector. In the Solomon 
Islands, where community tenure was the norm and recognised by the state, the nature 
of the timber exploitation paradigm undermined existing tenure arrangements by
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creating another level of rights to forest, resources. Here the power imbalances caused 
by lack of education, poor access to information and the financial inducements offered 
all undermined existing structures. In British Columbia, where state control of the forest 
resource predominated, management of the forest resource for timber production by 
private corporate interests had been explicitly promoted by forest policies for decades. 
Local forest communities had no input into decision-making regarding forest allocation 
and use. As a result, the power relations inherent in the prevailing property rights 
structures meant that changes in tenure were difficult to negotiate. Nevertheless, in both 
case studies there were examples of forest communities who had managed to establish 
community forest management projects that included timber production, suggesting that 
in certain circumstances alternative property rights approaches to the dominant timber 
regime could be pursued.
Chapter Seven provided a cross-case analysis, using the factors identified in the 
analytical framework to explore the complex political processes behind institutional 
choice and change in the two case study locations. The four factors of distributional 
conflict, bargaining power, ideology and historical path dependence provided a basis 
upon which to compare common themes in different case study locations and 
contributed to an analysis of how property rights institutions were chosen and the 
constraints on and incentives for institutional change. The empirical cases suggest that 
the factors are linked and influence each other. For example, who gains access to the 
benefit stream and/or decision-making authority to forests and who is excluded affects 
what positions the bargaining parties adopt. Outcomes are determined by the relative 
strength of the bargaining parties to produce the institutions favourable to themselves 
and these outcomes can in turn be influenced by ideology and different actors’ 
subjective worldviews regarding what is the best outcome. All of these factors over time
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are influenced by distributional norms and the pre-existing divisions of power within 
society, and this tends to make changes to the status quo difficult. However, any or all 
of these factors over time can change and create an environment that favours 
institutional change. For example, ideological shifts were apparent in both locations, 
and the relative strength of bargaining parties changed over time, for example 
depending on the formation of strategic alliances and changes in government. The focus 
on these key factors within the empirical cases highlights the dynamic and complex 
processes surrounding property rights institutions and the usefulness of the analytical 
framework in considering political dimensions of property rights within forest 
management.
8.2 How have the aims of the thesis been addressed?
This thesis has two main aims: to investigate the implicit property rights assumptions of 
the dominant production/protection forest management regime, particularly in relation 
to forest communities’ rights and access to forest resources; and to analyse how and 
why property rights institutions are chosen and how property rights institutions evolve 
over time within the context of forests as contested domains. During the research 
process, both the theoretical and empirical work sought to address these aims. By 
exploring theoretical concepts of property rights and developing a conceptualisation of 
property that incorporates power, exclusion and competing rights claims, a clear basis 
for understanding forests as contested domains emerged, particularly those forests that 
have been allocated for timber production. This provided a context for exploring how 
forest communities have been excluded from decision-making and control of local 
forest resources, even when they have informal rights claims to those forests. However,
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the thesis’ second aim seeks to go beyond merely critiquing the property rights 
assumptions of the dominant forest management regime. It seeks to understand property 
rights institutions as complex and dynamic processes, incorporating concepts of choice 
and change. For this reason, an analytical framework was developed based on 
institutional theory, which explicitly addresses the political dimensions of property 
rights institutions and proposes four key factors that constrain and influence property 
rights choice and change.
The case study approach was considered the most appropriate method to address the aims. 
The Solomon Islands and British Columbia were selected as case studies because they 
were expected to provide especially illuminating examples: each location had a forest 
management regime dominated by timber production for export markets; and in each 
location in the 1990s there was heightened tension and conflict over management and 
control of the forest resource. They were also selected because of the very differing tenure 
systems in each location, with 87% of the Solomon Islands being held under customary 
tenure and with 97% of British Columbia’s forests being held under state control. This 
presented an opportunity for comparative analysis of the property rights themes in different 
settings, in order to, on the one hand, explore the uniqueness of each case within common 
themes and, on the other hand, explore the usefulness of the analytical framework in 
understanding processes in different settings.
The research questions that guided the data collection for each case study were developed 
because they were considered to be appropriate to the aims and were designed to ensure 
that data collated was relevant. The research questions were: how has the dominant forest 
management regime evolved? What are the property rights implications of the forest 
management regime for communities? How do local communities and the dominant
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forest management regime interact? By addressing these questions in each location, 
issues of control, access and conflict could be investigated as well as interactions 
between social actors regarding management of the forest resource. The analytical 
factors provided a useful means of comparative analysis between the case studies and 
helped explain the dynamic and complex political processes surrounding property rights 
and forest management, not only in terms of how the institutions were established but 
also how change has been constrained or mediated over time.
8.3 Contribution to knowledge
The thesis contributes to the literature on property rights and natural resources. It does 
this by addressing the political nature of property rights and decision-making authority 
regarding the allocation and use of natural resources. It raises issues of exclusion, power 
and competing rights claims and in doing so moves beyond the regimes approach 
common in the literature whereby different property rights regimes are seen as an array 
of management tools, amongst which it is possible to choose the most appropriate 
regime depending on the resource, the user group or the demands of the market. It 
challenges the neutrality of economic approaches to property rights based on resource 
allocation efficiency and amenability to the market by addressing the political nature of 
resource allocation and control. It also raises the issue of the power relations and 
resistance to change inherent in the juridical status quo, whereby formal property rights 
are protected and upheld by the law even when there are competing rights claims and 
informal norms.
Whilst there is a vast literature on forests, deforestation and forest management within a 
wide range of disciplines across natural and social sciences, much of this work is
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apolitical in nature, focusing on managerial and technical aspects. The thesis contributes 
to the emerging literature on political aspects of forest access and control by critically 
examining the political and dynamic characteristics of property rights institutions and in 
particular focusing on interactions between local forest communities and the timber 
regime. By looking at the property rights limitations of the dominant forest management 
regime in relation to forest communities’ access to and control of forest resources, the 
thesis contributes to an understanding of the political nature of forest access and control 
and the distributive issues related to forest allocation decisions. In this framework, 
overlapping, and sometimes competing, rights claims can be explicitly addressed and 
forests can be understood as contested domains.
Finally, the thesis contributes to the development of institutional theory by focusing on 
its applicability to analysing political processes. Whilst institutional theory has largely 
evolved to analyse economic trends, and why inefficient economic outcomes persist, the 
literature acknowledges the political nature of institutions to explain non-rational 
outcomes. For example, although North (1990) and Libecap (1989) both consider 
private property to be the most economically efficient form of property right, they use 
institutional theory to explain why non-optimal property rights institutions persist. 
Ostrom (1990), on the other hand, has persuasively argued that common property 
regimes can offer the most efficient institution for the management of natural resources 
in certain circumstances. Ensminger (1996), Mehta et al (1999) and Reddy (2002) 
identify a gap in the institutional literature in terms of addressing institutions and 
political processes. By identifying the key factors within institutional theory that 
influence institutional choice and change, and using those factors to analyse political 
processes rather than economic ones, this thesis makes a small contribution to the
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development of institutional theory as an analytical framework for understanding the 
processual and dynamic nature of property rights as complex political institutions.
8.4 Limitations of the thesis and further research
Whilst the previous section discussed the contribution of the thesis to knowledge, this 
section reviews its theoretical and methodological limitations and avenues for further 
research. In terms of the contribution to institutional theory, the thesis identified key 
factors within the literature that contribute to an understanding of political processes 
influencing property rights choice and change. In this context, the thesis makes a 
contribution to analysing the political factors that influence institutional choice and 
change. There is scope for further research that analyses property rights institutions as 
dynamic processes rather than static rules. The empirical work indicated that the 
analytical factors were relevant and aided analysis but no attempt was made to evaluate 
them in terms of their relative importance or how they interacted with each other.
Further research, for example more detailed ethnographic studies, could reveal insights 
into the role of ideology as a factor influencing property rights institutions in particular 
locations. Likewise, further research into the changing power of bargaining parties 
could shed further light on factors that influence institutional change. These could in 
turn have policy implications for encouraging new institutional arrangements that reflect 
more inclusive approaches to social actors. Further in-depth studies of cases at different 
scales, for example more detailed analysis of local property rights institutions for timber 
production, and how they have evolved within the context of the state forest policy, 
would be useful. This could be undertaken within an institutional theory approach and 
would help to further contribute to the development of understanding the political
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dimensions of property rights institutions. Such theoretical development in relation to 
forest management could help analyse not only the problems associated with the 
dominant forest management regime but could also contribute towards identifying 
possible solutions to achieving socially inclusive sustainable forest management.
By focusing on the political dimensions of property rights, the thesis has treated 
environmental issues as exogenous and has not included an ecological perspective. A 
political ecology approach, which views social institutions as embedded within nature, 
could reveal insights into the links between forest ecology and the types of local 
property rights institutions that evolve. The thesis does not engage specifically with 
discourses around native rights and interpretations of nature (for example as undertaken 
by Braun (2002)), although this would be relevant in a number of locations. 
Complementary research could be undertaken on native interpretations of nature and 
property rights, from both colonial and post-colonial perspectives, and this could have 
particular relevance in relation to native rights claims to land, for example in countries 
such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
The thesis recognises the existence of multiple rights claims, both formal and informal, 
but does not explore the characteristics of these different systems in any detail. Different 
theoretical and methodological approaches could reveal further insights into the political 
dimensions of property rights. Legal pluralism could reveal insights into different 
property rights claims, in particular the types of claims, their characteristics and the 
source of their authority. This would involve methodologies that were more 
ethnographic and anthropological in nature.
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In terms of the methodology used in the thesis, the decision to undertake research in two 
countries had advantages and disadvantages. The advantages in terms of breadth of data 
available for comparative analysis have already been discussed. However, there were 
disadvantages too. The broad context of the case studies, covering the historical 
development of forest management policies and interactions with local forest 
communities, inevitably meant that the richness of individual cases within the case 
studies, such as the community forest initiatives, could not be fully explored.
Theoretical insights could have been revealed by more in-depth study of these.
Similarly, by focusing on a comparative analysis of smaller-scale cases within one 
country, more detailed data could have been revealed that would contribute to 
theoretical development, for example on one or more of the analytical factors.
Although comparability of data was an explicit aim of the research process, in the event 
the differences in geographical and political scale of the two places meant that this 
objective was not always achieved. Whereas the Solomon Islands was predicted to be 
the problem in terms of data accessibility, BC proved to be problematic for different 
reasons, notably the size of the province and access to informants. In BC, the large 
distances and costs of travel meant that interviews with key informants were more 
limited. In the Solomon Islands it proved much easier to access high-ranking officials 
and politicians and sensitive data, and it was easier to travel around the country. This 
was in large part as a result of being in the Solomon Islands in two guises -  as PhD 
researcher and NGO representative. However, to compensate for the fact that the 
geographic and political scale made it more difficult to interview key informants in BC, 
the level of availability of forest policy data was much higher. This was in large part
289
due to the culture of transparency and growth in use of the world wide web as a means 
of publishing official and policy documentation.
8.5 Final reflections
The research process undertaken to develop this thesis has illuminated a particular 
epistemological approach to forests that merits closer analysis. This approach assumes 
that different social actors have different and evolving worldviews about how forests 
should be managed and that these different worldviews reflect a provisional relationship 
to forests that is based as much on subjective as on objective realities. The implications 
of such an approach fundamentally challenge other approaches to forests that are based 
on scientific certainty, whether economic or ecological. The value of such an approach 
is that it allows for the possibility of forest management to be reconstituted according to 
social actors’ evolving preferences and needs. However, it also highlights the 
importance of the implications of power relations, equitable access to decision-making 
processes and an acceptance of other ways of looking at forests. These aspects could 
have profound affects on the way forest management is conceived, both as a process 
and as an outcome.
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Appendix 1 Case study protocol
I. Aims o f the thesis
- To explore the implicit property rights assumptions of the dominant forest 
management regime, particularly in relation to forest communities’ rights and access 
to forest resources.
- To analyse how and why property rights institutions are chosen and how they 
evolve over time, within the context of forests as contested domains.
II Conceptualisation o f property
This guides the overall analysis of the empirical data.
Property rights are institutions mediating relationships between social actors. The political 
dimensions of property rights include issues of power, exclusion, access, control, 
distributional conflict.
Four analytical factors identified in the theoretical literature influence institutional choice 
and change and these will guide the analysis of empirical data:
Distributional conflict:
Disputes over allocation of benefits and decision-making because there are winners and losers. 
Heterogeneous bargaining parties:
The relative power of the bargaining parties influences their ability to obtain the outcomes 
favourable to them. Bargaining parties can use financial resources, information, strategic 
alliances, interest groups and political influence as sources of power.
Ideology
The world views of the social actors can influence the kinds of institutions they think are the 
most appropriate and this can explain non-wealth maximising behaviour, for example those 
calling for environmental protection.
Historical path dependence
What has happened in the past can influence the decisions and actions that are possible in the 
present.
I ll Research questions for empirical work
The idea of the research questions for each case study is to ensure that data collected is 
relevant to the aims of the thesis and comparable. Questions to be answered by each case 
study (level 2 questions: Yin, 1994: 70-73). These will guide the specific data to collect 
and the content of qualitative interviews.
- How has the dominant forest management regime evolved?
- What are the property rights implications of the forest management regime for 
communities?
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- How do local forest communities and the dominant forest management regime 
interact?
Background information to collate:
Economic contribution of forestry/forests to national economy; numbers employed; 
market/trade; forest ecology and geography/politics
Case study questions:
1. What is the link between forest management and tenure?
2. Who are the main stakeholders?
3. What is the nature and extent of conflict over forest management?
4. What is national or provincial forest policy, including responsibility e.g. Ministry?
5. How has forest policy evolved? What have been the forces that have influenced its 
evolution? What are the other policies that affect forest management?
6. What is the tenure system and ownership/control of forest resource? What have been 
the changes over time? include protected areas, community/indigenous control etc.
7. What is the decision-making process re. the assignation of timber cutting rights? Has 
this changed over time?
8. How extensive are community forest management projects? Try to find examples in 
each case study
IV Data sources:
Interviews
with forestry department staff; NGOs; community group representatives; 
others as relevant in situ 
Documentation 
Current:
forest policy; forest legislation; community management plans;
company documentation; other relevant primary and secondary data gathered in
situ
Documentation
Archival:
forest policy; forest legislation; royal commissions; legislative debate; 
correspondence;
other as relevant in situ
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Appendix 2 Key informants
Solomon Islands October 1995
Interviewee Location of Interview
Abraham Baenesia, Solomon Islands Development Trust Honiara
Moses Bariri, Solomon Islands Indigenous Peoples Environment Organisation Honiara
Keith Campbell, National Forestry Action Plan Co-ordinator, Ministry of Forests Honiara
Seri Hite, WWF and representative from Michi Village, Western Province Honiara
Roger James, Solomon Islands Development Trust (based on Makira) Honiara
Lawrence Kilivesi, from Viru Harbour, Western Province Honiara
Seamus Mulholland, Commercial Manager, Timber Control Unit, Ministry of Forests Honiara
Rick Hou, Governor, Central Bank of Solomon Islands Honiara
John Roughan, Solomon Islands Development Trust Honiara
Group discussion with villagers from Dorio Province, Malaita Honiara
Group discussion with women villagers Lambi Bay
Solomon Islands August-September 1996
Interviewee Location of interview
Moses Bariri, Solomon Islands Indigenous Peoples Environment Organisation Honiara
Seri Hite, WWF and Michi Village representative Gizo
Patrick Lavery, Public Solicitor Honiara
John Roughan, Solomon Islands Development Trust Honiara
Sam Patavaqara, Solomons Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) project Honiara
Willie Fetei, Isabel Sustainable Forest Management Project Buala
Peter King, Isabel Sustainable Forest Management Project Buala
Mary Morrissey, Legal Advisor, Isabel Province Buala
Savakana Smith, Timber Control Unit, Isabel Province Buala
Group discussion, provincial executive members, Isabel Province Buala
Group discussion with landholders Settlement north of Buala
British Columbia January-February 1999
Interviewee Location
Paul Mitchell-Banks, Researcher on community forestry Vancouver
Mitch Anderson, Staff Scientist, Sierra Legal Defence Fund Vancouver
Kelly Fink, Project Leader, Community Forest Pilot Project, Resource Tenures and 
Engineering Branch, Ministry of Forests
Victoria
Craig, Aboriginal Affairs Branch, Ministry of Forests Victoria
Marilyn Burgoon, Perry Ridge Water Users Association Silverton and New Denver
Colleen McCrory, Director, Valhalla Wilderness Society Silverton and New Denver
Susan Hammond, Executive Director, Silva Forest Foundation Slocan Park
Earl Sept, Timber Forester, Nelson Forest Region, Ministry of Forests Nelson
Group Discussion with Ramona Faust, Rami Rothkop, Karen Kane, Harrop Procter 
Watershed Protection Society
Nelson
